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Preface
Human fascination with transplantation has been portrayed in mythology
and legend as well as in art and literature throughout history. It has both horrified
and captivated our collective conscience and has progressed, in a relatively short
time period, from science fiction to a modern accomplishment that can improve
longevity and enhance quality of life.
The primary obstacle for transplantation is no longer scientific in nature
but is predominantly one of supply and demand and carries with it attendant
ethical concerns. Specific to this work is the question of whether a particular
method of organ procurement known as Donation After Cardiac Death procures
organs from the newly dead or from the imminently dying. Since the normative
rules that guide transplantation require that one may not be killed for or by the
removal of one’s organs determining the nature of death is of paramount
importance.
Accordingly, the primary question concerned herein is whether Donation
After Cardiac Death donors are dead at the moment of organ recovery. This work
focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of why a person is said to be dead
according to particular definitions and when specific criteria and tests are fulfilled.
Much attention is devoted to exploring why the irreversible loss of cardiorespiratory functions or the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain signifies death and whether these two criteria represent distinct types of
death or if they instantiate the same overarching definition.
The first two chapters of this work are structured as a chronology
demonstrating how our conception of death was intimately tied to the ability to
test for certain bodily functions. These notions would quickly change when
medicine developed technologies that could substitute for such functions and
when transplantation demonstrated that the brain, not the heart, was of primary
importance in determining life from death.
The third chapter focuses on clinical and theoretical arguments with the
discussion of the traditional biological definition of death and the whole brain
death criterion. Chapter four continues by challenging the biological definition of
death as internally inconsistent and advances an ontological position while
retaining the neurologic criterion. The dissertation concludes by drawing on the
arguments established throughout to ultimately claim that some Donation After
Cardiac Death Donors are not yet dead at organ procurement according to either
a traditional or an ontological definition of death.
Transplantation saves lives and is a social good that society ought to
continue to support. The aim of this dissertation is not to denigrate the field. On
the contrary, if donation is to thrive we must ensure that our definition and criteria
for death are coherent and that the methods for procurement operate
accordingly.

vi
An Examination of the Bio-Philosophical Literature on the Definition and Criteria
of Death: When is Dead Dead and Why Some Donation After Cardiac Death
Donors Are Not

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments

iv

Preface

v

Chapter One: The History of the Definition of Death
18th Century to the 20th Century

1

The Cardio-Respiratory Standard
Premature Burial
Safeguards to Prevent Premature Burial
Medical Advancement

Chapter Two: The History of Organ Transplantation
Mythology and Legend
Early Experimentation
Phenomenon of Rejection
Overview of Immune System
Modern Era of Transplantation
Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation
Logistics of Organ Transplantation
Historical Shift

Chapter Three: On the Legitimacy of Whole Brain Death
The Relationship Between Transplantation and Death
The Concept of Whole Brain Death
The Brain as the Primary Integrator of the Organism
as a Whole
Diagnosis of Whole Brain Death
Debate and Reevaluation of the Definition of Death

2
7
13
24

29
29
33
35
39
41
45
51
55

66
67
72
84
94
105

Chapter Four: Evaluating a Higher Brain Death Definition
and Criterion for Death

111

Revisiting the Problem of Whole Brain Death

114

vii
Approaches to Define Death
Competing Concepts of Death
A New Definition of Death
Conceptual and Clinical Difficulties with the Higher
Brain Death Criterion
A Hybrid Approach

Chapter Five: On the Legitimacy of Donation After Cardiac
Death
Background: Defining Donation After Cardiac Death
DCD and the Institute of Medicine
Auto-Resuscitation and Manual Resuscitation
Defining Irreversibility
Heart-dead Versus Brain-dead
Additional Procedural Concerns
Conclusion

116
124
131
145
154

160

165
171
176
192
203
211
221

Appendix A

226

Appendix B

227

Appendix C

228

Appendix D

229

Bibliography

230

1
Chapter 1
The History of the Definition(s) of Death
18th century to the 20th century
A person is dead when a physician says so. 1

This dissertation will argue that some Donation After Cardiac Death (DCD)
donors are not dead at the moment of organ recovery because the practice uses
a criterion of death that prognosticates death rather than diagnoses it. The
analysis of DCD is reserved for the final chapter, with each prior chapter
addressing a particular issue that contributes to the foundation of that claim.
This first chapter is not concerned with a conceptual exploration of what death
“is” but focuses instead on when death occurs (determination of death) and the
operational criteria used to confirm it (tests). The question of why death is said to
occur when particular criteria are met will be more fully examined in chapter three
during the discussion of cardio-respiratory death versus brain death. The
purpose here is to chronicle when and how death has been determined
beginning in the 18th century until the mid 20th century.
An interesting dynamic will be shown across these time periods. Physicians in
the 18th century were certain that death occurred when the heart and lungs
ceased but lacked adequate tests to certify it. In the 20th century the moment of
death became less clear, and for that reason the tests physicians had finally
perfected proved insufficient. This chapter lays the foundation for this dissertation

1

Kenneth V. Iserson, Death to Dust (Tuscon: Galen Press Ltd., 1994) 19.

2
by examining when an individual is said to be dead and discusses it in an
historical sequence.
To this end, this chapter will examine the history of the determination of death
from the 18th century until the mid 20th century, focusing on the ways in which
death has been diagnosed and misdiagnosed, the problem of premature burial,
and the cultural shift that occurred when the brain death criterion was introduced.
Historically, until the early 20th century, physicians’ inexperience in human
anatomy and physiology left them poorly equipped to accurately test for death.
Despite the fact that death could not be assessed with precision instruments, the
moment when an individual was considered dead was simple and absent
substantial disagreement: from the 18th through mid 20th centuries a person was
declared dead when her heart stopped beating and her lungs ceased to function;
this was also known as the cardio-respiratory standard of death. A consensus
emerged that once the heart and lungs ceased to function the person was dead,
although the empirical criteria to test for death were suspect, depending more on
folklore, wives’ tales, and superstition than on medical expertise. Because of this
critical divide between theory and practice, instances of premature burial
occurred.
Refined tests with enhanced sensitivity to measure somatic functions would
come about later, in the early part of the 20th century. However, in this time
period, while the criteria to test death were by now well established, the
understanding of when death occurred became the subject of great debate. The
fear of premature burial was replaced by the fear of suspended animation

3
regulated by life support systems. These issues culminated in the latter part of
the 20th century when the cardio- respiratory standard of death was reevaluated
and a new notion of brain death was introduced. In addition to raising new
questions as to the moment of death, the brain death criterion further
necessitated that empirical tests be revised.
It is necessary to establish a working definition of death in order to explore the
topics presented above. The nature of death, however, does not lend itself to
one discipline; it cannot be defined without considering metaphysics, sociology,
theology, and medicine. Death evades an immutable objective definition and
instead is understood in subjective terms that are culturally and historically
regulated. 2 Karen Gervais argues that a “decision of significance” must be
established before criteria to test for the definition of death can be imposed. Such
a decision identifies specific features that are necessary to differentiate a living
person from a dead person and the conceptual reasons why such features are
significant. 3
Historically, the permanent cessation of heart and lung activity constituted
death because the absence of heart and lung function quickly resulted in the
failure of the entire organism. Thus consensus emerged that cardiac and
respiratory activities were significant for distinguishing the living from the dead.
The moment of death was firmly established but the task of creating criteria to

2

Martin S. Pernick, "Back From the Grave: Recurring Controversies Over
Defining and Diagnosing Death in History," Death: Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria, ed.
Richard M. Zaner (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988):17.
3

Karen Grandstrand Gervais, Redefining Death (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1986) 2.
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test for the permanent quiescence of these functions proved more challenging
and often had devastating results.
Safeguards to prevent premature burial date back to antiquity with the
Thracians, Romans, and Greeks who each waited three days for putrefaction to
begin before burying their dead. 4 The Romans took a more extreme approach
by cutting off a finger to see if the stump bled (spilling blood would imply
circulation) in addition to calling out the person’s name three times while on the
funeral pyre. 5 It is clear that premature burial was a concern, although it did not
reach a fevered pitch until the 18th century; this was largely facilitated by the
intellectual climate.
The Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution catalyzed a radical change in
perceptions of life and death. Secularization, together with a mechanistic
interpretation of the body and new burial practices, encouraged a sense of
isolation by individualizing the person, and subsequently, personalizing their
death. 6 Belief in the afterlife was no longer as important as life in the “here and
now” due in part to the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, which focused
on the notion that life could be improved if not perfected by scientific
manipulation. Galileo compared mastering nature with mastering mathematics.
Once the patterns and rules were discovered the argument followed that
outcomes could be accurately predicted and ultimate understanding of the body

4

Iserson, Death to Dust 25.

5

Iserson, Death to Dust 25.

6

Marc Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House: Premature Burial
and the Signs of Death," Hastings Center Report 10(1980): 27.

5
could be achieved. Accordingly, there was little practical need to concern oneself
with an afterlife if this life could be manipulated by the art of medicine. 7 This
engendered the notion of a vitalist perspective where every second of life was
intrinsically valuable and immeasurable. Bruhier D’Ablaincourt wrote, “As the
Life of man is priceless, one should be instructed how to bring back to life, or
better, to a long life, those returned from the tomb. This is proper even if after a
century or more, only one life will be saved, indeed, even if only one life can be
prolonged for a few hours.” 8
The revulsion against cadaveric dissection found in the 16th and 17th centuries
dissipated as the study of human anatomy revealed the secrets of the “belle
mécanique” or the beautiful machine. 9 Man was no longer an enigma but could
be deconstructed and dutifully examined. Such knowledge revealed the unique
vulnerabilities of the human body and served to heighten an awareness of
oneself and one’s mortality as understood within the new mechanistic paradigm.
Illness could now be directly related to a particular malfunction within the
individual rather than a curse or punishment for wrongdoing; sickness was no
longer capricious but traced directly to one’s own body.
Changes in 18th century tombstone iconography also had a profound impact
on the perception on death. Effigies and plaques now adorned individual graves

7

8

9

Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 27.
Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 28.
Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 27.
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that accurately depicted the deceased individual. 10 Further, the introduction of
the coffin meant burial was no longer a communal experience where bodies were
commingled in catacombs or mausoleums, but was an isolated event, effectively
sealing off the body from any other. 11 Fear of “subterraneous seclusion” and
premature interment became endemic due to ideological changes coupled with
the uncertainty of the signs of death. 12
The anxiety of premature burial was not simply a literary device found in the
legendary works of Edgar Allen Poe, but it permeated the collective conscience
as scientists began to study the phenomena of suspended animation and
resuscitation. The horror of science gone awry illustrated in Mary Shelly’s
Frankenstein was based on the work of Giovanni Aldini, a physics professor in
Bologna who pioneered electrical cardiac resuscitation. 13 Reality was becoming
as bizarre as fiction while the line between them grew less distinct through each
new medical discovery.
Knowledge of artificial ventilation was well documented by the 1740s, though
the first recorded incident dates back to 1627 when William Harvey maintained a
decapitated rooster’s lungs and circulation with a bellows. 14 Giovanni Bianchi is
known for resuscitating a canine in 1755 using electricity; this technique was

10

Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 27.

11

Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 27.

12

John Snart, Thesaurus of Horror (London, 1817) 145.

13

Pernick, "Back From the Grave” 23.

14

Stuart Youngner, Robert Arnold, and Renie Schapiro eds. The Definition of
Death Contemporary Controversies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1999) 5.

7
applied to the first human nineteen years later. By the early 19th century electro
resuscitation and artificial respiration helped increase public fears of the inability
to distinguish life from death and with that the hysteria of premature burial gained
momentum.
It is a fact that premature burial occurred; its frequency however, is
debated. Physicians had an obvious self-interest in downplaying such instances
but a near universal distrust of the medical establishment bred communal
hysteria. Disagreement in the medical field itself over the uncertainty of the signs
of death in addition to professional insecurity further eroded the public
confidence. Further challenging physicians’ credibility were the abundance of
charlatans and quacks, which were difficult to distinguish from physicians,
especially in rural areas. 15
Despite the sensationalist headlines run by the press that “many ugly
secrets are locked up underground,” some physicians in the 18th and 19th
centuries collected data in order to better understand the phenomenon of
premature burial to prevent further occurrences as well as to bolster their status
in society. 16 Jean Bruhier-d’Ablaincourt, a Paris physician, attested that seventytwo people were mistakenly declared dead in 1742. 17 In 1842 J. de Fontenelle
reported forty-six incidences of misdiagnosis of death or actual premature
interment and just three years later Carré recorded an additional forty-six cases

15

Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace” 26.

16

Iserson, Death to Dust 32.

17

Iserson, Death to Dust 29.
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of persons who revived before burial. 18 In 1896 T.M. Montgomery oversaw the
disinterment of the Fort Randall Cemetery. He speculated from the exhumed
remains that nearly two percent of persons had been buried alive, the
unfortunate victims of suspended animation. 19
M. Josat, a 19th century French physician, studied ‘apparent death’ by
chronicling how long it took for persons who were declared dead to revive.
According to Josat’s records, thirty persons recovered in two to eight hours; fiftyeight recovered in eight to fifteen hours; forty-seven recovered in fifteen to twenty
hours; twenty persons recovered in twenty to thirty-six hours; and in seven cases
thirty-six to forty-two hours elapsed before recovery. 20 The causes of apparent
death included lack of oxygen, apoplexy, hysteria, overdose, and concussion,
with concussed victims reviving in the shortest amount of time. 21
Women may have been especially vulnerable to being misdiagnosed as
dead since they suffered bouts of fainting and fits of hysteria that accurately
feigned death. William Tebb observed the following:
Nervous and highly hysterical females, who are
subject to fainting fits are the most frequent subjects
of this kind of apparent death, in which the person
seems in a state very nearly resembling that of

18

Iserson, Death to Dust 29.

19

Iserson, Death to Dust 33.

20

Iserson, Death to Dust 29.

21

Iserson, Death to Dust 29.
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hibernating animals, such as the dormouse, bat, toad,
frog, etc. which annually become insensible,
motionless and apparently dead, on the setting in the
winter’s cold, but spontaneously revive on the
returning warmth of spring. Here by some peculiar
and as yet unknown circumstance, the vital principle
has its action suspended, but neither its existence
destroyed, nor its organs injured, so as absolutely to
prevent recovery, if not too long neglected. 22

Also, a Roman law still imposed in some areas of 18th century Europe
required physicians to perform a Caesarian section on females who died in labor.
If a female were hastily declared dead but in fact was not, the procedure would
be deadly given the lack of antiseptics and antibiotics. 23 Advances in
bacteriology would not come until the works of Pasteur and Koch in the 1860’s
and sulfa drugs and antibiotics would not revolutionize the pharmacopoeia until
the 20th century. 24
There is an extensive literature on instances of premature burial ranging
from ancient to contemporary times, although for the purpose at hand a brief

22

William Tebb and Edward Perry Vollum, Premature Burial and How it May be
Prevented with Special Reference to Trance, Catalepsy, and other forms of Suspended
Animation (London, 1896) 121.
23

24

Iserson, Death to Dust 29.

Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1997) 10-11.

10
summary of the more infamous cases will suffice. In a New York hospital in May
1864, a male patient unexpectedly died. In order to determine the cause of
death a post mortem examination was ordered. When the first incision was made
however, the ‘dead man’ lunged at the physician and grasped his throat. The
physician promptly died of apoplexy while the ‘dead man’ went on to make a full
recovery. 25
Two renowned cases occurred in 17th century Scotland. Marjorie
Elphinstone was declared dead and subsequently buried without incident. She
revived while grave robbers attempted to steal her jewelry, and according to
records, she ultimately walked home. In a similar event Margaret Halcrow
Erksime was purposely buried in a shallow grave in order for the sexton to steal
her jewels. Having difficulty in obtaining a ring from her finger, the sexton began
to cut the finger off, at which point the dead woman awoke and eventually
recovered. 26
Another case, which is frequently cited in the literature, concerns a young
girl who was visiting Edisto Island, South Carolina. During her holiday she had
fallen ill from diphtheria and was immediately entombed in a local family’s
mausoleum in order to prevent further spread of the disease. The mausoleum
was reopened after the family’s son was killed in the Civil War where the small
skeleton was found lying next to the door. 27 The following is an excerpt from a

25

Iserson, Death to Dust 28.

26

Iserson, Death to Dust 32.

11
letter published by Dr. Brouardel, the director of the Paris morgue on October 1,
1867:
I exhumed at eight p.m. Philomèle Jonetre, aged
twenty-four, buried at five p.m. in a grave six feet
deep. Several persons heard her tap distinctly
against the lid of the coffin. These blows appeared to
me to have left visible marks, but I did not hear them
myself…Ammonia and other restoratives were
applied…She was not dead, but like a candle, the
flames of which had been extinguished, though the
wick continues to glow. No definite sounds of the
heart, but the eyelids moved in my presence.

28

Perhaps the greatest risk of being buried alive occurred in times of
epidemic and civil unrest. During the outbreaks of cholera, plague, and
smallpox, the deceased were interred quickly for infection control. Both
renowned British medical periodicals, The Lancet and The British Medical
Journal (BMJ), addressed the problem of hasty interment in the late 19th century.
The Lancet exposed a rash of premature burials resultant from the cholera
outbreak. The article stressed the need to ascertain the cause and fact of death

27

Margaret M. Coffin, Death in Early America (New York: Thomas Nelson Inc.,
1976) 106.
28

Iserson, Death to Dust 33.
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before burial and compared such “inexcusable carelessness” akin to
manslaughter. 29
The BMJ recounted a case of premature burial occurring in Naples where
a female was interred while being in a state of suspended animation. The article
concluded with a description of the court’s penalty for the physician who signed
the death certificate and the Major who authorized her burial. Each was
sentenced to three months in prison for involuntary manslaughter. 30
Many of the foremost graphic accounts of premature interment can be
found in Premature Burial and How it May be Prevented. In it, William Tebb
declares that narrow escapes from premature burial numbered in the thousands
and that evidence of such occurrences could be found wherever cemeteries were
removed due to overpopulation. 31 Such evidence usually involved the following:
bodies flipped on their faces, the limbs broken or badly dislocated, the hair and
clothing torn, and the body mutilated from the torture of entombment. 32 Tebb
concluded that premature interment was vastly underreported in order to spare
the family such a horrifying image of their loved one and in order for physicians to
maintain public trust. 33

29

“Burying Cholera Patients Alive," The Lancet 2(1884): 329-330.

30

"Buried Alive," British Medical Journal 2(1877): 819.

31

Tebb,Premature Burial 64, 105.

32

Tebb, Premature Burial 105.

33

Tebb, Premature Burial 105.
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Horace Welby addressed the unthinkable in his work Mysteries of Life,
Death, and Futurity in 1861. In his chapter on trance, he concludes that
suspended animation does not always lead to the suspension of consciousness;
thus a person could be well aware that he or she is about to be buried alive. He
supports this premise from a case where a young woman who appeared to be
dead was prepared for burial. Before the coffin lid was nailed shut, however, she
was observed to perspire profusely. She soon revived and retold her terrifying
experience of being unable to speak or move but being able to clearly hear and
feel others around her. 34
Safeguards to prevent premature burial were creative though impractical
and often bordered on the macabre. One 1790 practice in England involved
laying a corpse out and painting the words “I am dead” above it in silver nitrate
on a pane of glass. The silver nitrate words remained invisible until they were
converted to a visible sulfide form by a surplus of hydrogen sulfide gas emitted
from the corpse. 35 Once the declaration was apparent, the body was buried,
though it could take some time for enough sulfide gas to accumulate.
In the early 20th century, Anthony de Chionski invented an apparatus that
functioned as a vacuum chamber in which to assure death. 36 The body was
placed within the chamber while air was incrementally removed; any movement
of the body during the process would be cause to stop and check for signs of life.

34

Horace Welby, Mysteries of Life, Death, and Futurity (London, 1861) 119.

35

Iserson, Death to Dust 25.

36

Iserson, Death to Dust 27.
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Absence of movement after undergoing the process signified that the corpse was
in fact dead.
Christian Eisnebrandt invented the prototype of the “life preserving coffin”
in 1843. 37 It was fashioned with wires and pins, which facilitated the lid to spring
open if any movement was detected within the coffin. In 1897 Count KarnicéKarnicki invented a similar “life signaling” coffin that would alert the outside world
if the inhabitant revived. 38 The coffin was hermetically sealed and equipped with
a tube that extended from the coffin to the surface approximately three and one
half inches in diameter. The tube was affixed to a spring-loaded ball, which
rested upon the body’s chest and would release at the slightest movement
causing the lid of the box to open to allow for the passage of air and light inside.
At the surface, a flag would raise while a bell would sound for thirty minutes. If
the body should revive during the night, a lantern would burn as well.
A “torpedo coffin” was suggested to deter grave robbers who frequented
new burial sites to pilfer corpses for jewels or other valuables. If disturbed, the
torpedo coffin would emit an explosive current. Less violent means to
discourage grave robbers involved sprinkling ashes over the tops of graves,
which would reveal footprints. 39 A “preserver” or “corpse cooler” was favored in
the later half of the 18th century, which allowed the body to putrefy while packed

37

Coffin, Death in Early America 106.

38

Iserson, Death to Dust 36.

39
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on ice. 40 The corpse cooler was constructed out of a wooden box with a
galvanized liner. It allowed for ice to be stocked up to the body’s shoulders while
a glass pane allowed the face to be viewed. Openings were drilled into the
cooler to facilitate a continuous ice supply while a hose aided in drainage (both
for water and bodily fluid) into a bucket beneath the cooler. 41 If a corpse cooler
was not on hand, the body could be placed in sod instead. 42
The question that arises thus far is what methods were physicians using to
determine death that caused such ghastly mistakes and required such extreme
measures be taken? Not surprisingly, there was little agreement in the 18th and
19th centuries on which methods could accurately confirm death and the dubious
process of testing could take hours. In fact, simply waiting, referred to as the
Death Watch, was standard practice before accurate tests were established. 43
Thierry pioneered the concept of waiting mortuaries, which were large
rooms with glass doors where corpses were left to decay in sanitary isolation
before burial. 44 The bodies were arranged in rows on sarcophagi, each one
tilting downward with the deceased in a supine position. 45 An additional
safeguard consisted of a ring fitted for each corpse with a string attached to it
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Prog Transplant 11.1(2001): 58.
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that was tied to a set of bells affixed above the head. Any movement of the body
would stir the bells, which in turn alerted a caretaker, staffed twenty four hours a
day, to check for signs of life. Usually however, any movement was due to the
build up of gasses within the body rather than revival.
The mortuary rooms were separated between the rich and poor, although
aside from the types of flowers adorning the bodies, no practical difference
between them existed. 46 Humane Societies to resuscitate the apparently dead
were established in the 1760’s and spread throughout England, the United
States, the West Indies, South America, and North Africa. 47
The London Society claimed to have resuscitated over two thousand
people by 1796, although what level of functionality these individuals were
returned to is not documented. 48 One of the primary problems with Humane
Societies was that a person was only declared dead after failure to resuscitate.
Ostensibly, this meant that there was no longer a ‘natural death,’ but death could
only be declared after every medical restorative had been applied. This mentality
is a precursor to the medicalization of death seen in 20th century, which will be
addressed in the following chapter.
In addition to waiting mortuaries and Humane Societies, there were many
notable methods used to determine death. Johannes Creve postulated that life
may not be absent if the application of a sulfer and zinc arc (used to create an
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electrical current) caused a contraction in an exposed muscle. Dr. Josat, whom
we have noted for his studies in apparent death, won first prize from the
Académie de France for his invention of the nipple pincher, whose
implementation certainly would rouse one from an apparent state of death. 49 In
1813, F.E. Foderé, a Paris physician, suggested drawing an incision in the left
chest to manually feel if the heart was still beating. 50
Many individuals specifically requested such tests or others like them in
order to alleviate the fear of premature interment, especially since the medical
community could not adopt a single authoritative test. In response to the need
for a definitive test for death, the French anatomist Jean-Jaques Winslow
published The Uncertainty of the Signs of Death and the Danger of Precipitate
Interments and Dissections in 1740. Winslow favored thrusting a long needle
deep under one’s toenail and was also partial to burning the apparently dead
through the application of a hot iron to the feet or crown of the head. 51
Pinpricks, blood letting, or incisions were proposed but ultimately could not
be relied on with absolute certainty. Winslow’s student, Bruhier d’Ablaincourt,
carried Winslow’s ideas further and championed the Uncertainty Thesis, that is,
that all signs of death were inconclusive save for putrefaction. 52
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Putrefaction was endorsed by Diderot’s Encyclopédie and gained rapid
acceptance by the medical and lay communities. 53 Though putrefaction did
obviate the possibility of premature burial, it was not without its drawbacks.
Since waiting for a body to putrefy did not require medical expertise, this further
decreased confidence in physicians’ abilities. Further, waiting for decomposition
posed a serious health threat to the living and was not only aesthetically
displeasing but also emotionally draining on families who had to bear witness to
the process. Waiting for the onset of putrefaction also hindered human
dissection as anatomists preferred to study the newly dead rather than
decomposed bodies. 54
The French surgeon Antoine Louis criticized the theory that putrefaction
was the only certain means to determine death. His opposition was likely due to
the fact that the practice fundamentally undermined the authority of physicians.
Louis emphasized the need for education, especially on the ‘apparent’ signs of
death, which could include syncopy (fainting) and lethargy among others. In an
effort to prove the necessity of well-trained physicians, Louis maintained that
putrefaction was not an absolute sign of death since it could be confused with
gangrene, which preyed on the living. 55 Louis recommended documenting
changes in the eye and rigor mortis as a more accurate measure of determining
death.
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The infamous Thesaurus of Horror authored by John Snart in 1817
catalogues other methods used to assure death including: placing a mirror to the
mouth; keeping the body warm for one week during the Death Watch; applying
acid, electricity, or warm water to the soles of the feet; placing tissue paper over
the nose and mouth; pumping scotch snuff up the nose; funneling ammonia
down the throat; severing the jugulars; separating the carotid arteries; cutting the
medulla in half; and piercing the heart. 56 Obviously if one was not dead before
these tests were performed, one was assuredly dead afterward.
By the mid 19th century, physicians were well acquainted with
thanatomeisis, or death feigning. 57 Such conditions that mimicked death
included alcoholic stupor, extreme cold, opiates, hemorrhage, apoplexy (stroke),
suffocation, fever, head injury, lightening strike, diabetic ketoacidosis, epilepsy,
drowning and hysterical fainting. 58 Inhalation anesthesia was introduced in 1846,
which also mimicked death.
Suspended animation was problematic, and occupied much of the
scientific debate over the signs of death. 59 Research on animals provided
perplexing data. Scientists found that the most primitive single celled organisms
could return to life after months of apparent death and worms had the stunning
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ability to revive even decades after apparent death. 60 Tebb cited other instances
of suspended animation in animals including pond trout and snails. The former
could be frozen in snow for days but regain life when brought back to body
temperature while the latter could be dry and in a state of dormancy for fifteen
years but easily revived by cold water.

61

It was not a far leap to speculate whether human beings could possess
this power of ‘hibernation’ or suspended animation similar to the states found in
animals. 62 Instances of human torpor can be found in the literature concerning
Indian fakirs. An Indian Sanskrit scholar was renowned for his ability for selfinduced trance. Skepticism and rumors of a hoax were put to rest in 1889 when
the fakir submitted to a medical exam upon entering his trance. 63 The physician
reported that the fakir’s heartbeat and pulse slowly decreased until it could no
longer be detected by auscultation or palpation. The fakir was wrapped in a
shroud and entombed in an underground cell for a period of thirty-three days. 64
He was in rigor mortis when the tomb was opened and appeared on all levels to
be dead. Three days later, however, the fakir was fully recovered. 65 This
experiment was chilling, for it forced the question of how many other individuals
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could be in a similar state of life-in-death but would not be as fortunate to be
exhumed?
Most 18th century physicians skilled in resuscitation believed that
suspended animation was the result of a true suspension of circulation and
respiration. 66 Others in the medical establishment however denied such a
condition existed. They rejected the notion that circulation and respiration had in
fact ceased and insisted that such functions were merely undetectable by
standard devices. 67 The debate was settled by the late 19th century discovery of
open chest cardiac massage, which could restart a heart that had ceased
beating. 68
Such discoveries allowed 19th century physicians to shed their previous
image and propelled them into a secure status. Instead of developing a single
test for death as Winslow attempted, physicians now relied on a variety of tests
and incorporated newer ones with traditional ones. 69 In 1819 Rene Laennec had
a serendipitous encounter with a portly young female patient, which lead to the
invention of the crude stethescope. Laennec, not wanting to place his ear to his
patient’s breast, rolled up his notebook and used it to amplify her heart sounds. 70
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It was not until 1846, however, that Eugene Bouchut used it as a diagnostic tool
to test for death. 71
The 19th century fascination with suspended animation launched the
search for more sensitive tests to determine the presence of heartbeat and
circulation while traditional tests were employed as well. Tests for respiration in
the 19th century included the following: a mirror held to the mouth; a feather
placed under the nose; submerging the body in water for the presence of
bubbles; auscultation with a stethescope; and a hygrometer held to the nose.
Tests for circulation included palpating for a pulse manually or cutting open an
artery to detect the presence of flowing blood. The following empirical signs
indicated circulatory failure: livid spots; pallid skin; depressed loins; sunken
eyeballs; relaxed sphincter; and a cold body. 72 Carl Wunderlich was the first to
measure body temperature in the 1860’s and thermometers were employed from
1868-1880 in order to ascertain a person’s “vital fire.” 73
Newer tests were more technical but also proved to be more destructive to
the body. High intensity heat lamps were used in order to view circulation
through the webbing between fingers. Microphones were used in order to clearly
detect chest sounds and x-ray fluoroscopy was used in order to determine
movement of internal organs. 74 The ophthalmoscope was used to examine
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changes in the vessels of the eyes. The presence of boxcars, or stationary
segments in the eye, indicated a lack of circulation and loss of cardiac activity. 75
The hypodermic syringe, having been recently improved, was used to inject
ammonia into the body in order to elicit an inflammatory response. Dr.’s Cloquet
and Laborde invented a technique where a new steel needle was inserted deep
into a muscle. Their theory maintained that when inserted into living muscle the
steel needle would be metabolized and rust but when inserted into a dead
muscle the needle would remain shiny and without corrosion. 76
Other tests to check for inflammatory response were widely used. These
included burning the skin over an open flame, pouring boiling water over the
body, or inserting a heated cautery deep into the flesh. Dr. A.T. Middledorpf was
known for inserting a needle directly into the heart with a flag attached to the
other end that would ceremoniously wave if the heart were still beating. 77 The
complexity of these tests elevated the status of physicians, and the fact that most
of these tests would kill those who were still living did not curtail the practice.
Arterial embalming was introduced in the 1880’s and 1890’s and
effectively squelched the fear of premature burial. 78 Embalming has been used
by various cultures throughout history, but in its original form it meant to anoint
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with balm or natural sap. 79 Embalmment was an ancient practice that involved
removing the internal organs, packing the cavities with chemical solution, and
allowing the body to dehydrate, as evidenced by the ancient Egyptian mummies.
Modern arterial embalming involves replacing a body’s fluids with
chemicals in order to disinfect the body and slow the rate of decomposition by
inhibiting the growth of microorganisms. 80 The fear of premature burial may have
been the initial impetus to accept the practice since embalming is not necessary
unless a body is transported over some distance. 81 Today, embalming is mainly
used to prepare the body for viewing, a custom mainly practiced in the United
States and Canada.
The early part of the 20th century was a somewhat awkward transition
stage for medicine, however, as it enjoyed monumental successes but still
retained some of its primitive roots in folklore and superstition with regard to
determining death. As late as 1926 a primary text, Medical Diagnosis for the
Student and Practitioner, shows this dichotomy:
Signs of Life in Persons Apparently Dead.
1. A deep red or purple color in the fingertips will become evident
gradually if a firm ligature be applied to the digit.
2. Several hours after a supposed death blood will flow persistently from
a cut artery.
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3. If a needle thrust into the tissues and left for a time becomes oxidized,
life is present.
4. If any cloud repeatedly appears upon an ice-cold mirror held close to
the mouth, there is respiration, but its absence does not alone suffice
to prove death.
5. If a powerful vesicant produces redness or blisters, there is life.
6. If a body fails to take approximately the temperature of its environment
forty-eight hours after apparent death there is life.
7. Pupillary response to light shows life, its absence does not prove
death. Several hours after death it is affected neither by atropin nor
eserin.
8. Persistence of the red in, and visibility of the arteries of the optic disc
are signs of life, as is also persistent clearness of the media, six to
eight hours after death.
9. A sensitive cornea is a sign of life, absence of the corneal reflex is not
a sign of death.
10. Presence of electric excitability in all muscles twenty-four hours after
apparent death indicates life. 82

Like their forefathers, 20th century physicians incorporated newfound
sophisticated technology with traditional diagnostic tools. Fears of premature
burial became but a historical remnant of centuries past, however, as interest in
82

Charles Lyman Greene, Medical Diagnosis and the Student Practitioner
(Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son & Co., 1926) 1302.

26
deconstructing the individual at the organ and cellular level occupied scientific
inquiry. Carl Ludwig and Sydney Ringer developed perfusion techniques
between 1910 and 1920. 83 Using these techniques, Alexis Carrel, the United
State’s first Nobel Laureate, effectively cultured cells, tissues, and organ systems
outside the human body. 84 Doubtless, this epochal discovery was cause to
reevaluate traditional notions of life and death. At this juncture we see a
fundamental change from being unable to determine death due to medical
inadequacy to being unable to determine death because of scientific
advancement.
By 1920 kidney transplantation had been attempted and had limited
success in animals. The idea that organs could be procured from one body and
function in another was previously conjured only within the realm of science
fiction. Organ transplantation continued to fascinate, although it would not reach
its zenith until 1968, with Christiaan Barnard, the ramifications of which will be
discussed at length in the following chapter.
The principles of organ transplantation led neurologists to conclude that
the brain, not the heart, was the primary seat of integrative functioning. 85
Scientists were now primed to experience a veritable renaissance within their
field. Rather than pour boiling water over the patient’s body to test for life, which
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they had done just years before, physicians now used complex devices like the
Electroencephalogram (EEG) to measure the brain directly. 86
Advances in resuscitation proved to further blur the lines between life and
death as the introduction of effective cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
proved that death—as it had been traditionally understood—was not always
irreversible. 87 Complicating conceptual matters further, by 1927 electric shock
was able to reverse ventricular fibrillation and in 1940 Carrel’s perfusion
techniques facilitated life to be maintained in the head and body of a decapitated
dog. 88
Such progress in such a short amount of time was not without its
problems. As Poe and Shelley’s prose captured the climate of the 18th century,
Huxley and Orwell’s vision of medical progress gone awry echo contemporary
concerns. 20th century society was now primed to embrace their newfound
knowledge and equally quick to dissociate itself from the atrocities of premature
burial and other follies perpetrated by medical ignorance. However, as we shall
see in the following chapter, science does not exist in a vacuum; the boundaries
imposed by ethics, the law, and social policy will necessarily dictate its course.
To briefly summarize, this chapter examined the typical methods used to
determine death from the 18th through mid 20th centuries in order to frame the
fundamental question of this dissertation: when is dead ‘dead,’ and how is the
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practice of Donation After Cardiac Death consonant with our conceptual
definition. It is clear that the cardio-respiratory standard of death had been
agreed upon, but the methods used to determine it were questionable. The
medical community’s lack of consensus lead to distrust and societal instability,
which was furthered by the discovery that sometimes the dead were not truly
dead upon burial.
Extravagant life-saving coffins were thus conceived and physicians
performed an array of grisly tests to confirm death. The fear of premature burial
abated as embalming was introduced and medicine approached a secure status.
Medical advance exploded with the discoveries of perfusion techniques, organ
transplantation, and resuscitation. However, these new technologies forced a
unique problem that was foreshadowed by the institution of Humane Societies in
the 18th century: if the dead can be resuscitated, when are they ever “really”
dead? This question opens many more; yet before they can be explored, the
history of whole organ transplantation and the attendant problems it introduced
must be examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter 2
The History of Organ Donation

A Person is dead when he has undergone irreversible changes of a type
that make it impossible for him to seek to litigate. 89

We will now explore the history of organ donation from its mythological
roots, to its parallels with science fiction literature, to its current trend as a
successful treatment for organ failure. The medical and surgical aspects of
transplantation will be discussed including the discovery of anastomosis, the
phenomenon of rejection, and the problem of immunosuppression and antirejection drugs. This chapter will also explore how advances in resuscitation and
the diagnosis of brain death impacted organ transplantation, raising questions
that would have to be answered by sound public policies. To this end, this
chapter will use a timeline approach that is built around the major developments
in transplantation in order to chronicle the progression of organ donation and
demonstrate how we have arrived full circle back to Donation After Cardiac
Death candidates, who served as the first cadaveric organ donors.

I. Mythology and Legend
The mythical Chimera hails as the ultimate expression of success within
transplantation medicine. The Chimera was a fire-breathing hybridization
composed of a lion’s head, goat’s body, and serpent’s tail. This beast, and other
chimeric gods and heroes like it, was not regarded as a monstrosity, but as a
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figure of potency derived from its various acquired parts. 90 This notion has a
longstanding tradition in myth and folklore but also plays a prominent role in the
current goals of transplantation, at least metaphorically. To attain chimerism is to
succeed in incorporating genetically foreign tissue into a host body seamlessly, in
order to make the recipient stronger. 91
Interestingly, even the complex notion of clinical organ rejection can be
traced back to classical mythology. In the Metamorphosis, Ovid recounts the
story of the hunter Actaeon who is caught spying on the Goddess Artemis while
she bathes. Artemis punishes Actaeon by transforming him into a stag but his
new identity comes to an early demise when his own dogs fail to recognize their
owner and subsequently devour him. 92 The dogs’ inability to recognize the new
composite creature as their master and their violent reaction to destroy it mirrors
the immunologic struggle that ensues whenever an organ is transplanted, as will
be discussed later in this chapter.
Transplantation surgery is a modern accomplishment but the notion of
transplantation has a rich and impressive history. Evidence of prehistoric tissue
transplantation dating back to the Bronze Age can be found in the form of a
practice known as trephination, which was used to relieve intracranial pressure
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following a head injury. 93 Trephination involved the removal of a circular piece
of bone taken from the calvarium that was later replaced after brain swelling
subsided. This crude procedure represents one of the first known orthotopic
autografts that is, when tissue is removed from an individual and is later reimplanted in its proper positioning in the same individual.
The New Testament recounts several miracles in the form of autografting.
In one account Jesus reattaches a servant’s ear that Simon Peter had sliced off
with his sword. Similarly other biblical stories recount St. Peter restoring St.
Agatha’s breasts, which had been torn off through torture, and St. Mark
reattaching a soldier’s hand that had been lost in combat. 94 But perhaps the
most pervasive myth surrounding transplantation concerns two brothers, Cosmas
and Damian, the patron saints of surgery.
According to legend, Cosmas and Damian were twins born in Arabia
during the reign of Diocletian. They studied medicine in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia
Minor and were renowned for their medical skill and piety. The Roman Empire,
however, found the brothers’ faith in and encouragement of Christianity
scandalous and made several attempts to assassinate them though they
miraculously survived each attack. 95 The Empire finally succeeded by
decapitating Cosmas and Damian in 287 C.E. 96
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The brothers had developed a strong following that persisted after their
deaths as evidenced by the many loyalists who made pilgrimages to their burial
tomb in Ciro. After visiting their tomb, Emperor Giustiniano claimed to have been
healed of his maladies and subsequently erected a basilica in their honor. 97 In
348 C.E. the deacon Justinian visited the basilica to pray for relief from his
gangrenous leg. According to legend, while Justinian slept in the basilica
Cosmas and Damian appeared to him that night and replaced his leg with the leg
from a recently deceased Moor. 98
This represents the first cadaveric allograft, that is, the transplantation of
tissue or organ from an individual who is genetically distinct but belonging to the
same species. 99 This scenario has been recreated in art and literature and is
represented most prominently by Beato Angelico’s painting, The Miracle of
Transplantation. 100 These types of myths and legends whether found in GrecoRoman mythology, Ovid’s Metamorphosis or the Bible, demonstrate how the
notion of transplantation has been firmly rooted within the collective conscience
over the millennia.
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II. Early Experimentation
It is not until the 18th century that we depart from the realm of myth and
legend for the first recorded scientific experiments with transplantation. In 1749
Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau performed the bizarre experiment of
transplanting a chicken’s spurs into its comb. 101 John Hunter, known as the
British father of Scientific Surgery, implanted teeth into this chicken’s comb as
well, and in 1767 procured teeth from a human cadaver and transplanted them
into a living patient. 102
Skin grafts were attempted in the 19th century but were generally
unsuccessful. Two milestones that helped pave the way for future success in all
types of transplantation came with the discovery of ether in 1846 by William
Morton and the use of antisepsis endorsed by Joseph Lister in 1865. 103 Of note,
ether was thought to induce a state of “artificial death” by many and was not
endorsed by the American Medical Association (AMA) until 1848. 104
Organ transplantation would remain within the realm of science fiction until
the early 20th century when life imitated art by way of animal experimentation. In
1902 Emerich Ullman reprised the role of Mary Shelly’s Dr. Frankenstein by
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transplanting a dog’s kidney into another dog’s neck. The ureter was sewn
through the neck and produced urine in front of an astonished crowd for five
days. 105 Six years later Charles C. Guthrie grafted the entire head of a dog onto
the neck of a larger dog creating a stunning similarity to the mythological
Cerberus. Though the dog(s) only survived for one day, this same experiment
would be recreated in the 1950’s by Vladimir Demikhov who grafted the upper
body of a puppy, including it’s forepaws, onto its mother’s body. This transplant
was successful for twenty-six days.
The same year Guthrie presented his two headed dog, he and his
colleague Alexis Carrel published a technique for joining blood vessels together
in a leak-proof manner, known as vascular anastomosis (literally meaning mouth
to mouth), which revolutionized the field of transplantation medicine. 106 The
primary surgical problem inhibiting organ transplantation had not been in excising
the organs for transplant, but in reattaching them into the host since the blood
vessels had to be rejoined seamlessly. 107 Carrel and Guthrie’s technique of
anastomosis was seminal for future trends in transplantation and cardiovascular
surgery by overcoming the problem of unstable sutures but it was only one part
of the complicated equation. 108
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Despite this contribution, progress in transplantation continued to yield
poor results for the next two decades. In 1936 Y.Y. Voronoy, a Russian
physician, was the first to transplant a human kidney from a cadaver donor.
However, Voronoy had virtually guaranteed failure since the donor had
committed suicide from mercury poisoning, thus Voronoy placed the recipient at
risk by using potentially tainted organs. 109 Not surprisingly, the kidney only lasted
forty-eight hours and failed to produce any urine.
Not long after Voronoy’s failed kidney allograft, an unfortunate impetus
demanded a renewed interest in skin grafting. The Second World War produced
an overwhelming number of burn victims and the scientific armamentarium was ill
equipped to treat them effectively. The War Wounds Committee of the British
Medical Council solicited a scientist, Peter Brian Medawar, to investigate what
was causing the rejection phenomenon associated with skin grafts. 110

III. Phenomenon of Rejection
Medawar realized early on that burn victims did remarkably better when
skin was transferred from other parts of their own body (autologous skin grafting)
than from skin donated from a different individual (allogeneic grafts), but he
needed to establish why. 111 In 1946 R.D Owen proved that freemartin cattle,
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which are fraternal or dizygotic twins, would permanently accept each other’s
skin if their placentas had fused during fetal development. 112 Placental fusion
would allow for cross-circulation between the calves resulting in a failure to
differentiate “self” from “non-self,” which would become the cornerstone of the
immunologic concept of tolerance. 113
Medawar was confident that the biology of rejection was an immunologic
response and in 1953 he conducted his own experiments using mice that would
prove his theory. Medawar injected immunocompetent adult spleen cells,
meaning active cells that were not attenuated, into mice while in utero. Because
the mice did not have the capability to reject the spleen cells at such an early
developmental stage, the foreign cells infiltrated the body at a systemic level and
ultimately achieved chimerism, leading to immunologic nonreactivity. 114 When
the mice reached maturity they were exposed to skin and tissue from the donor
strain but were unable to differentiate it as foreign and as such did not mount a
rejection response. 115
This experiment proved two crucial points, first, that rejection was directly
based on immunologic factors, and second that these immunologic factors could

111

W. Muller-Rucholtz, "Glances at the History of Transplantation Immunology,"
Transplantation Proceedings 31(1999): 1444.
112

Starzl, “History of Clinical Transplantation” 759.

113

Rebecca Malouin, "Surgeons' Quest for Life: The History and the Future of
Xenotransplantation," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37(1994): 419.
114

115

"Organ Transplantation," Encyclopedia of Human Biology, 476.

Thomas E. Starzl, "Transplantation Milestones Viewed with One-And TwoWay Paradigms of Tolerance," JAMA 273.11 (1995): 876.

37
be manipulated in utero. The second point, while intriguing and perhaps of
benefit for future scientists, served little practical value at the time, as injecting
human fetuses in utero with donor cells was simply implausible. The first point,
however, was directly relevant to clinical medicine as it became apparent that
transplantation would be successful only if the recipient’s immune system
accepted the new tissue or organ as quasi-self. 116 The inverse would not be
realized until 1956, that an immunocompetent graft could in fact reject the donor
in a response known as Graft-Versus-Host-Disease (GVHD). 117
Despite some key misapprehensions early on regarding immunogenetics,
it was becoming rapidly clear that a transplant would be rejected relative to
genetic disparity such that the greater the genetic difference between donor and
recipient, the quicker and more aggressive the rejection response. 118 Medawar
was further convinced of this as evidenced by other mice experiments where
their immune systems appeared to remember or immediately recognize foreign
skin when it was grafted a second time. Exposure to the same donor graft strain
produced a rejection response much quicker than the first rejection, indicating
that the immune system operated under a type of pattern recognition.
Medawar hypothesized that the body’s immune system produced an
inflammatory response in an attempt to fight off any foreign tissue or organ
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because it perceived such material as an invader. Once the invader was
recognized and the immune system developed means to fight it off, any
subsequent interaction with the same invader would produce a prompt and
effective immunologic response. This finally explained why the autologous skin
gratfs that Medawar observed faired better than allogeneic skin grafts. In skin
grafting experiments with rabbits, Medawar noted that the application of cortical
steroids or total body irradiation forestalled the rejection response and
encouraged longer survival. 119 Medawar concluded that the body would need to
be immunosuppressed through the use of drugs in order to counter or delay such
a rejection response. 120
In 1958 Jean Dausset argued that one cause of rejection was due to
incompatibility of leukocytes or white blood cells (WBCs) between donor and
recipient. 121 Dausset theorized that Human Leukocyte Antigens, (HLA), which
are essential to a normal immune system response, could be tissue-typed for
compatibility in a similar way that blood had been typed into different
classifications. 122 This revelation would ultimately lead to a complex network for
organ sharing, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
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IV. Overview of Immune System
The immune system, which is relatively mature at birth, is an elaborate
and complex mechanism that plays both offensive and defensive roles in its effort
to protect the body. 123 Pathogens in the form of bacteria or viruses produce what
are known as antigens. These antigens stimulate an immune response rallied by
B Lymphocytes, which are found in WBCs and are the body’s first defense
against invasion. 124 The B cells react to antigens by dividing and producing
antibodies, which then bind to the antigens and ideally destroy the invader. 125 A
second arsenal of T Lymphocytes or “killer cells” will be deployed if the B
Lymphocytes cannot adequately fight the invader. 126
In the case of organ transplantation, the immune system immediately
sends out B Lymphocytes to determine if the organ is “self” or “non-self.” That is,
these cells must decide if the organ belongs or if it is an invader and they do this
by evaluating the antigens that come part and parcel with the donated organ. 127
The B Lymphocytes can be regarded as the sentries that will only summon the T
Lymphocytes if they cannot perform adequate damage control. Once called
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upon however, T Lymphocytes are virtually unremitting and will ultimately be the
responsible party for destroying the donor organ. 128
Rejection can be broken down into three categories: Hyperacute
Rejection, Acute Rejection, and Chronic Rejection. Hyperacute Rejection,
though rare today, is a swift process that occurs almost immediately after
implantation of allogeneic material. 129 This type of reaction is induced when the
recipient’s immune system already has formed antibodies to the antigens that are
introduced by the donor organ; thus destruction of the organ is certain. 130 Acute
Rejection typically presents within three months of grafting but can often be
effectively reversed through the use of cortical steroids. 131 Chronic Rejection, as
the name implies, is a late response that is not fully understood but appears to be
the unpredictable result of the immune system overreacting to the donor antigens
it seemingly tolerated until that point. 132
Once Medawar established the basis for rejection, attempts at
transplantation surgery burgeoned in the 1950s and 1960s although success was
not routine and many lives would be lost in these early years. The first “modern”
transplant is credited to Joseph Murray and his colleagues who performed the
first renal transplantation in monozygotic (identical) twins at the Peter Bent
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Bringham Hospital on December 23, 1954. 133 Using Medawar’s principles, it was
clear that a transplant between identical twins would eliminate the possibility of
an immunologic rejection response.

V. Modern Era of Transplantation
Interestingly, the main concern over Murray’s historic procedure was not
surgical but focused instead on an ethical question: ought a physician jeopardize
a healthy person by removing an organ for the sake of another life? This
question had never before presented and as such there were no guidelines,
policies, or committees from which to seek recourse. Murray and his colleagues
were subjected to harsh criticism for merely considering the operation, but
ultimately the principles of autonomy and beneficence prevailed. 134 As organ
transplantation became mainstream in practice, norms regarding donation and
consent would be concomitantly developed. 135
Murray followed his successful renal isograft that is, a transplant
between two genetically identical individuals, with a renal transplant between
dizygotic twins on January 24, 1959. 136 The transplantation boom had now
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officially swept the USA and parts of Europe. René Kuss in Paris led his team in
a number of successful renal transplants between 1959 and 1962 using dizygotic
donors, cousins, and in two cases non-relatives. Kuss’ success was due to the
use of immunosuppression, but these cases turned out to be the exception rather
than the rule.
Anti-rejection drugs were a necessity if transplantation medicine was to
move forward since most patients in need of a transplant did not have an extra
copy of their genetic material found in the form of a twin sibling. Further, vital
organs that do not come in pairs such as the heart or liver could not be acquired
through living donation for obvious reasons. Thus drugs that could depress the
body’s immune response to foreign tissue would widen the donor pool and in the
process utilize another source—the cadaveric organ donor. 137
Since Medawar had limited success in the early 1950s using Total Body
Irradiation and adrenal cortical steroids to prolong skin grafts in rabbits, these
chemotherapeutic agents were administered to human renal recipients in
1959. 138 However, since Total Body Irradiation rendered the patient
immunologically defenseless, any benefit of prolonging the renal transplant was
subverted by the risk of serious infection. 139 As transplantation immunology
progressed, three distinct immunologic patterns became clear. First, that
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rejection could be due to a Host-Versus-Graft (HVG) reaction, second that
rejection could also result from the graft rejecting the host (GVHD), and third that
tolerance/chimerism could be induced. 140
Thomas Starzl documented the vivid immunological chimeric change that
occurs in an organ recipient by conducting skin tests. Using tuberculin, mumps,
and candida, Starzl tested both the recipients and donors preoperatively. He
found that when skin reactions were positive in the donor but negative in the
recipient 77% of the recipients would exhibit a positive reaction post transplant.
In essence, the recipients were conferred with the donor’s immunity, which led to
chimerism and kidney acceptance. When the recipients failed to convert from
negative to positive reactions, the graft failed as a result of rejection.
In the early 1960s alternatives to Total Body Irradiation were introduced.
Starzl discovered that cortisone and prednisone could actually reverse an acute
rejection response, but the use of high dose steroids alone produced tremendous
adverse side effects including depression that could lead to psychosis, as well as
catatonia, inability to eat, memory impairment, and facial swelling. 141 Roy Calne
endorsed another type of chemical suppression known as azathioprine. 142 On
April 5, 1962, Murray successfully transplanted an unrelated kidney that
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functioned for a staggering 17 months using azathioprine. 143 Azathioprine was
originally used in oncology because it killed replicating cancer cells. It was
applied to transplant patients under the assumption that it would kill the
lymphocytes that cause rejection but it too produced negative side effects. 144
Beginning in 1962 Starzl was the first to incorporate steroids with
azathioprine creating a type of drug “cocktail.” This cocktail increased survival
but at the cost of a diminished quality of life as it caused bone marrow toxicity,
anemia, and growth retardation. 145 In 1963 at the University of Colorado Starzl
performed the first human liver transplant, but its failure echoed the sentiment of
much of the transplantation community at the time—transplantation had reached
a plateau. 146 Four years later, however, Starzl would reinvigorate the field by
producing long-term liver allograft survivors. 147 1967 was also the year
Christiaan Barnard performed the first human heart transplant using a Donation
After Cardiac Death organ donor in Cape Town South Africa. Though the patient,
Louis Washkansky, only lived for eighteen days, this procedure resonated not
merely with the transplantation community but with the world. Barnard claimed to
have waited three minutes before excising the heart from the donor, who had
been in a motor vehicle accident, though an undercurrent of skepticism was
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palpable and questions of when a person is dead began in earnest. At this point
two major medical themes and one conceptual theme converged almost
simultaneously, which would challenge the traditional notion of death: the use of
Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), the discovery of cyclosporine, and the
notion of brain death.

VI. CPR
The reanimation of the apparently dead has been attempted in a variety of
ways since ancient times but has not been a medical reality until quite recently.
The Ancients identified the body’s warmth with its vital fire, such that when the
body went cold the vital fire had been extinguished and the person was
considered dead. 148 The logical response to this was to apply heat or warmth to
a body in order to revitalize it. The methods of choice called for warm ashes,
burning excreta, or hot water to be applied to the victim’s abdomen either alone
or in combination with auditory stimulation such as yelling or crying. 149 Physical
abuse consisting of slapping or whipping was also a common practice. 150 Of all
of these, physical stimulation would ultimately play a fundamental role in modern
day resuscitation.

148

Howard P. Liss, "A History of Resuscitation," Annals of Emergency Medicine
15.1(1986): 65.
149

150

Liss, "A History of Resuscitation" 65.

Kelly Tucker, Michael A. Savitt, Ahamed Idris, and Rita F. Redberg,
"Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Historical Perspectives, Physiology, and Future
Directions," Archives of Internal Medicine 154(1994): 2141.

46
The 19th century saw its share of creative resuscitative methods including
stretching the rectum, stretching the tongue, and a process known as fumigation,
which called for air to be blown into the patient’s mouth and air and tobacco to be
forced into the rectum. 151 Whipping the victim took on a more violent and likely
destructive aspect when stinging nettles were added in hopes of “waking” those
in a “deep sleep.”
Though the bellows was popular for artificial ventilation throughout history
it became clear by the mid 19th century that a patient could be severely injured or
even die from over distension given the bellows’ imprecise nature. In response
to this problem, Marshall Hall developed a manual method of ventilation where
the patient’s body was flipped from lying on the stomach, which aided expiration
to lying on the side, which aided inspiration sixteen times per minute. 152 Tilting
the head back when attempting to resuscitate a patient had apparently been
instinctively done for many years but it was Hall who proved why it was a
scientific necessity: the patient’s tongue and larynx generally fall back and
obstruct breathing thereby obviating any chance of successful resuscitation. 153 In
1858 Henry Silvester made modifications to Hall’s method, which was used well
into the first half of the 20th century. Silvester’s method required the patient to be
placed in the supine position where the arms would be raised over the head in
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order to expand the rib cage causing inhalation and then lowered onto the chest
with pressure to cause exhalation. 154
In the mid 20th century, the Consolidated Edison Company (Con-Edison)
funded a research project to determine how their employees—electrical
linesman—could be effectively treated in the event of electrical injury. 155 To this
end W.B. Kouwenhoven was enlisted to study ventricular fibrillation at Johns
Hopkins where he and his colleagues made a series of crucial rediscoveries that
would lay the foundation for modern resuscitation, which would further be
championed by Peter Safar. Kouwenhoven determined that an electrical shock
given to a dog in ventricular fibrillation could reset the heart’s electrical pattern. 156
This theory, that a fibrillating heart could actually stop fibrillating with the
application of another electrical shock, led to the introduction of the first cardiac
defibrillator in Johns Hopkins in 1957. 157
Kouwenhoven and Safar collaborated during the same year to discover a
way for lay individuals to aid a victim while awaiting a defibrillator. The following
year Kouwenhoven and his research fellow established the efficacy of closed
chest cardiac massage, that is, that chest compressions performed on fibrillating
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canines could restore spontaneous circulation. 158 Safar went on to provide the
complex fundamentals behind CPR, which are beyond the scope of this paper,
but the repercussions of which bear directly on the topic at hand.
In 1958 modern and effective CPR had arrived along with its attendant
consequences. Patients who would have otherwise died were now being
resuscitated and often required follow-up support in the form of intensive care or
rehabilitation, a new concept that required an innovative response. Such patients
could not be cared for on general wards; thus in 1958 Safar opened the first
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) in the United States at Baltimore. 159 One of the
problems, however, was that it was nearly impossible to predict which patients
would fully recover after resuscitation and which patients would suffer permanent
brain damage of varying degree. ICUs subsequently became in danger of being
overwhelmed with moribund patients who were being maintained with new
technologies that could promote vital signs or specific organ systems but offered
little to no hope of recovery of the individual as a whole. Resuscitation further
had serious implications on the traditional notion of death, which was identified
by the absence of cardio-respiratory activity. Since machines could now support
ventilation and support hemodynamic systems, it became difficult to establish
where life ended and death began.
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The introduction of mechanical ventilation in the late 1950s furthered the
ambiguity between life and death in the presence of technology. The iron lung
was the prototype of tank respirators. The term “respirator” has infiltrated the lay
public’s vocabulary and is frequently used interchangeably with “mechanical
ventilator.” In fact, respiration and mechanical ventilation are not the same
activity and ought not be confused. Respiration is a process that occurs at the
cellular level within the mitochondria from the exchange of oxygen and carbon
dioxide whereas ventilation simply refers to the passage of air through the
trachea into the lungs. 160 Respiration is essential to life, whereas ventilation is
not, as evidenced by the sustainability of individuals on cardiopulmonary bypass
or even a fetus in the womb. 161 The distinction between respiration and
ventilation will be explored further in chapter three; it is briefly presented here in
order to clarify our language and definitions.
The iron lung was a large tank that engulfed the patient’s entire body,
save for the head, which functioned by lowering the atmospheric pressure inside
the tank fifteen to twenty times per minute to expand the ribcage to allow for
inhalation. 162 Routine nursing care for a patient confined to an iron lung was
daunting as nurses only had access to the patient through ports on the sides of
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the tank, which could only be opened upon exhalation, which occurs naturally
without the maintenance of air pressure. 163
Iron lungs were predominantly used for those suffering from poliomyelitis
but as medicine progressed, mechanical ventilators improved, became more
accessible, and were applied to a larger population of patients who were critically
ill. Anesthesiologists were among the first to understand that a body could be
kept alive using life-sustaining treatment in the absence of a functioning brain. 164
This raised troubling questions that were not easily answered within the medical
community and would begin a public dialogue that would include religion,
philosophy, and the law. Pope Pius XII was asked whether it was appropriate to
keep a body alive when the brain has been irreversibly destroyed. In The
Prolongation of Life, Pius XII did not presume to displace physicians’ authority or
their expertise in the determination of death. Rather, he stated that such a
determination was a medical decision not to be usurped by the Church.
However, the Pope concluded that extraordinary means of treatment need not be
undertaken when a situation is considered hopeless as life need not be
maintained at all costs. 165
Two years later French neurophysiologists studied patients in deep coma
during which they coined the term coma depassé, meaning “beyond coma.”
These patients lacked spontaneous respiration, requiring the use of mechanical
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ventilation and demonstrated electrocerebral silence. 166 Upon autopsy the brains
showed variations of necrosis with the most extreme presenting as autolysis, or
liquification of the brain. It became clear at this point that mechanical ventilation
could prolong “life” in a body with a dead brain but the necessary ingredients for
a historical shift to determine death by neurologic criteria had yet to coalesce
until the late 1960s.
As the 1960s progressed, technology continued to burgeon, raising
questions that had never before been entertained while medical advance far
outpaced society’s ability to reconcile these new ethical dilemmas. In what
follows we shall see that the advancement in organ preservation techniques and
immunosuppression through the drug cyclosporine were crowning achievements
in the late 1960s and 1970s, although the future of organ transplantation required
more than isolated medical accomplishments. In order for transplantation to
thrive, it ultimately depended on social and public policies to guide it, as we shall
see in the final section.

VII. Logistics of Organ Transplantation
At this time during the late 1960s, medicine focused on improving two
fundamentals to successful organ transplantation: organ preservation techniques
and anti-rejection drugs. The success of cadaveric organ donation was directly
proportional to adequate preservation techniques, as laws concerning heartbeating cadavers declared dead by a brain-based standard had yet to be
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codified. In the 1960s Starzl developed a process known as core cooling, which
remains the initial step in the preservation of organs today.
Core cooling utilizes cannulae, or long thin tubes, to lower the temperature
of the organs in situ (in their proper position), which allows them to be cooled
within the donor’s body before excision. 167 Cannulation cools the organs using
the vascular route, through the capillaries, arteries, and veins. 168 Organs must
be cooled in order to reduce warm ischemia, which begins as soon as circulation
stops. By carefully dropping the temperature and cooling the organs, organs can
remain viable because they are in a state similar to hibernation and require little
nutrients, a concept known as metabolic inhibition. 169 Organs cannot remain in
such a state indefinitely, however, as each organ has its own shelf life after being
cooled.
Since organs often need to be transported after excision, F.O. Belzer
developed a process that would induce hypothermic metabolism outside of the
body by perfusing the organ with plasma, which allowed the organ to be
supported in its natural substrate. 170 Belzer’s method facilitated a large increase
in kidney transplants, although cold storage methods continued to be improved.
Collin’s or Ringer’s solution utilized a high amount of potassium in order to
counter the loss of intracellular potassium that results from metabolic inhibition,

167

Gutkind, Many Sleepless Nights 288.

168

Gutkind, Many Sleepless Nights 288.

169

Hakim, History of Organ and Cell Transplantation 69.

170

Hakim, History of Organ and Cell Transplantation 69.

53
and this remained in practice until the 1980s when Viaspan replaced it. 171
Viaspan was developed at the University of Wisconsin and was responsible for
extending the viability of the liver and pancreas from four hours post excision to
between thirty and seventy-two hours. 172
The most significant anti-rejection drug discovery came in the form of a
fungus found in the soil of Southern Norway in 1969 known as cyclosporine. 173
Cyclosporine was not officially introduced in clinical practice until 1978 but upon
its application it increased the number of successful liver transplants from 18% to
68%. 174 This drug was remarkable not only for its ability to exponentially
increase survival but to do so with fewer side effects. The beauty of cyclosporine
lay in the fact that it was more discriminating than any anti-rejection drug used
previously. Rather than obliterate the immune system as other drugs had done,
it sought instead to manage the immune system. Cyclosporine allowed the
immune system to function at a normal capacity by inhibiting rather than
destroying T Lymphocytes, which were responsible for destroying the new
organ. 175
Cyclosporine was clearly an improvement on previous drugs although it
was by no means the perfect solution. Cyclosporine reduced the incidence of
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acute rejection although chronic rejection remains a problem to this day; thus
new drugs are continually in development. 176 The current species of antirejection drugs, FK506 and sirolimus, have shown promising results in effective
immunosuppression although they too are not without side effects. The risk of
infection, usually from viral, fungal, or bacterial agents, remains the most
common cause of death in immunosuppressed transplant recipients with up to
90% of all kidney recipients at risk of Cytomegalovirus (CMV), which ranges in
presentation from flu symptoms to myocarditis to pancreatitis, or immune system
collapse. 177
As better preservation techniques and anti-rejection drugs were
implemented, the next problem and still the most formidable one today, became
apparent; the supply of organs was insufficient to meet the demand. Many
historians attribute this problem as the impetus that led to the proposal of a
redefinition of the traditional notion of death. 178
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By way of a preface to the following section it should be clear that whether
the notion of brain death was “constructed” as a means to access a larger donor pool or
whether it was merely “discovered” by the concomitant boom in medical acumen is not
the focus at hand. It will be clear that organ transplantation obviously played a role in
the development of brain death, but this must be viewed within a broader context as no
single event caused a new definition of death but it was part of a multi factorial sociohistorical shift. Also, it is worth noting in order to frame our perspective that the many
ethical tenets that we take for granted today such as removing a patient from life
sustaining treatment (LST) when it offers no benefit were foreign concepts at this time.
Since removal of LST was akin to homicide, the licit removal of LST may have been an
equally compelling reason to redefine notions of life and death. It is accurate to say that
society was indelibly shaped by medicine and its new technologies since life does not
exist in a vacuum but always reflects a particular culture in relation to a particular place
in time. The culture of medicine at this time was undergoing a twentieth century
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VIII. Historical Shift
In 1968 The United States National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws proposed model legislation in the form of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). 179 The UAGA allowed individuals to direct whether
they would like to donate all or part of their bodies to science after death and
further allowed a deceased patient’s family to authorize donation provided the
deceased did not voice a previous objection. 180 By 1971 all fifty states adopted
the UAGA in an effort to publicize the practice of organ donation and also to
remedy what was quickly becoming the greatest obstacle to transplantation, the
organ shortage.
The same year the UAGA was drafted, Henry Beecher chaired the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death that would develop a new concept of death. 181 A new definition of death
had been suggested years before this formal Committee convened, however, as
we saw in 1959, when French neurophysiologists studied patients on mechanical
ventilation whose brains were permanently damaged.

renaissance. It is therefore impossible to determine what caused the definition of brain
death; suffice it to say that it came by way of a set of circumstances and factors that
contributed to the growth of organ transplantation at a particular point in history.
Whether or not brain death is a structurally sound diagnosis for death will be discussed
at length in subsequent chapters.
179

Baker "Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technological
and Ethical Developments” 13.
180

Baker, "Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technological
and Ethical Developments" 13.

56
Transcripts from a 1966 Symposium on Medical Ethics in London hosted
by the Ciba Foundation show that perceptions were radically changing about how
and when death ought to be declared. 182 During the Symposium, physicians
from Belgium and France discussed a type of “heart-beating cadaver” that was
used for organ transplantation. This new type of organ donor was not declared
dead based on the traditional cardio-respiratory criterion of death, but by a series
of criteria that proved the brain was dead. This revolutionary idea allowed
organs to be removed from a corpse with intact circulation, which greatly
improved the possibility of a successful transplantation by diminishing the
problem of warm ischemic injury. 183
The Harvard Committee set forth the necessary criteria for diagnosing a
dead brain. Unfortunately, their language was imprecise at best, for the original
task was to define “irreversible coma.” Perhaps the most glaring criticism is that
the Committee failed to prove why the criteria that diagnosed a dead brain
proved that the individual was dead. In other words, even if specific criteria may
be met to confirm that a brain is dead, where is the justification to prove that a
dead brain is the same as a dead person? What is special about the brain per se
that death can be declared by neurological criteria even if the heart continues to
beat? These questions raise conceptual problems that are appropriate for
discussion in the following chapter on whole brain death. For our purposes here
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I wish to simply present rather than critique the Harvard Committee’s
recommendation in order to show its implications on organ transplantation.
The Harvard Committee advanced two primary reasons for a redefinition
of death. First, new technologies made it difficult to determine death using
traditional criteria, and the application of such technologies could maintain the
irreversibly comatose indefinitely, which the Committee concluded, could be
emotionally draining on families as well as on hospital resources. 184 Second,
since the traditional determination of death was in question, obtaining organs
from such patients was mired in controversy. Thus by endorsing a new, modern
definition of death as opposed to the obsolete cardio-respiratory standard, death
could be determined in the presence of technology and in the process allow for
the licit removal of a patient’s organs. 185 Certainly it was preferable to procure
organs from a well-perfused cadaver that was being maintained by machines
than from a cadaver whose circulation had ceased. The question arose,
however, of how to consider a breathing person who is pink and warm as one
who is actually dead whose organs can be excised? This and many other
questions will be fully explored in the following chapter.
The following criteria were endorsed by the Committee to diagnose
irreversible coma:
1. Unreceptivity and Unresponsivity. There is a total
unawareness to externally applied stimuli and
184

Baker, "Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technological
and Ethical Developments” 20.
185

Baker, "Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technological
and Ethical Developments” 20.

58
inner need and complete unresponsiveness—our
definition of irreversible coma. Even the most
intensely painful stimuli evoke no vocal or other
response, not even a groan, withdrawal of a limb,
or quickening of respiration.
2. No Movements or Breathing. Observations
covering a period of at least one hour by
physicians is adequate to satisfy the criteria of no
spontaneous muscular movements or
spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli
such as pain, touch, sound, or light. After the
patient is on a mechanical respirator, the total
absence of spontaneous breathing may be
established by turning off the respirator for three
minutes and observing whether there is any effort
on the part of the subject to breathe
spontaneously.
3. No Reflexes. Irreversible coma with abolition of
central nervous system activity is evidenced in
part by the absence of elicitable reflexes. The
pupil will be fixed and dilated and will not respond
to a direct source of bright light. Since the
establishment of a fixed, dilated pupil is clear-cut
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in clinical practice, there should be no uncertainty
as to its presence. Ocular movement (to head
turning and to irrigation of the ears with ice water)
and blinking are absent. There is no evidence of
postural activity (decerebrate or other).
Swallowing, yawning, vocalization are in
abeyance. Corneal and pharyngeal reflexes are
absent.
4. Flat Electroencephalogram. Of great confirmatory
value is the flat or isoelectric EEG. We must
assume that the electrodes have been properly
applied, that the apparatus is functioning normally,
and that the personnel in charge is
competent… 186

Contemporary brain death protocols differ somewhat from the above
criteria set forth in 1968. For example, most institutions do not require the
absence of all reflexes given the potentiality for the “Lazarus Sign.” This
phenomenon, which ranges from the deceased exhibiting small twitches to sitting
upright, is due to residual spinal cord activity and/or muscle reflexes that may
persist after death. 187 Since this activity, though certainly unsettling to some
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degree, does not indicate the presence of life, a modern determination of death
typically focuses on the quiescence of cephalic reflexes, which indicates a dead
brain stem rather than on stretch reflexes. 188
Despite some other modifications, which shall be discussed in the next
chapter, the criteria remain largely unchanged, perhaps explaining how the
Committee’s fundamental recommendation that a non-functioning brain is
equivalent to death was rapidly accepted in the late 1960s and is accepted,
though not without criticism, today. A primary problem that resulted, however,
was a lack of uniformity, such that a person could be declared dead by brainbased standards in one state but alive in another state that did not recognize
brain death.
In 1981 the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) was enacted to
remedy this problem. The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research endorsed and
presented the UDDA to President Ronald Reagan on July 9, 1981. The UDDA,
which stated that an individual who has sustained either 1.irreversible cessation
of circulatory functions, or 2.irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead, was approved by the American Bar
Association (ABA), the American Medical Association (AMA), and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 189 The UDDA did not
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determine how the above criteria ought to be tested, only that a determination be
made in accordance with accepted medical practice.
Upon acceptance of the UDDA, heart-beating cadavers became a
potentially large resource for organs, at which point it became clear that
organized social policies concerning organ donation were necessary. In 1984
Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act, which prohibited buying
and selling organs and set up provisions for a national organ sharing system that
would later become the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). 190 The
following year The Association of Organ Procurement Organizations was created
and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) established.
In 1986 The Omnibus Reconciliation Act required that all transplantation
programs be members of the OPTN, which is regulated by UNOS. 191 Also this
same year hospitals were bound to perform Required Referral, which entailed
that they report all deaths to the local Organ Procurement Organization (OPO),
though organs could only be procured with consent. 192
In 1987 UNOS was established as a national registry for organs and is
divided into regions across the United States. Organ shortage was apparent
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from UNOS’s inception as evidenced by formal waiting lists. Statistics show that
from 1987 to 1991 the number of patients in need of transplants increased by
75% from 13,153 to 23,056 but the number of donors remained relatively
unchanged, growing only from 4000 to 4357. 193 In theory, heart-beating
cadavers were viewed as a solution to the problem of scarcity as up to 200,000
people were declared brain dead annually in the 1980s. However, of the
200,000 brain dead corpses, organs were only retrieved from 2000 each year. 194
There was and continues to be disagreement as to how organs ought to
be allocated and despite the fact that transplantation is a medical procedure it
became quickly apparent that values and issues of social justice were at stake.
When life hinges on the need for an organ it is often difficult to be dispassionate
about allocation. Some groups lobby for the right to purchase organs, though the
19th century Burke and Hare scandal still persists as an historical reminder of the
inherent dangers surrounding the commodification of human bodies. 195
Burke and Hare were originally body snatchers in Edinburgh, that is, they
dug up the freshly dead and sold the cadavers to medical schools for dissection
lessons. 196 Pilfering graves, however, proved to be laborious and time
consuming with unpredictable results, as only corpses in good condition would
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elicit a competitive price from anatomists. Since it was impossible to determine a
cadaver’s condition prospectively, the men sought alternate means to procuring
bodies where they could control the amount of bodily injury and/or decomposition
in order to ensure payment would be forthcoming. Burke and Hare subsequently
developed a strangulation technique, which is still known as Burking, that belied
their murderous ways allowing them to kill and sell the bodies of sixteen men,
women, and children before their activities were discovered.
Another concept that seems to have arisen directly as a means to
safeguard against Burking is the Dead Donor Rule (DDR), which dictates that
one may not be killed for or by the removal of organs. 197 Our organ retrieval
system is based fundamentally on the idea of donation, and while other means to
obtain organs have been attempted such as presumed consent, our normative
guidelines rely squarely on the notion of altruism. 198

197

Baker, "Organ Donation and Transplantation: A Brief History of Technological
and Ethical Developments" 24.
198

Robert Truog has argued prolifically to abandon the DDR in favor of removing
organs from patients who are in PVS or from similarly neurologically devastated patients
who he claims are beyond harm and/or from those who can explicitly give consent for
organ removal such as the imminently dying. He argues that respect for autonomy and
nonmaleficence should guide normative rules for donation rather than relying on the
concept of whole brain death, which does not satisfy the DDR given its inherent
incoherence, which shall be explored in the following chapter. See Robert D. Truog and
Walter Robinson. "Role of Brain Death and the Dead-Donor Rule in the Ethics of Organ
Transplantation." Critical Care Medicine. 31.9 (2003): 2391-96.
Notwithstanding Truog’s often compelling arguments, especially with regard to
the problems with whole brain death, the transplantation community is sensitive to public
perception and has repeatedly refused to abandon the DDR despite the fact that it would
surely expand the donor pool. In 1994 the American Medical Association’s Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommended making an exception to the DDR in the case of
anencephalic infants. The UNOS Ethics Committee immediately rejected their
recommendation despite the fact that some members viewed such infants as
appropriate candidates for donation. While some UNOS members agreed with the AMA
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In the interest of equipoise, UNOS rations organs on a point system that
seeks to uphold just allocation. The following criteria are applied to each patient
and a number of points is accumulated according to: geographic location, tissue
type, compatibility in size of organ, blood type, degree of medical need, and
amount of time on the waiting list. 199
It is however beyond our purposes to further elaborate on the problems and
potential solutions to the just allocation of organs.
This chapter has chronicled the major developments in organ
transplantation from its fabled beginnings to its current place in medicine as a
viable treatment for organ failure. Despite its accomplishments, however, the
future of organ transplantation may be inhibited due to the shortage of donor
organs. Whether or not it was a solution to this particular problem, this chapter
presented the notion of whole brain death proposed in 1968 that in theory would
expand the donor pool. What we did not do, which is the task for the following
chapter, is to explore in fine detail what is meant by whole brain death and
determine whether it is clinically as well as philosophically sound, as well as to
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build our case to argue that cardiac death is not the same as brain death and
donation after cardiac death patients are not yet dead.
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Chapter 3
The Legitimacy of Whole Brain Death
It isn’t that they can’t see the solution. It’s that they can’t see the problem. 200

This chapter explores the legitimacy of Whole Brain Death (WBD). I will
argue that WBD is a theoretically inconsistent criterion and that its main premise,
that a functioning brain is required for integrative life, is flawed. I will provide
evidence that the bodies of WBD patients continue to integrate at the level of the
organism as a whole and therefore fail the classic definition of death. If the ability
to maintain integrated functioning is what distinguishes life from death as the
current definition of death holds, I will argue that a dead brain does not stop such
functions from continuing.
I will also dispute whether the clinical tests used to diagnose WBD are
sufficient to prove all critical brain functions have ceased, as well as examine the
sets of brain functions that persist in many WBD patients. I will ultimately
conclude that the definition of death must be modified if we intend to maintain a
WBD criterion. We cannot adequately analyze the practice of non-heart-beating
donors (DCD) before we analyze the concept that supports organ procurement
from heart-beating (WBD) donors. That is, before we can endeavor to expose
the problems with DCD it is necessary to ensure our definition of death is
medically and philosophically coherent. This chapter will argue that WBD in fact
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is neither and must be reformulated in order to legitimately continue to use such
patients as organ sources.
The concept that undergirds the WBD criterion avoids the philosophical
issue of what is significant to the human and focuses instead on the biological
claim that a dead brain proves the organism, as a whole, is dead. I object to
WBD in that it fails to prove this biological claim, for while a patient cannot be
dead if the brain is alive, the classic definition of death requires more than a dead
brain; it requires the permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the
organism as a whole. I will argue that integrated functioning continues in WBD
patients and the brain is not the primary integrator of the organism as a whole.
I. The relationship between transplantation and death
There are two misconceptions that must be clarified at the outset of this
chapter. First is the belief that the definition of death is distinct from organ
recovery efforts, and second is the belief that donors are stone dead at the
moment of organ procurement. As pertains to the first issue, it has traditionally
been held that a definition of death should remain independent of organ donation
and the public has been assured there is such a division. 201 History shows
otherwise, however, as one of the primary reasons WBD was introduced was as
a means to obtain organs, which was disclosed in the Harvard Committee’s
Report. Further, Donation After Cardiac Death (DCD) protocols (previously
referred to as non heart—beating donation (NHBD) manipulate a declaration of
death in order to obtain organs as rapidly as possible for transplantation based
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on the moral position that the patient will not be resuscitated rather than on
clinical data that proves death has occurred.
Therefore, while it may be theoretically safer to separate any definition of
death from transplantation in order to avoid the specter of impropriety, they
cannot practically be removed from one another. Thus we will be better off to
concede that definitions of death are constructed with the efforts of organ
transplantation in mind and maintain that this does not necessarily cause
problems.
Problems arise when we attempt to obfuscate this truth rather than
acknowledge that death is definitional, meaning that human beings decide at
what point on the continuum a particular clinical state qualifies as dead. A
definition of death is a pronouncement rather than an authentic discovery
because the specific biologic moment of human death cannot be readily
identified. Thus we agree on the characteristics that all organisms that are dead
should share and call that point death.
The point on the continuum is inevitably to some degree a construct. This
does not mean, of course, that the determination of death is totally constructed.
We do indeed discover that death has certainly occurred at some point in the
continuum. That death has occurred for Aristotle and for John Kennedy is not
simply a construct; it is a fact that we discover. Thus there is a point on the
continuum after which death has certainly occurred. And there is also a point
before which death has certainly not occurred and that point is the point when
revival to a conscious state is still possible. We will deal in chapter five with the
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problems this poses for Donation After Cardiac Death and with suggestions for
dealing with these.
It is not by accident that our definition of death fits nicely with organ
transplantation nor should it be a problem provided we deal openly with the
issue. Integrity requires that the public understands that our definition of death is
a socially constructed agreement that may change. Danger lurks when we
attempt to modify it surreptitiously under the false pretense that we have
discovered this unknowable truth that coincidentally facilitates organ
transplantation.
Concerning the second issue, the clinical requirements of transplantation
demand living organs and tissues while the conceptual requirements promise a
dead donor. This is where WBD comes to the forefront, specifically whether we
can call the WBD patient clinically dead despite the fact that the body continues
to cooperate in unison as an integrated unit. If WBD does not fulfill the classic
definition of death, then by virtue of the dead donor rule organs ought not to be
procured from such patients. If we adhere to this, however, the following
repercussions are likely: organ transplantation will collapse until other
technologies such as organ cloning are developed and/or DCD will increase in
order to balance the loss of WBD donors. Both of these are undesirable
outcomes that may pose more societal problems than maintaining WBD as it
currently stands, but we must at the very least expose the problems therein.
Conceptual clarity and honesty are at stake. While the public may in fact
accept WBD as death, the majority of people cannot articulate why a dead brain
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is equivalent with a dead human being. This is not surprising given that medical
professionals themselves are confused about the concept. 202 This is less
surprising still given that with support a WBD body can be maintained for long
periods of time and can continue to perform many tasks that corpses cannot,
leading to the conclusion that they really are not dead in the traditional sense of
the word.
One of the reasons we have difficulty reconciling such patients as dead is
that they do not look dead; they do not exhibit the characteristics we associate
with death. 203 For example, our visceral reaction to a person who is pink and
warm and who is breathing is fundamentally different from one who is cold, stiff,
and pallid. We do not need to appeal to reason to reach the conclusion that one
is alive and the other dead, for we know it at a primitive or intuitive level. But a
brain dead patient requires that we suppress this distinction, which sets the stage
for an epistemological struggle.
In order fully to examine the conceptual underpinnings of WBD we must
go back to the source. WBD was endorsed as a criterion of death in 1968 and
was accepted with little public opposition. The Harvard Committee began by
stating, “Our primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion of
death.” As Paul Byrne and Walt Weaver observe, however, the Committee did
not set out to establish if coma was a new criterion of death, but to make it so. In
this manner, data could be manipulated to fit an already pre-designed
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conclusion. Further, Byrne and Weaver note that the Harvard Committee
published its report without patient data or references to scientific reports. 204
While the Harvard Committee outlined criteria to diagnose a dead brain, it would
be more than ten years before any justification was offered as to why a dead
brain was equivalent with a dead person. 205 Notwithstanding the fact that more
than a decade elapsed before a coherent presentation of WBD was offered, what
is more puzzling is how WBD, appearing at least on a pre-theoretic level to
contradict the traditional notion of death, did not generate more public debate. 206
In fact, what debate did ensue was isolated mainly within academic
circles, perhaps owing to a society that was disinclined to challenge the medical
establishment. 207 More than thirty years later, however, our current social
climate coupled with ample empirical data regarding the physiology of the braindead patient, has enabled spirited debate as to the validity of WBD.
Disagreement over the legitimacy of WBD is now widespread in philosophy and
medicine, especially with regard to the practice of organ donation and the
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question of whether one is “really” dead when organs are recovered from braindead donors.
In chapter one we examined the many signs and tests used to diagnose
death from the 18th to the mid 20th century. The most reliable indicator among
these was the irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat. As Bartlett and
Youngner note, “When a human being’s heart stopped beating or breathing
failed, consciousness, internal integration, and the life of individual organs,
tissues, and even cells ceased—quickly, inevitably, and permanently.” 208 As we
saw in chapter two, however, advances in artificial life support systems in the
latter part of the 20th century made it difficult to determine death accurately using
the traditional cardio-respiratory criterion and, subsequently, a whole brain death
criterion was introduced. The first question that arises is what is “brain death ”as
opposed to “cardiac death?”
II.

The Concept of Whole Brain Death

It is generally asserted that there is only one definition of death:
irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole,
but that it can be diagnosed in two ways, using a cardio-respiratory criterion or a
neurologic criterion. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA) devised this “separate but equal” status,
which established that death could be established by either 1) the irreversible
cessation of circulatory functions or 2) the irreversible cessation of the entire
brain, including the brain stem. This means in effect that “brain death” or
208
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“cardiac death” are two ways to diagnose the same condition, not fundamentally
different types of death as either criterion signifies the loss of functioning of the
organism as a whole. But this requires further examination.
The criterion for death as the irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions does not require that the brain has ceased functioning.
Moreover, it is theoretically possible for the heart and lungs to stop and for the
brain to continue to function for a time. 209 James Bernat, a vocal defender of
WBD, recognizes the problem with using dual criteria when he notes, “It takes
considerably longer than a few minutes for brain and other organs to be
destroyed from cessation of circulation and lack of oxygen.” 210 This is of grave
concern for DCD, which we will explore at length in a subsequent chapter.
Conversely, the criterion for death as the irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain does not require cessation of circulation and
respiration. We will also pursue this in greater detail in the chapter on DCD, but it
appears then that death has a bifurcated rather than a unitary definition that does
not require the permanent cessation of the organism as a whole but only of
certain parts of it. 211
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Scholars agree that regardless of the criteria used to fulfill the definition of
death they should be both necessary and sufficient. 212 The UDDA, however,
only requires the neurologic criterion to fulfill both conditions, and even that is
arguable according to some WBD critics. 213 For example, loss of consciousness
is necessary for death but it is not sufficient; only whole brain death (according to
WBD proponents) meets both necessary and sufficient conditions to declare
death.
In discussing necessary and sufficient conditions, we must consider the
cardio-respiratory criterion of death: loss of heartbeat and breathing are sufficient
for death but not necessary in the presence of WBD. Heartbeat and circulation
are said to be irrelevant if the patient is clinically brain dead, but as F.M. Kamm
observes, “any property empirically correlated with a characteristic or criterion of
life can be a sign of it.” 214 Interestingly, WBD proponents ascribe significance to
heartbeat and respiration when they are spontaneous. WBD advocates criticize
a higher-brain criterion that would allow death to be declared in the presence of
spontaneous breathing and heartbeat but negate their importance in the WBD
patient simply because they are artificially induced. 215 WBD advocates argue
that implementing a higher brain death criterion would entail burying patients with
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spontaneous breathing and heartbeat, something that would be a profound
departure from our traditional practices. 216 This is true, although WBD allows
excising a beating heart and/or mining other organs in a WBD patient who
exhibits the same signs of life simply because such functions are maintained
through technology. 217
This is an argument we will explore in greater detail, but let us grant for
the moment that if certain functions are necessary for the continued functioning
of the organism as a whole then the mechanism that performs them, whether it is
a brain or a machine, is irrelevant so long as the functions continue. 218 From
what has been raised thus far it is clear that we will need to examine further
whether it is legitimate to declare brain death when cardio-respiratory functioning
continues, albeit with assistance. We will fully address the issue after we give a
more detailed account of why WBD is said to be death.
There are two main reasons advanced for why WBD is considered an
appropriate criterion for death. The first is the claim that all death is in fact brain
death, such that all the signs traditionally used to determine death have always
been neurologic in nature. 219 In other words, as we saw above, the cardio-
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respiratory criterion simply informs us of the status of the brain since breathing is
usually a direct measurement of brain function and heartbeat is contingent on the
ability to breathe. Advocates of this line of reasoning would reject the suggestion
that WBD was invented or that death has been redefined since they contend that
all tests for death are and always have been merely instantiations of WBD.
The second is the biological claim that the brain is the primary integrator
without which life cannot continue in the organism as a whole. This is generally
regarded as the traditional or “orthodox” justification for why a dead brain is
equivalent with a dead person. The functioning of the “organism as a whole”
must be distinguished from the functioning of the “whole organism,” as the
definition of death requires the permanent cessation of the former but not the
latter. WBD proponents do not require the death of every brain cell to declare
brain death but only those that contribute to the integration of the organism as a
whole. 220 Therefore, WBD proponents claim that death occurs when all “critical”
parts of the brain that are responsible for integrated functioning cease, since the
brain, according to this argument, integrates the entire organism.
Bernat describes the organism as a whole as being greater than the sum
of its parts and as referring to a set of vital functions that supports the life and
health of the person. 221 For example, someone who has lost a limb is no longer
a whole organism proper, but nonetheless remains an organism as a whole since
the body continues to exist as an integrated unit. It is not inconsistent that life in
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isolated cells or tissues can continue after death whereas organized and directed
systems that work in unison cannot. Axiomatically, a definition of death cannot
require the permanent cessation of the whole organism since the only reliable
criterion then would be to await putrefaction.
Both proponents and critics of WBD agree on the distinction between
organism as a whole and the whole organism; the point of contention focuses on
whether a dead brain proves that the organism as a whole has permanently
ceased functioning. In 1981 The President’s Commission convened in order to
answer this question and they began their deliberation with an anatomic
presentation of the brain and its functions, which I will briefly sketch here.
Occasionally a bit of imagery is more instructive than any amount of technical
verbiage; thus the following description of the brain is offered. “Yes, the good
Lord bricked that sucker in pretty good, and for a reason. We’re not supposed to
play with it. The brain is sort of like a ’66 Cadillac. You had to drop the engine in
that thing just to change all eight spark plugs. It was built for performance, not
for easy servicing.” 222
Put more academically, the human brain floats in a bone encasement
known as the cranium and in general is well protected from infection and from the
usual bumps and bruises we encounter as itinerant creatures. It is divided into
three regions: the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum, and the brainstem, which
includes the midbrain, pons, and the medulla oblongata. Each area performs
certain functions, which will be discussed below, but it would be a mistake to try
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to quarter the brain into sections that perfectly correspond to a particular purpose
or manifested action. For example, it was traditionally thought that awareness or
consciousness was sponsored solely by the cerebral cortex but the brainstem
also serves as an interface in the process. 223 This might not sound exceptionally
exciting but it demonstrates that complex interactions occur within the brain
diffusely rather than in isolated parts, which will be somewhat problematic for
proponents of higher brain-death as we shall see in the next chapter.
The cerebral cortex is the largest part of the brain; it is divided into two
hemispheres and is regarded as the center of our higher faculties, which includes
our ability to summon consciousness, memory, learning, reasoning, emotions,
judgment, and intelligence. 224 The cerebellum, literally, “little brain” facilitates
fine motor skills and coordination and is involved with the brain stem in
performing various voluntary movements such as posture and balance, walking,
eating, and adjusting the speed and tempo of such activities. 225 The brainstem
connects the cerebral hemispheres with the spinal cord and is responsible for the
vegetative processes including regulating blood pressure, breathing, and various
reflexes such as coughing, sneezing, and vomiting. 226 The breathing center is
located within the medulla, which stimulates the diaphragm, which in turn causes
the lungs to expand leading to the cellular process known as respiration.
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Ventilation is not the same as respiration but a thoroughgoing explanation
will be given later in this chapter. It is sufficient for the moment to note that if the
medulla is destroyed or injured then the natural result would be for the lungs to
fail followed by the heart and eventually all the cells would become anoxic
culminating in the death of the organism as a whole. This process shows the
relationship between the brain, circulation, and respiration and how they maintain
the organism as a whole. The President’s Commission focused specifically on
the brain as having primacy in this triangle. “When an individual’s breathing and
circulation lack neurologic integration, he or she is dead.” 227 According to this
argument, since only the brain can direct the entire organism, the loss of brain
function is equivalent with death. Accordingly, the brain is the primary integrator
that organizes the body into an organism as a whole without which the body is
simply a chaotic group of subsystems whose functioning serves no purpose. 228
Having explored the main argument for WBD, we must press the issue of
the legitimacy of declaring death in the presence of cardio-respiratory
functioning. The Commission established that artificially maintained respiration
and circulation in a WBD patient are irrelevant because they are controlled by
mechanical intervention rather than by the brain. They conceded that though it
may look as if patient is alive, in fact the body is not functioning in any integrated
manner since it is being manipulated externally. Accordingly, they argue, “the
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function and results are similar, but the source, cause, and purpose are different
between those individuals with and those without functioning brains.” 229
Moreover, the Commission suggests that there are “startling” differences
between WBD patients and those with intact brain stems, such as yawning for
instance, yet they fail to acknowledge the equally disturbing differences between
a corpse in a morgue and a WBD patient. 230 We must now carefully examine
whether it matters if vital functions are maintained artificially.
We immediately encounter problems if we determine life from death based
on technology if we consider that a person is not any less alive if he requires an
artificial intervention. By its very definition, life-sustaining treatment serves to
sustain life. Hans Jonas asks us to consider if we would hesitate to make a dead
brain function if it required an artificial intervention to do so. 231 More likely than
not, he assumes most people would not care how the brain continued to function
as long as it did.
The Commission seemed to conflate a function as identical with the
mechanism that performs it. 232 However, there is a difference between the thing
that sponsors the function (brain) and the function itself (respiration, circulation,
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etc.), and if the function itself is what is significant and if it continues, then it ought
not to matter what causes it so long as it occurs.233 Both circulation and
respiration are diffuse throughout the body and brain failure does not stop them.
It is true that artificial technology is required to support them, but as we have
already established, reliance upon technology in determining life from death
creates intractable problems. 234 These critical functions are of the same kind we
require must cease in the WBD patient based on the argument that they
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represent integration in the organism as a whole. Thus, the biological argument
for WBD espoused by the President’s Commission fails as a criterion of death.
Tom Tomlinson argues that a paradox is possible wherein the criterion for
death (non functional brain) may be fulfilled but not the definition (cessation of
the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole) if something other than the
brain supports integrated functioning. 235 He as well as others conclude that a
functioning brain may not be necessary for the integrated functioning of the
organism as a whole.
The Commission put forth the argument that the presence of integration
indicates life and its absence death but considered integration in a WBD patient
merely artifact because the brain does not direct it. Daniel Wikler concludes that
such a position requires the Commission to dismiss any activity in a WBD patient
as “unintegrated” unless it is directed by the brainstem. 236 Intensive Care Units
(ICUs) can substitute many functions of the brainstem, reinforcing the fact that
the source of integration is irrelevant provided it can continue. Wikler argues that
the Commission commits the fundamental mistake of confusing necessary and
sufficient conditions. He points out that an intact brainstem in general means
that a patient can breathe spontaneously, but, as we shall see in the following
section, WBD patients are capable of respiration with assistance, thereby
showing that brainstem capacity is not necessary. Wikler further argues that the
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Commission’s view implicitly holds spontaneous ventilation as the sine qua non
for life but does not hold the standard consistently. 237 He writes,
The problem is that any number of patients, be they
sufferers of polio, ALS, or other maladies, are
incapable of spontaneous respiration and yet are
indisputably alive. Of course, most of them are also
conscious. Occasionally, however, these respiratordependent patients lapse into seemingly permanent
unconsciousness (PVS). At that moment they
become patients who lack both the capacity for
consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous
respiration, which in turn is a stand-in for integrated
functioning. According to the concepts underlying the
current consensus, therefore they should be counted
as dead. 238
We have thus far argued that determining life from death based on
technology is untenable and that it ought not matter what causes the heart and
lungs to function as long as integrated functioning can continue. We must now
consider whether the functions that do continue in the WBD patient actually
reflect integration in the organism as a whole or if they are merely disorganized
subsystems.
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III. THE BRAIN AS THE PRIMARY INTEGRATOR OF THE ORGANISM
AS A WHOLE
Here we need to examine carefully the claim that the brain is the sole
integrator of the organism as a whole and evaluate the sorts of functions that
continue in the WBD patient, that is, whether they are integrated or random
collections of subsystems.
This requires that we define what is meant by integration and criticality.
Unfortunately, these terms mean different things to different people.
Integration can be viewed on a sliding scale such that one could argue
integration requires awareness of the external environment (meaning patients in
PVS lack it) whereas another may interpret it is at the organic level though
biochemical reactions. The President’s Commission has taken the middle ground
approach and defines integration as brain function that manifests as physiologic
homeostasis. 239 Following this definition then, WBD patients should not be able
to exhibit homeostatic control. It is clear, however, that some WBD patients will
continue to regulate free water homeostasis through arginine vasopressin, which
does not preclude a determination of WBD. Robert Truog argues that this is
more physiologically integrative than brain stem reflexes such as pupillary
constriction, which must be absent in WBD patients. 240 Thus, using the definition
endorsed by the President’s Commission, some WBD patients will continue to
integrate and do not meet the requirements for the classic definition of death.
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Bernat sidesteps the integration debate in favor of defining the critical
functions of the organism as a whole that are required for its continued life,
health, and unity. 241 Specifically, he defines three areas of biological functioning
that must be permanently lost for the organism to fulfill the definition of death: 1)
spontaneous breathing and circulation, 2) homeostatic control, and 3)
consciousness. 242 Bernat concedes that any one of the three is sufficient to
declare life and all three must be absent to declare death. He endorses the
irreversible loss of the clinical functions of the entire brain to best satisfy the
above conditions as both necessary and sufficient.
But his three areas of critical functioning are not always absent in all WBD
patients, which means such patients cannot be dead according to these criteria.
Concerning his first condition, demanding cessation of “spontaneous” breathing
and circulation is problematic since the issue of technology is controversial in the
definition of death as we have seen. Irreversible cessation of the spontaneous
functions of the organism as a whole is irrelevant since spontaneous function is
not necessary for life, as evidenced by the many patients who require
technological interventions and who are very much alive. 243 The term
spontaneous appears nowhere in the definition of death for this very reason.
Assisted breathing and circulation can equally foster the life, health, and unity of
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the organism as a whole. Second, as we have just shown above, some WBD
patients can continue to regulate homeostatic control, and third, it is arguable
that consciousness is, strictly speaking, a critical function of the organism as a
whole. According to Bernat’s argument, functioning of any one of the three
critical groups indicates life; therefore WBD patients that can breathe and
circulate blood (whether this is spontaneous is irrelevant) and regulate
homeostasis ought to be considered alive.
D. Alan Shewmon, a prolific critic of the concept of WBD, argues that
many of the integrative functions of the organism as a whole are not in fact
mediated by the brain; thus ”linking the loss of somatic integration exclusively to
brain-based criteria is not a physiologically tenable rationale for equating brain
death with the death of the organism as a whole.” 244
Shewmon lists seven requirements to fulfill the definition of integrative
unity: 1) it should be generic, meaning that it applies to all living species and not
specifically to humans; 2) it should be actively anti-entropic, meaning the
organism maintains organization without which it would cease to exist; 3) all
corpses should lack integrative unity when resuscitation is no longer possible but
prior to rigor mortis; 4) it should distinguish a composite unity from a mere
collectivity (Shewmon clarifies that a unity is de facto unified because it involves
anti-entropic mutual interaction among all the parts as opposed to a collectivity
that is artificially maintained that will tend toward increasing entropy); 5)
integrative unity should be clear and not ambiguous; 6) it must not confuse
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disability or reliance upon technology as being disintegrated; 7) consciousness is
not a necessary condition for integrative unity. 245
In light of the above requirements, Shewmon argues that a definition of
integrated unity should meet the following criteria: 1) Integration requires that the
organism possess at least one emergent, holistic-level property. Shewmon
defines an emergent property as one that derives from the cooperation of parts
and a holistic property as one that is not dependent on isolated parts but of the
entire composite unity. 2) A body that requires less assistance to maintain life
than another similar living body that possesses integrative unity should be
regarded as a living whole. 246 According to this account, many WBD patients
fulfill both criteria.
Briefly, some of the integrative functions of the organism as a whole that
are not controlled by the brain include homeostasis, energy balance, wound
healing, infection fighting, and gestation of a fetus. 247 These are not
characteristics of the dead; they are not reflexes but evidence of a body that is
integrated at the level of the organism as a whole. What is more disturbing is
that these functions can occur in patients who have passed WBD protocol
because they are not tested when making a determination of death, which we
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shall examine in the next section. 248 WBD criteria only test the irreversible
cessation of a portion of intracranial functions. For instance the pituitary gland,
cardiovascular tone, and thermoregulation are not generally tested. 249
Shewmon’s main argument is that the brain does not confer integration
but that it contributes to a somatic unity that is already presupposed. 250 Earlier
we discussed that the breathing center is located within the medulla, but it is
important to note that while breathing is the same as ventilation neither is the
same as respiration, which continues in WBD patients.
The brain regulates breathing, but this simply refers to the movement of
air in and out of the lungs and such movement, Shewmon argues, is not a
somatically integrative function, for ventilation is not a sine qua non for life as
demonstrated by patients on cardio pulmonary bypass or a fetus in utero. 251
Respiration however is a complex cellular and biochemical process that refers to
the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide, which is not controlled by the brain
but is present diffusely within the body and is required for the life of the organism
as a whole. In addition, Shewmon acknowledges that the brain controls eating,
drinking, and swallowing, but argues that such functions are not somatically
integrating. The brain does not play a pivotal role in nourishment or digestion,
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which is properly regarded as the biochemical process of energy conversion,
which is, unlike the mere act of swallowing, an integrative function of the
organism as a whole. 252
Severe cases of Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) can mimic WBD and
further undermine the argument that a body cannot live unless the brain is
directing the organism. Such patients can lose all brain stem function including
brain stem reflexes. 253 Only testing through EEG, which is not required to
declare WBD, can differentiate these patients from WBD patients. A GBS patient
would require life-sustaining treatment for continued integrated functioning but
would still retain consciousness; thus we would be ill advised to declare this
patient dead.
This shows that the underlying concept of WBD is theoretically
inconsistent when a patient with a severe case of GBS can be in the identical
clinical state as WBD whereby all critical integrative functions of the brain have
been lost but the GBS patient will clearly be regarded as a living human being.
Both patients continue to integrate and both require artificial assistance to do so;
the only fundamental difference between the two is that the patient with GBS will
eventually recover brain function whereas the WBD patient will not. The GBS
patient proves that a functioning brain is not necessary for life.
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Shewmon further proves that the body does not possess an integrator but
integration by demonstrating the clinical similarities between a brain dead patient
and a patient whose brain is functionally disconnected in the case of high Spinal
Cord Injury (SCI).
If the brain is uniquely responsible for the organism’s
biological unity, so that in the absence of the brain’s
coordinating activity the organism becomes a mere
disunited collection of organs and tissues, such
somatic ‘dis-integration’ should be just the same
regardless [sic] whether the absence of brain
coordination is due to absence of a brain or merely to
functional disconnection from the brain… The “central
integrator of the body” rationale of WBD can therefore
be tested by examining the vital status of braindisconnected bodies, so long as the somatic
physiology of the two conditions is indeed
equivalent… The purpose of this comparison is not to
advance a claim that WBD is clinically
indistinguishable from high spinal cord injury (SCI),
which would be absurd. Nor is the issue to which the
comparison is relevant the clinical criteria for
diagnosing a dead brain but rather one particular
conceptual rationale for equating a dead brain with a
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dead individual: namely the one that claims that a
dead brain equates with a dead body… Subjective
consciousness is simply not a sine qua non of the
‘orthodox’ organism-rationale, so it is beside the point
in this debate. 254
Bernat counters that the spinal cord does not play a critical role for the
organism as a whole since patients can live with minimal support following a
devastating spinal cord injury. From this he concludes that the integrating
functions of the spinal cord are not necessary for life and clearly their absence is
not necessary nor is it sufficient for death. 255 This brings us full circle back to
Bernat’s justification that consciousness is a critical function of the organism as a
whole. He argues that consciousness is an emergent function and that it is
necessary for the continued health of the organism. However, if the absolute
threshold of what makes a function critical is whether one can live without it,
which is how he dismisses the spinal cord’s role as not critical, then it is
inconsistent to claim consciousness breaks it, as it is not necessary for life either.
If consciousness is a critical function it must be on grounds other than a purely
biological argument since a patient can live without it.
This is tangential to Shewmon’s point, however, as he claims it is precisely
because the spinal cord is not necessary for biological life that there exists a
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conceptual problem. He compares the similar somatic traits shared between a
WBD patient and a SCI patient and concludes that brain function is not
necessary for biological life (equally at the level of organism as a whole).

According to the mainstream, “orthodox” rationale, the
purported loss of somatic integrative unity in Brain
Death is attributable to the destruction of the many
brain-stem and hypothalamic integrative centers. But,
is it their destruction per se or rather the body’s
nonreception to their influence that most immediately
affects somatic integration? Surely the latter,
because it is more proximate to the phenomenon of
interest, it is the means through which the former
exerts its effect, and it can also be brought about by
other possible causes such as mere disconnection
from cephalic structures. That the impact on somatic
physiology of nonreception of rostral influence should
be indifferent to the reason for the nonreception
implies that body A with a destroyed brain and body B
with a disconnected brain (due to high SCI) should
have the same vital status. Logical consistency
demands that if we assert A is dead as a biological
organism, we must be prepared to say the same of B;
but if we insist that B is clearly alive as a biological
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organism (and not merely because it is conscious)
then we must be willing to admit the same of A…
From the body’s perspective Brain Death and
atropinized high cord transection are virtually
indistinguishable because the caudal margin of total
brain infarction is in fact a cervico-medullary junction
infarction. Thus, regardless how one might choose to
define operationally terms such as “integrative unity”
or “organism as a whole,” if they are defined carefully
enough to apply properly to any ventilator dependent
quadriplegic with Diabetes Insipidus, then ipso facto
they will apply as well to any Brain Dead patient. 256
Again, similar to the case of GBS discussed earlier, we have a patient who
is in the same clinical state of WBD but is clearly still alive. The brain is
functionally disconnected from the body, which means the patient relies on
external support for integrated somatic activity. It should be clear then that the
brain is not the primary integrator of the organism as a whole and the WBD
criterion is theoretically and, as we shall see, clinically inconsistent.
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IV. Diagnosis of WBD
Shewmon further exposes a tension between the conceptual argument for
WBD and the diagnostic tests used to confirm it. If the argument is that the brain
is the primary integrator of the organism as a whole, Shewmon questions why
the diagnostic criteria do not require the cessation of a single somatically
integrative brain function. Truog concurs by arguing that “many of the
components of the brain death exam measure functions that contribute nothing to
physiologic integrity (such as determining whether the pupils react to light), yet
functions that are critical to maintaining physiologic integrity (such as the
regulated secretion of anti-diuretic hormone) are ignored. 257 Instead, WBD
protocols only require loss of consciousness, cessation of cranial nerve function,
and absence of spontaneous breathing. 258 Ironically, the regulation of blood
pressure, maintenance of body temperature, or the presence of neurohormonal
functions, all of which are brain mediated, are not tested in WBD protocols. 259
Many patients who are declared WBD do not suffer from marked
hypotension and, if supported on life sustaining treatment, many regain
hemodynamic stability without requiring other cardiovascular aide. 260 Shewmon
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recoils at the American Academy of Neurology’s position that “normal blood
pressure without pharmacologic support is compatible with a diagnosis of brain
death.” 261 Other WBD critics argue that loss of blood pressure control is the sine
qua non of somatic “dis-integration” without which the body could not be declared
dead. 262 It has been documented that 95% of patients show an increase in
arterial blood pressure upon incision for organ recovery while others have
exhibited increased heart rate and/or sweating. 263 One may ask how such
patients who are said to be dead react to incision that may require the use of
general anesthesia or paralytic agents before organ recovery. 264 The traditional
response is that these are simply “reflexes” that do not have any bearing on the
declaration of death. Further, WBD patients retain the ability to regulate their
temperature to some degree spontaneously such that with the assistance of
blankets they can tend toward normothermia. 265 Shewmon points out the
obvious that a corpse cannot raise its temperature regardless of how many
blankets are applied, thus forcing us to compare the bodies of those we know are
dead with bodies that do not exhibit the same properties.
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Halevy and Brody identify two areas of persistent functioning in some
WBD patients that are critically integrating: neurohormonal regulation, and brain
stem functioning. Further they argue that cortical function is present in some
WBD patients, and though this is not a critical function as we have seen, there is
a general agreement that declaring someone dead with higher brain functions
intact is unacceptable.
Continued hypothalamic function in particular is troubling for many critics
of WBD. When the brain is able to secrete anti-diruretic hormones it can prevent
the development of central Diabetes Inspidus (DI), which confirms that the
hypothalamus and posterior pituitary are intact. This is important since “a
functioning neurohormonal pathway is essential to the viability of the organism as
a whole and it is a major example of the integrative role of the brain.” 266
However, many patients who pass WBD protocols do not exhibit D.I., and retain
residual neurohormonal regulation, which is readily assessable at the bedside
and even according to Bernat’s most stringent definition of critical does not
indicate mere activity but organized functioning. 267 Halevy and Brody observe,
“neurohormonal regulation is a component of the integrative role of the brain in
regulating the rest of the body—the very role that is emphasized in the wholebrain definition of death.
Bernat initially contended that persistent hypothalamic function in the
WBD patient, which prevented D.I., was acceptable because hypothalamic
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function is not a critical function of the organism as a whole. However, Bernat
recently amended his position regarding persistent hypothalamic function and
admits to being skeptical of WBD patients that do not progress to D.I. or who
have normal arginine vasopressin. He suspects such patients may not have
sustained a complete absence of intracranial blood flow and concludes that
cerebral blood flow studies should be mandatory in WBD protocols. 268
Bernat does maintain, however, that the continued somatic activity that is
maintained by artifice has no significance and is comparable to that of a kidney
that lives outside of the body or of cells in a Petri dish. 269 Yet Wikler takes him to
task by employing Bernat’s own argument of organism as a whole against him.
For the WBD patient is an intact body where the parts clearly interact with one
another, “the heart pumps blood, which carries oxygen to cells where metabolic
processes continue and wastes are carried off and excreted”; therefore it is not a
collection of disjointed parts in vivo. 270
Bernat also takes liberty by modifying the definition of death to mean the
cessation of the critical functions of the organism as a whole, with regard to how
much of the brain must die in WBD. 271 While we stated in the beginning of this
chapter that death is definitional, it would seem that modifying the definition,
though possible, would require societal consensus rather than a decree through
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a private citizen. 272 Further, Bernat claims that the UDDA’s definition of death as
the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain was actually intended
to have the qualifier “clinical” functions of the entire brain. The difference is that
clinical functions are observable by bedside physical exam whereas “physiologic
activities” require confirmation through laboratory tests. 273 Some scholars
suggest that Bernat’s conception of criticality is somewhat arbitrary but many are
willing to grant him these indulgences since the functions that continue in a WBD
patient usually meet his definition of criticality and are observable on clinical
exam.
Bernat justifies his claim that only clinical functions are significant by
referencing the President’s Commission, which made a distinction between
“systemic integrated functioning” and mere “physiologic activity.” 274 Complex
tests are not necessary to demonstrate the irreversible absence of the clinical
and critical functions of the brain as they can be proven by bedside exam and
include the following: apnea, profound coma, unresponsiveness, and absent
brain stem reflexes. Clinical exams are performed at the bedside and focus
specifically on brain stem function rather than on all brain function, but Bernat
argues this is adequate since reversible drug and metabolic disturbance are
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already ruled out and a structural or organic etiology must be demonstrated
before a diagnosis of WBD can be made. 275
Differential diagnosis is mandatory to prove that some other less severe
state is not mimicking WBD, since GBS and viral encephalitis are but two illness
that can effectively feign WBD. 276 Yet if a patient with hypothermia, barbiturate
overdose, or a severe case of GBS can meet the clinical WBD criteria we must
ask why they are not declared dead when they pass the protocol. The obvious
answer is because these are reversible conditions. But as R. Hayden argues,
irreversibility is not an appropriate criterion for death since it is based on the
current state of the art. 277 Thus, what will happen if/when brain failure can be
reversed? The problem with irreversibility is not one we can address here but
will become a focal point in the discussion on DCD. Suffice that such patients
are being maintained without brain function, thus again calling into question
whether a brain is required for biological integration.
Most diseases or neurologic events that are sufficient to cause the
permanent cessation of cranial nerve and brain function usually result from
massive head trauma, intracranial hemorrhage, hypoxic ischemic damage from
prolonged cardiac arrest or some other defined condition. 278 In the absence of a
catastrophic brain insult, a diagnosis of WBD should be held in abeyance, as the
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brain obviously must be injured in some way before it can be declared dead. 279
Once such a devastating neurologic insult occurs, the ensuing process generally
follows the same pattern: brain swelling and simultaneous intracranial pressure
where the brain ultimately strangulates within the cranium. Subsequently, the
brainstem herniates, becomes infarcted and blood supply to the brain is rendered
impossible.
The brain, unlike some other organs, is delicate and cannot survive an
interruption in blood flow for more than a few minutes without suffering varying
degrees of irreversible damage; if blood supply is completely obstructed the brain
has no chance to survive and will begin to self-digest or autolyze within days. 280
Bernat concludes that herniation and infarction are easily tested on bedside
exam and provide conclusive evidence that there is extensive damage
throughout the brain resulting in the irreversible cessation of the clinical functions
of the brain. 281
Despite the above, Bernat concludes that WBD is an “approximation.” In
this regard, he argues it is not inconsistent that “nests” of neurons may survive
and even show quantifiable output. 282 Any continued functioning that remains,
he argues, does not contribute significantly to the organism as a whole and
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therefore cannot be considered critical, in which case the criterion of neurologic
death can be satisfied. 283
Michael Potts argues that some WBD patients continue to show
Electroencephalogram (EEG) activity, but as we saw earlier, Bernat and other
WBD proponents do not find this at odds with the definition of WBD, since the
residual function is not regarded as critical nor is it clinically apparent. 284 Halevy
and Brody reference data where 56 patients passed WBD protocol in which 11
patients had non-isoelectric EEGs and 2 patients had EEG activity that
resembled sleep patterns. 285 The post mortem exams revealed brain-stem
destruction with little higher brain damage. 286 Such EEG activity meets the
threshold for what the President’s Commission considers functioning since the
cellular activity is “organized and directed” thus showing another inconsistency in
concept and clinical tests. 287 This is not simply an error in diagnosis since an
EEG is not required for a declaration of WBD. This raises the specter of how
many patients who are not given an EEG can actually support organized and
directed activity.
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Siegler and Wikler note, “If the Whole-Brain Dead patient is a corpse, it
has some unusual properties”; in which they refer to a body that breathes,
circulates blood, digests food, filters wastes, and maintains temperature, which
becomes difficult to reconcile as dead. 288 WBD critics refer to an exhaustive
account of integrative functions that are not controlled by the brain but are
present in some WBD patients, therefore delivering a critical blow to the
assertion that the brain controls the entire organism and death of the brain is the
death of the organism as a whole. We are obligated to consider why these nonbrain mediated functions, which are clearly integrative, are discounted in the
diagnostic and conceptual underpinnings of WBD. They include the following:
Homeostasis of a variety of chemicals through the
liver, kidneys, and cardiovascular and endocrine
systems. Elimination, detoxification, and recycling
cellular wastes. Energy balance through the
interaction among liver, endocrine systems, muscle,
and fat. Maintenance of body temperature (at lower
than normal with the help of blankets). Wound
healing, fighting infections, febrile response to
infection, cardiovascular and hormonal stress
responses to unanesthetized incision for organ
retrieval, and gestation of a fetus. 289
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Working from what has been discussed above, Shewmon and others
assert that somatic integrative unity is not derivative in that it clearly does not rely
on one specific locus, such as the brain. Rather, the body itself has a unity that
is already presupposed which the brain contributes to and enhances but does not
control. In sum, the brain modulates a preexisting integrative unity but the brain
is not a prerequisite for biological life; Shewmon reminds us that integration does
not necessarily require an integrator per se as shown by plants and embryos. 290
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that a WBD patient is not dead
arises when such a patient successfully gestates a fetus to term. A 2003 article
published in Critical Care Medicine reviewed 10 such cases of women who
passed WBD protocols who were supported in ICUs in order to bring their
fetuses to term. 291 The longest amount of time a WBD patient spent on life
sustaining treatment was a woman who was fifteen weeks pregnant at the time of
admission and required support for 107 days. Surprisingly, the authors note,
“The clinical problems found in those women were similar to other long-term
patients in ICU.” 292 Clearly this comparison to other ICU patients implies that
these women were not corpses according to the traditional biological definition of
death or the WBD criterion that ostensibly fulfills it.
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When the Harvard Committee first introduced irreversible coma as a
criterion for death, which incidentally begs the question of how one who is in a
coma could be considered dead since coma refers specifically to a condition of
the living, they based it on a claim that rapid asystole inevitably occurred in such
patients. 293 It is clear from what we have discussed thus far that WBD patients
can continue on life sustaining treatment for much longer than originally
postulated, but the fact remains that such a claim was merely prognostic in
nature and not a legitimate way to determine that death had already occurred. 294
Shewmon and others admit that total brain destruction is predictive of death but
refer to ample empirical evidence to prove that the organism as a whole, though
disabled, is not yet dead. 295
The biological argument that a dead brain indicates a dead organism is
not necessarily true. A patient who respires and circulates blood, who can regain
hemodynamic stability, metabolize and excrete waste, exhibit some brain
function including measurable EEG output and an intact neurohormonal pathway,
raise her temperature with the help of blankets, gestate a fetus, and react to
surgical incision does not fulfill the definition of death on biological grounds.
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Further, as we have seen, the tests used to diagnose WBD are insufficient to
prove all brain functions have ceased.
V. Debate and Reevaluation of the definition of death
Aristotle cautioned us to not require greater precision than the subject
matter affords, and while we could devote an entire thesis to the epistemological
problems inherent in WBD, necessity dictates a compromise must be reached
between the unknowable and the practical in matters of life and death. However,
the fundamental problem is that WBD has been imposed upon society by
appealing to an unsound biological argument. As we have seen throughout this
chapter WBD attempts to fulfill the definition of death as the permanent cessation
of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole despite overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. At the conclusion of this chapter it should be clear that
WBD patients are not yet dead on the biological merits of this definition.
Shewmon argues persuasively and presents enough clinical evidence that
other scholars have no choice but to admit that the traditional biological basis of
the brain as the primary integrator of the organism as a whole is insufficient. This
should not be minimized since the reason we hold WBD as death is precisely
because we have been told the brain integrates the organism as a whole, without
which the body cannot survive. Bernat admits, “Alan Shewmon has written
convincingly that the integration argument alone is inadequate. After numerous
conversations with him over the years I have come to conclude that he is

106
probably correct. I have struggled to discern what else is important in addition to
the integrator theory.” 296
We might ask why the WBD concept continues to be endorsed given that
the criterion fails the definition of death and the diagnostic tests do not guarantee
a dead brain. It appears the reason is utilitarian, a view many hold and is well
summarized by Truog:
Given all of these problems with the concept of brain
death, what are possible solutions? The current
approach is simply to ignore all of these problems and
inconsistencies. Surprisingly, perhaps, this approach
has much to recommend to it. Our primary strategy
for organ procurement and transplantation relies
heavily upon the diagnosis of death by neurologic
criteria. Any serious disruption in the transplantation
enterprise could jeopardize opportunities to save the
lives of those in need of vital organs. As epitomized
in the name of the old game show “Truth or
Consequences,” sometimes it is better to sacrifice
devotion to the truth in order to optimize important
consequences. 297
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Notwithstanding Troug’s perspective, given the theoretical and practical
problems associated with WBD, it is ethically irresponsible to maintain the status
quo and grossly negligent to do so in order that transplantation may continue. As
Wikler notes,
Even though these beneficial effects arguably include
the savings of thousands of lives, however, they do
not in themselves constitute an argument in support
of the thesis that a patient is dead whose brain as a
whole has suffered irreversible cessation of
functioning. They merely show that good things
happen if we choose to operate with that definition of
death. Unless one is an extreme pragmatist, the
utility of such a belief does not demonstrate, let alone
constitute, its validity or truth. 298
WBD patients are not dead under the current definition of death and ought
not to be used as organ sources unless the public agrees to abandon the dead
donor rule or revise the definition of death. This final suggestion may prove to be
the best response to this problem.
I will suggest the definition of death be amended from a purely biological
model to an ontological definition that focuses on that which is essential to the
human person, the loss of which constitutes death. In this regard, the
justification for death will not be argued on purely organic terms, since as we
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have seen, the body can continue to integrate despite a dead brain, and also
because a strictly biologically oriented approach fails to capture that which
distinguishes humans from other animals. An ontological definition will rest on
the agreement that the human brain possesses unique functions and capacities,
which are significant to the nature of the human person to the extent that when
the individual has irreversibly lost such capacities he or she is dead.
In the following chapter I will argue that there is a difference between
biological life and human life. The cessation of the latter occurs when one has
irreversibly lost the capacity for consciousness or personhood despite the
persistence of the former. I do not claim to be able to determine precisely the
necessary conditions for personhood and/or consciousness; rather my intention
is to demonstrate that the concept undergirding higher brain death (HBD) is a
philosophically coherent alternative to WBD.
While I will endorse an ontological definition I will not advocate a HBD
criterion due to the inability to clinically quantify the loss of such human
properties, capacities, and functions. Therefore, revising the definition of death
will not require discarding the WBD criterion, which as a purely practical matter,
continues to work for society despite its shortcomings, though it may be
supplanted by other criteria as medicine improves. As Youngner and Bartlett
note, the various criteria used to fulfill the definition of death are determined by
the current medical and technical armamentarium but the definition itself, at the
philosophical level, will remain constant. 299
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It is true that organ transplantation can continue without a redefinition of
death by either maintaining the status quo, by embracing an overt utilitarian
perspective that such patients are “dead enough,” or by abandoning the dead
donor rule in which some people will be considered candidates for donation if
they are “beyond harm.” These are not ideal choices, however. The status quo
requires that we accept that a dead brain ensures that the organism as a whole
is dead, yet as we have presented throughout this chapter, there are compelling
philosophical arguments and clinical data that suggest otherwise. Recently, at a
closed meeting on DCD, the participants, composed of physicians, nurses,
lawyers, and transplant coordinators, were strongly opposed to abandoning the
dead donor rule. 300 The consensus was that it would actually be to the detriment
of transplantation as it may fuel public distrust hinging on questions social justice
such that individuals may fear they may not receive adequate medical care if
another life is at stake.
It is perhaps painfully naive or impossibly arrogant to assume that we can
implement a new definition of death and solve all of these issues. It should be
clear at this point that this is a complicated issue and the best we can hope for is
an answer with fewer problems than the current alternative. This chapter has
reviewed the major conceptual issues surrounding WBD, both medical and
philosophical, in which I have argued that a dead brain does not necessarily
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equal a dead human being on the merits of the traditional biological argument.
The obvious tension we have exposed is that the biological model itself is
insufficient for a definition of human death since a person cannot be dead until
the brain is dead, but this requires more than a purely physiologic argument, one
we shall discuss in the following chapter.
Donation After Cardiac Death relies on a different criterion of death than
the WBD criterion but both criteria are said to rest on the same biological
definition of death. I will argue that the neurologic criterion and the cardiac
criterion do not inform the same definition of death, either biological or
ontological, and thus DCD removes organs from the dying rather than dead
regardless of which definition one espouses.
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Chapter 4
Evaluating Higher Brain Death

I do not want to be confused with my gagging…I even take it as kind of an insult
that I could be confused with any of these trivial bodily capacities. 301

Having examined the traditional definition of death and the conceptual and
clinical problems inherent with the whole brain death (WBD) criterion, we have an
additional issue to resolve before we can argue against the legitimacy of
Donation After Cardiac Death. This chapter will offer an alternative definition of
death and evaluate a higher brain death (HBD) criterion. I will proceed by
examining the various approaches used to evaluate any definition of death. I will
ultimately choose an ontological one, which does not focus solely on the loss of
organismic functioning, but considers that which is essential to the nature of the
human person, the loss of which signifies human death. After identifying this
specific approach to frame our discussion, I will then explore the conceptual
basis for the neurologically oriented concept of death as opposed to the
traditional cardio-respiratory concept. Following this, I will specify the formal
concept of death, explore the philosophical underpinnings of HBD, and evaluate
whether it can be used as a criterion to fit our new definition.
After exploring its conceptual roots, I will review the current criticisms of
the HBD criterion and argue that it cannot yet be accurately quantified clinically
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and therefore is relevant in metaphorical rather than public-policy-making terms
for the determination of death. I will conclude this chapter by arguing that,
although irreversible loss of consciousness is a more philosophically sound
approach to determining death than the biological argument focusing on
integrated functioning, diagnostic weaknesses preclude moving to a HBD
criterion.
Consequently, I will recommend that the WBD criterion be maintained in
order to fulfill our new definition of death until tests for HBD gain greater
specificity, since all those who meet WBD will necessarily meet HBD. In so
doing we recognize the need not only for a defensible concept of death, since the
current use of WBD rests on the faulty premises that a functioning brain is
required for integrative life and that any functions that are not regulated by the
brain are necessarily unintegrated, but also the need for clinical confidence. I
concluded the last chapter by claiming that WBD patients are not dead according
to the traditional definition of death. I will conclude this chapter with the assertion
that WBD patients are dead if we adopt a new definition of death.
In the modern era death is often no longer a singular event where all vital
functions fail at once. Rather, technology has caused death to be fragmented,
the result of which can be the preservation of biological functioning absent a
human subject to experience it. While it is accurate to say that death is a
process, we attempt to quantify it as a specific event purely for pragmatic
purposes: mourning, burial practices, transfer of legal rights and responsibilities,
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organ and tissue procurement, etc. 302 However, in our attempts to cleave to an
outdated binary model for what is now a nonlinear phenomenon we have
encountered insurmountable problems. Our definition and criteria of death are
no longer consistent; thus the reevaluation of when death is and how we
determine it has occurred is mandated.
I do not claim to be able to solve unequivocally the question of when death
has occurred or how it ought to be declared, but there is a pressing need for a
more formidable alternative to the current definition and criteria that are in place
given the conceptual and operational ambiguities. In embarking on this task to
define death I am reminded that, “It is only the ideologue or the fool who
acknowledges noon and midnight, but denies all the states of light and darkness
that smoothly shade together in the real world, to create day and night.” 303
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I. Revisiting the problem
As we have seen, the traditional definition of death is the irreversible
cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole. This
definition focuses solely on organic or biological functioning. The criteria used to
fulfill this definition, discussed in the two previous chapters, are the cardio
respiratory (CR) criterion and the WBD criterion as endorsed by the Uniform
Determination of Death Act (UDDA). Heretofore we are concerned with the
neurologic criterion, as the CR criterion will be carefully examined in the following
chapter on Donation After Cardiac Death (DCD).
We encountered two primary problems with WBD as a criterion to fulfill the
traditional concept of death in the previous chapter. First, we saw that a body that
passes a WBD protocol often may continue to integrate at the level of the
organism as a whole, such that though the criterion of death has been fulfilled (a
dead brain), the definition of death has not (cessation of integrated
functioning). 304 Second, we saw that patients who are diagnosed as WBD may
not have lost all functions of the entire brain. 305 This forced the rather counter
intuitive question of how much of the brain must be dead in “whole” brain death.
By way of a brief recapitulation, recall the integrated functions that occur in
the organism as a whole that do not cease in the presence of a non functional
brain including homeostasis, energy balance, wound healing, infection fighting,
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gestation of a fetus, and circulation and respiration. 306 Consider also the
following brain functions that may persist after a declaration of WBD including the
presence of hypothalamic function sufficient to prevent the development of
diabetes insipidus; the regulation of free-water homeostasis through arginine
vasopressin, and continued EEG activity. 307
It is clear that sometimes the whole brain is not dead after a declaration of
WBD. WBD advocates concede this by arguing that some brain functions, those
that contribute to the integration of the organism of the whole, are more important
than others. 308 The functions they include and exclude are arguable, however,
as pupillary responses, which must be absent for WBD, do not reflect integration
whereas an intact neurohormonal pathway does reflect integration but may
persist despite a declaration of WBD. Thus, purely from a linguistics perspective
whole brain death is not necessarily an accurate term. We will have to arrive at
some agreement on what parts and how much of the brain should be dead in
order to be certain that a brain-based criterion has been met, but we must
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prescind from this issue for the moment as our first task is to decide on an
appropriate foundation upon which to base our new definition of death.

II. Approaches to define death
In devising a coherent definition of death we must distinguish between
three conceptual approaches: (1) biological arguments, (2) moral arguments, and
(3) ontological/metaphysical arguments. The biological arguments are well
represented by the traditional concept of death, which focuses on integrated
biological functioning. Such a position makes no distinction between the death of
Fido the canine or the death of Mother Theresa; death occurs for both when
organismic functioning fails. The moral arguments focus on value and quality of
life (QOL), such that death is determined when a person lacks the requisite
features that make life more valuable than death. Ontological arguments
establish what is significant to the nature of the human person; they are
concerned with those characteristics that are necessary conditions for the
existence of a human being.
We must evaluate these approaches in turn in order to determine which
will best serve us in discovering what is the quantum change that differentiates
life from death. We will see how the President’s Commission identifies the
human being solely on the basis of its being a biological organism without
reference to its unique capacities. The biological argument focuses on several
functions it considers necessary for life: the ability to breathe spontaneously,
demonstration of cephalic reflexes, regulation of body temperature, metabolism,
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and blood pressure control. 309 Notwithstanding that many of these functions
persist after a declaration of WBD, these represent the autonomic functions of
the central nervous system and do not speak to any “human functions” such as
consciousness, personhood, or self-reflection. 310
By ignoring capacities specific to the human being, the President’s
Commission commits itself to a purely biological perspective of life and death.
This leads some to conclude that this approach is specious since it actually
characterizes the death of the wrong type of organism, one that is not a human
being. 311 To see clearly how the Commission focuses on biological functioning
we need to consider their position on decapitation.
The Commission argues that if exsanguination were prevented in a
decapitated body and a ventilator were attached to maintain respiration and
circulation, such a body would not be alive despite such continued functions. 312
Roland Puccetti argues that the Commission must then regard a body that has
been only partially decapitated, one with an intact brain stem that supports
spontaneous custodial functions, as alive. He exposes the difficulty with the
Commission’s position when he points out that if we excise the brain stem and
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substitute a ventilator the body is immediately considered dead though there is
no discernable difference aside from assisted versus spontaneous function. 313
We have discussed at length in the previous chapter the problems
associated with determining life from death based solely on whether or not
integrated functions continue spontaneously or with assistance. If integrated
functioning can continue via mechanical assistance then the source ought not to
matter. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, brain stem function
is not a sine qua non for life as patients with high spinal cord injury rely on
mechanical assistance to maintain biological integration yet are certainly not
considered dead. 314
Puccetti’s example shows how the biological argument, which relies on
integration to differentiate life from death, is inconsistent, since integration can
continue in each of the decapitated bodies. It makes little sense to claim a body
is alive on the basis of spontaneous brainstem function when a patient who lacks
spontaneous brainstem function, such as someone with GBS, is not regarded as
dead. What is truly at stake is consciousness, though if the traditional biological
argument is to remain true to its position (that death is the loss of integrating
function) then consciousness is irrelevant since it is not an integrating function of
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Recall also severe cases of Gullain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) in which
mechanical assistance maintains somatic integration until the patient can recover. Such
patients can meet the clinical criteria for WBD, yet since they retain the capacity for
consciousness they are not declared dead. Consciousness, as we have seen in the
previous chapter however, does not play a role in biological integration, and as such
GBS patients ought to be regarded as dead if the biological perspective is applied
consistently.
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the organism as a whole. Puccetti’s argument shows that either integration or
consciousness is of primary importance in determining life from death, but since
they rely on entirely different justifications it cannot be both, as one rests on a
biological argument and the other on an ontological one. Puccetti shows that a
choice is mandated when he concludes, “Either human life is rooted in brain stem
function or in the capacity for human experience.” 315 We will argue for the latter
in this chapter.
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., offers an example to illustrate how the
biological argument falls short of a meaningful conception of human life. He
offers the following thought experiment: imagine a neurologist informs you that
you are suffering from an untreatable, terminally degenerative brain disease.
The doctor reassures you that the prognosis is not as grim as you might think,
however, since modern technology will be able to keep your body functioning for
a near normal life expectancy despite the fact that the entire brain will ultimately
be destroyed. This condition is known as whole brain death. Not wanting to
“live” in such a state, you seek a second opinion only to be told that the entire
brain will not be destroyed. Instead, the brain stem will be functional and you will
not only have a full life expectancy, but you will be able to ventilate
independently. This condition is known as higher brain death. Engelhardt
concludes that brainstem integration is not a sufficient condition for existence, but
rather there is a difference between human and biological life. The former refers
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to at least some level of self-awareness or sentience while the latter refers to
organic functions. 316
Robert Veatch faults the biological perspective for
primarily focusing on non-essential functions, which fail to
recognize that human death has normative import.

To view man as essentially a respiratory creature is to
ignore most of the faculties which philosophers and
anthropologists have considered essential to the
species…It ignores man’s rational capacity, his ability
to experience emotion…It ignores his capacity for
consciousness and memory which in turn gives rise to
purposes, actions, and the eventual building of
language and culture. 317
It seems apparent that the biological approach has serious deficiencies
and will not serve as a valid approach to determine death. Thus we must now
evaluate a moral perspective. Jonathan Glover favors the moral approach to
evaluating a proper definition of death by claiming that we must decide what type
of existence has value. 318 Josie Fisher focuses the moral argument not solely on
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QOL but on the moral value of technology. She compares and contrasts two
high-profile patients, Karen Ann Quinlan, who was in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS) but ultimately was found to ventilate spontaneously, and Trisha Marshall
who was WBD but maintained on life sustaining treatment (LST) for one hundred
five days to deliver her child by Cesarean section. 319 The only difference
between the two women was that Marshall continued to integrate as an organism
as a whole with LST while Quinlan did so spontaneously. Fisher concludes that
unless there is a morally relevant difference between spontaneous and assisted
integrated functioning, the moral status of the two women was univocal. 320
John C. Hoffman uses the moral approach to answer “what minimal
quality of life in a human body preserves sufficient intrinsic value to obligate us to
regard it as a living person?” 321 He concludes that the value of life is contingent
on QOL such that we may not be obligated to regard all human life as inherently
valuable if it falls below a specified threshold. In contradistinction, Hans Jonas,
who also uses the moral approach, argues that human life simply by virtue of it
being human life has intrinsic value that is unaffected by any change in QOL. 322
Jonas agrees with Fisher that technology has no bearing on distinguishing life
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from death, but disagrees with her that the WBD patient is dead. Jonas focuses
on QOL as it pertains to the individual, such that when life is of no value for that
individual it need not be prolonged, but a QOL argument does not justify a
declaration of death.
Jonas shows that the moral approach is, though for different reasons,
equally problematic as the biological argument, since QOL alone cannot
distinguish life from death. As Green and Wikler note, some conditions, senility
for example, may cause QOL to plummet long before a diagnosis of death.
While one may prefer to be declared dead rather than to exist in a state that may
be valueless for one, this does not make a person dead. 323
Green and Wikler pose the question for moralists thusly, “The question to
be answered is whether the moral proposition that maintenance of the brain dead
preserves nothing of value and may be ceased when convenient, shows the
brain dead are dead.” 324 They conclude that the QOL of the brain dead patient
merely shows that the patient need not be supported, not that he is dead. The
perils of determining death based solely on QOL assessments may well lead us
to revisit reprehensible acts justified in Nazi Germany and in works such as
Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Living. 325
Taken on their own, the biological and moral approaches are insufficient
to analyze a concept of human death. However, death does have biological and
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moral components; thus it may serve our purposes to utilize a tripartite approach
that considers biological and moral elements while embarking on what is
primarily an ontological pursuit. Thus I will attempt to define the death of the
human being rather than a generic, biological definition of death that applies to all
species, since humans are ontologically different from other animals. The death
of a dog is categorically different than the death of a human. Fido cannot
participate in morality; he cannot, most people would agree, ponder his inner
Fidoness. 326 We cannot take up an excursus on the moral status of animals
here; it must be enough to note that many philosophers would argue that when a
human has lost the fundamental attributes that confer humanness, she becomes
only a Fido-like entity; an organic, living thing but no longer a human being. 327
Aristotle distinguished between accidental and essential properties. An
accidental property is something a thing can lose without ceasing to exist as that
particular kind of thing, hair color for instance. By contrast, an essential property
is something that a thing cannot lose without ceasing to exist as that kind of a
thing. Answering what this essential thing is that makes a human being a human
being is an ontological question, which lies at the heart of any definition of death.
At this juncture we have established that the biological and moral
arguments taken independently cannot provide a conceptual basis for human
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death. Our task now is to explore the basis of any neurologic concept of death,
that is, to examine whether WBD and HBD rest on the same foundation or if HBD
rests on a different concept entirely. If death declared by any neurologic criterion
is conceptually distinct from death declared on the traditional CR criterion, then
WBD and HBD differ in degree rather than kind, since both depart from the
traditional definition of death.

III. Competing concepts of death
Despite the fact that the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee for the Redefinition of
Death did not defend a conceptual justification for declaring the irreversibly
comatose dead, it is instructive to review the language used and their motivation
for endorsing a neurologic criterion of death. The Committee discussed the
“burden” of those who fulfill the neurologic criterion and described them as
“patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect.” The Committee recognized that
modern technology could “…restore ‘life’ as judged by the ancient standards of
persistent respiration and continued heart beat” but such patients should
nevertheless be declared dead because “…there is not the remotest possibility of
an individual recovering consciousness following massive brain damage.” 328
In an unpublished paper delivered at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science Meeting in 1970, Henry Beecher, chairman of the
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee, defended his position that spinal reflexes could be
excluded from the brain-based criterion because he did not consider its functions
essential. He described essential functions as “the individual’s personality, his
328
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conscious life, his uniqueness, his capacity for remembering, judging, reasoning,
acting, enjoying, worrying, and so on.” 329 Clearly the language the President’s
Commission subsequently adopted for WBD, such as “the functioning of the
organism as a whole” or “the body’s ability to organize and regulate itself,” is a
clear departure from the original arguments for WBD, which not only
acknowledged but seemed to favor higher brain functions. 330
The President’s Commission resisted moving to a new concept of death,
favoring instead a conservative approach that did not disturb societal
consensus. 331 However, we need to examine this claim more closely since first,
as Veatch notes, simply because a concept is new is no basis for rejecting it;
second, WBD actually is a conceptual change from the traditional cardio
respiratory approach; and third, the Harvard Committee itself acknowledged that
such a conceptual change was involved in the shift from a cardiac to a neurologic
determination of death. 332
The traditional use of the cardio-respiratory criterion focused on the
importance of the heart and lungs to the extent that their failure served as
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indicators of death. WBD strategists piggybacked their concept onto the CR
concept and declared that these were synonymous approaches since absence of
CR activity would inexorably lead to brain failure; therefore such functions were
used as indirect tests of brain status. The argument that heart and lung function
were historically used only as signs of brain activity is suspect, however.
Julius Korein claims that the WBD criterion and the CR criterion operate
under the same concept since WBD follows from CR failure, although he admits
that we cannot conclude the traditional criteria are brain centered. 333 The shift to
a neurologic criterion allowed death to be declared in the presence of heart and
lung function. Never before in the history of humanity had death been declared
while the corpse was warm, had spontaneous heart beat, and continued to
breathe and circulate blood. 334 Heartbeat and circulation were traditionally used
as indicators of death rather than as indicia of neurological status.
Gervais claims that the WBD criterion is not heart centered nor is the
traditional CR criterion brain centered but that they are in fact disjunctive. 335
Veatch concurs by arguing that a neurological concept is clearly concerned with
the functions of the brain, which was a distinct move away from the traditional
criteria that regarded non-neurological functions as the sine qua non for life. 336
The President’s Commission asserted that continued respiration and circulation
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is not to be taken as a sign of life in the presence of a dead brain whereas the
traditional CR criteria focused precisely on respiration and circulation to
distinguish life from death.
The issue of spontaneous versus assisted life comes to the fore yet again.
Green and Wikler note that if we define ‘spontaneous’ to mean independent of a
mechanistic source, then the capacity for respiration and heart beat is a property
of the body as a whole, in which case WBD is not equivalent to the loss of
capacity of spontaneous respiration and heart beat. 337 Nevertheless, they
continue, loss of such spontaneous function cannot be the litmus test for death
as evidenced by those with pacemakers or high spinal cord injury. 338 It does not
matter then that WBD may reflect the loss of spontaneous functions since
cessation of spontaneous function is not a necessary condition for death. The
use of the WBD criterion means that in some cases it does not matter that cardio
respiratory functions continue, which is a clear departure from our traditional
notion of death. 339
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Some would dispute, however, the claim that cardiac activity in the WBD
patient is spontaneous. Robert Schwager claims that since the heart will stop
functioning once mechanical ventilation is removed, heartbeat is nonspontaneous; therefore there is no change in the concept of death, which
requires permanent cessation of spontaneous cardiac function. 340 His argument
is curious, however, since cessation of ‘spontaneous’ functions is not required for
any statutory or conceptual definition of death. More to the point, however, he
relies on a fallacious dependency clause between the heart and the lungs,
arguing that if mechanical ventilation causes the lungs to function then heartbeat
is by default non-spontaneous. 341
Schwager’s primary mistake is found in his dependency relation because,
as Gervais reminds us, functions are only categorized as non-spontaneous when
they directly receive mechanical assistance. 342 Schwager’s argument is also
clinically flawed since the heart can continue to beat for a prolonged period of
time even after mechanical ventilation is removed. 343 Hence, there is a significant
conceptual change that comes with using a neurological criterion when the
spontaneous heartbeat is viewed as irrelevant. 344
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This leads us to consider a crucial question posed by Gervais: why is it
legitimate to declare death in a permanently comatose individual when
technological intervention could successfully maintain somatic integration, but
illegitimate to declare death for a patient who requires such artifice because his
brain stem is dysfunctional (i.e. in high spinal cord injury)? The reason is
because the first patient is permanently comatose whereas the second retains
consciousness. As Gervais asserts, that somatic function is assisted in the
second case is irrelevant because consciousness, not integrated functioning, is
of fundamental import. 345 Thus, it seems disingenuous that the President’s
Commission would argue against HBD on the basis that it endorses a new
concept of death when WBD itself is a new concept from the traditional CR
criterion and rests on the same foundation as HBD.
The President’s Commission attempts to assimilate WBD with the
traditional CR criterion but, as others have noted, to do so embroils them in a
severe case of conceptual schizophrenia. The Commission focuses on
integrated functioning as evidence of life but is silent regarding how
consciousness, which is not necessary for integrated life, is related. Further,
functioning is dismissed as ‘unintegrated’ when it is artificially maintained in
certain circumstances—when the brain stem is dead—but only if consciousness
(which does not contribute to somatic integration) is also permanently absent. It
fails to explain how consciousness fits into this biological argument.

345

Gervais, Redefining Death 33.

130
The core of WBD lies in the permanent loss of consciousness as
essentially significant since it is only when consciousness is permanently lost that
integrated functions are ever discounted. 346 But, if the Commission were to
admit this, then they would have also to concede that integrated functioning
(spontaneous or assisted) is not really the sine qua non for life; consciousness is,
and as such, the entire brain need not be dead in order to fulfill brain death
protocol. 347 This would require a shift from a biological to an ontological
approach, one we will engage in presently.
We must now specify the formal concept of death, in that we must
determine that which is essential to the human being, the loss of which signifies
death. We will need to identify the conditions of existence for persons since I
argued earlier that human death is the death of the person rather than the death
of the human organism. We must bear in mind that if there were agreement on
this issue it would no longer be a fertile philosophical debate; thus our purpose is
not to make a sweeping conclusion on the matter but to present a variety of
arguments and align with the most compelling.
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IV. A new definition of death
The President’s Commission acknowledged that the concept of death is
“fundamentally a philosophical matter” though they were not committed to
pursuing what they classified as abstract definitions (necessary conditions of
personhood for example) for the purposes of public policy. 348 The Commission
wrote,
Personhood consists of the complex of activities (or of
capacities to engage in them) such as thinking,
reasoning, feeling, human intercourse which make the
human different from, or superior to, animals or
things. One higher brain formulation would define
death as the loss of what is essential to a person.
Those advocating the personhood definition often
relate these characteristics to brain functioning.
Without brain activity, people are incapable of these
essential activities. A breathing body, the argument
goes, is not in itself a person; and, without functioning
brains, patients are merely breathing bodies. Hence
personhood ends when the brain suffers irreversible
loss of function. 349
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The Commission claimed it could not endorse such an argument due to the lack
of consensus regarding which characteristics are essential for personhood. 350 It
appears they avoided a genuine philosophical analysis that would determine the
conditions of existence of persons and instead endorsed a biological definition of
death simply because it was less controversial, rather than because a personcentered definition was indefensible. 351
John Lizza argues that the lack of consensus is overstated; for while there
has been longstanding philosophical debate over which particular attributes or
capacities are essential to personhood, there is agreement that some cognitive
function is essential for being regarded as a person. 352 Lizza refers to the
various philosophers who have articulated the necessary conditions for
personhood: Aristotle defined it as rationality, Descartes as thinking, Locke as
awareness of self over time, Hume as psychological characteristics, and Sartre
as self- consciousness or intentionality. 353
Lizza endorses a substantive account of personhood, meaning that it is
not simply a manifestation of certain functions but personhood refers instead to
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the unique self; it is what makes you specifically you and no other. 354 The
President’s Commission adopts the contrary view; it does not define personhood
as an entity but in terms of certain abilities. Lizza draws from twentieth century
philosophers Peter Strawson and David Wiggins, who hold that persons are not
merely states of consciousness but have corporeal characteristics as well. In this
way they reject the dualistic stance of the President’s Commission and endorse
personhood as that which is embodied; the loss of either physical or mental
attributes equally portends death. 355
Lizza admits that specifying particular traits to determine personhood may
be impossible, but at a minimum some cognitive function is required, though he
defines the person as having both psychological and material qualities that
equally apply; the loss of either is equivalent with death. 356 Lizza defines death
as the irreversible loss of the person. The criterion he uses to fulfill this definition
is the irreversible cessation of higher brain function, which renders any cognitive
function impossible. 357 We will thoroughly discuss the HBD criterion in the
following section; presently, however, we are concerned with evaluating a
person-centered definition of death as opposed to the traditional definition of
death as the irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism
as a whole.
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Lizza, as well as those who advocate a person-centered rather than a
biological approach, recognize that by making a distinction between conscious
and biological life the death of the former is possible despite the continuance of
the latter, which will leave an entity that may appear human but is actually a
“humanoid” or “biological artifact.” 358 James Bernat, a supporter of the biological
definition, argues that such a view is unacceptable since “most of the functions of
their organism as a whole are in intact” in patients who are neocortically dead. 359
Robert Veatch responds that Bernat’s position focuses solely on enumerating a
majority of functions to determine life from death rather than assessing whether
the essential ones are present or absent. 360
While it may initially appear counterintuitive to pronounce human death in
the presence of biological life, we should bear in mind that continued biological
functioning occurs in WBD patients and in this case it is regarded as artifact.361
Thus, by using the WBD criterion to fulfill the biological definition of death, we
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already do distinguish human life from organic life if only inconsistently. 362
Further, as Richard Zaner illustrates, the Commission itself implies that the death
of a human being is the death of the person when they speak of “bodies lacking
all brain function and patients with intact brainstems.” 363
As Bartlett and Youngner note, the WBD criterion does not correspond
with the biological definition of death, which would only require destruction of the
brainstem. A WBD patient and a Locked-In patient have both lost the ability to
integrate as an organism as a whole and would be classified as dead according
to the biological definition of death, yet only the WBD patient is classified as dead
according to the WBD criterion. 364 Bartlett and Youngner suggest that the
definition of death ought to be consonant with the criterion, which requires that
we identify which attributes are more important than others, precisely the issue
the President’s Commission failed to address.
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Gervais captures the problem succinctly: “In a theoretically blind
maneuver we adopted a criterion for determining death, along with attendant
tests to ensure it was fulfilled without clarifying the underlying concept of
death.” 365 She frames the issue by focusing on the reasonableness of WBD, that
is, she suggests WBD was accepted so readily because it assured us that a
patient had irreversibly lost consciousness and that loss was the determinant
factor in judging such a patient as dead. 366 As we have seen, patients who retain
consciousness despite having lost the capacity to spontaneously regulate
integrative functions are regarded as alive. Consciousness then is regarded as
indicative of personal existence and its loss is regarded as death.
Robert Veatch, perhaps best known as the pioneer for HBD and a prolific
critic of the biological definition of death, argues that we must identify those
characteristics or attributes that are essential to humanness if we are to
adequately define the death of the human being. In contradistinction to Strawson
and Wiggins, and by association Lizza as well, Veatch aligns with a functionalist
argument, that is, the notion that the physical substrate that supports the function
is not the essence of a thing, rather the function itself is what is essential, and
provided it continues it does not matter what causes it. 367 In other words, a clock
is a clock by virtue of its telling time, not by virtue of what it is made of, since it
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could be digital or composed of springs and dials. 368 Veatch argues that a
patient with an artificial brain would be considered alive since it is not the
neurological tissue per se that is important but rather the continuance of
consciousness, experience, reason, etc. 369
However, Veatch is often purposely ambiguous and fails to carry his
arguments to a solid conclusion. For example, he claims that a person is dead
when he loses higher brain functions but does not argue convincingly why this is
the case. He states, “The question of what characteristics are essential for
treating someone as alive can be dealt with without reference to the personhood
debate or deciding what characteristics are essential to personhood.” 370 Though
he effectively dismantles the President’s Commission’s biological argument, his
own argument appears to sidestep the issue. He settles on what he deems
critical to the human being: the embodied capacity for consciousness or social
interaction although his use of the word ‘embodied’ is curious. 371
If functions are important to the degree that an artificial brain, which could
produce such functions would be regarded as alive, it is somewhat strange to
then require it be embodied within a human form. That is to say, if the material
brain is not important why is the material body of paramount concern? The
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analogy often used to flesh out the problems with functionalism is that if the brain
is viewed as hardware and its functions as software, it may be theoretically
possible to download such information onto a disc or a computer tape and upload
it into another body whose brain has been stripped or even onto a computer.
Though it incites discomfort, it would be difficult to argue such a computer was
not alive if consciousness could in fact be transferred in such a way. 372 We
cannot focus attention on the mind-body problem, which is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. An unsettling notion to consider, however, is that since
consciousness is a subjective phenomenon it would be difficult to be able ever to
prove one is in fact a conscious entity. 373 We will revisit some of the problems
inherent with the concept of consciousness when we explore the criticisms of the
HBD criterion.
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Similar to Veatch, Green and Wikler also focus on the conditions of
existence of persons but rely on a theory of personal identity. Though I believe
their position is inconsistent and ultimately indefensible, it is noteworthy both
because of its prominence in the literature and because it exposes the
weaknesses in the biological definition. Similar to Gervais, they note, “If the loss
of capacity for mental activity which occurs at brain death constitutes death, it is
not for moral or biological reasons but ontological ones.” 374 Accordingly, a
person ceases to exist at brain death not for the biological justification, which as
we have seen is vexed, but because the body has lost its psychological traits.
Green and Wikler advance their theory based on the view that personal
identity cannot continue in the presence of brain death. They argue, “The
continued possession of certain psychological properties by means of a certain
causal process is an essential requirement for any given entity to be identical
with the individual who is ‘Jones’.” 375 Brain death effectively rules out the ability
of ‘Jones’ to retain psychological capacities and therefore his identity ceases to
exist.
It appears that for Green and Wikler there must be more than the
preservation of brain tissue; rather, certain brain processes that occur within the
tissue are also required for personal identity. They claim, “A given person ceases
to exist with the destruction of whatever processes there are which normally
underlie that person’s psychological continuity and connectedness…These
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processes are essentially neurological so that the irreversible cessation of upper
brain functioning constitutes the death of the person.” 376 In what appears to be
the undoing of their argument they go on to claim that their position does not
assume death occurs upon loss of consciousness so long as brain matter is
preserved. They refer to a comatose patient who might be alive if enough of the
brain were structurally and functionally preserved. The question that arises is,
how much is ‘enough’ and how could one evaluate, under such circumstances,
whether functions were intact? That is to say, they do not articulate how a
comatose patient could demonstrate ‘enough’ functions have remained intact.
Moreover, we must question how psychological continuity continues in the
absence of consciousness; it may be the case, although they fail to defend their
contention.
Green and Wikler appear then to undermine their argument by claiming
that simply because a human does not have the requisite matter to support
consciousness does not necessarily mean she is dead. 377 They make reference
to the anencephalic who, it appears, has no capacity for personal history or
psychological functions or personal identity since it lacks a forebrain, yet they
place it in a separate category of “never-to-be-conscious,” which means the
conditions are not the same as for those for persons. It would seem less
ponderous to simply apply the absence of personal identity to such infants rather
than construct a different category.
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Somewhat more difficult to accept, however, is the following position that
“the issue is not whether the patient is a person after brain death. It is whether
the person is that person, ‘Jones’.” 378 This commits Green and Wikler to declare
a person who suffers an injury, amnesia for example, as dead if he does not
retain the same psychological history. Clearly this is a conclusion we must
reject. Gervais argues the loss of personal identity alone is not a sufficient
condition for declaring death, but rather that personal identity is present as long
as there remains some capacity for mental life. 379
Karen Gervais offers perhaps the most cogent argument for the death of
the person as the loss of consciousness. She, as well as the various
philosophers discussed in this section, attempts to identify the conditions of
existence for persons rather than for organisms. Accordingly the death of the
human being is equivalent with the irreversible loss of the person as opposed to
the cessation of integrated biological functioning, which we have demonstrated
describes the death of something that is not necessarily a human being. 380
Gervais asserts that consciousness is the sine qua non for personal existence;
she claims, “The individual’s essence consists in the possession of a conscious,
yet not necessarily continuous, mental life; if all mental life ceases, the person
ceases to exist; when the person ceases to exist, the person has died…Upper
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brain death destroys all capacity for a conscious, mental life and it is therefore
the death of the person.” 381
Gervais argues that neither WBD nor HBD rest on the same foundation as
the biological argument, which focuses on integrated functioning. The WBD and
HBD criteria move from an organismic concept to a consciousness-based
concept and, as we have thoroughly examined, organismic functioning continues
in both WBD and HBD. That such integrated functioning is assisted in the former
but not in the latter is irrelevant. The shift to WBD was an epic change that made
the transition from focusing on the human being as merely an organism to a
person. However, as we have seen, despite the motivation of the Harvard
Committee, later WBD advocates refused to concede that such a change
occurred and continue to manipulate the legitimacy of WBD on organismic
grounds, a legitimacy that WBD simply cannot consistently claim. The only
option for conceptual clarity is to admit that WBD is fundamentally concerned
with the death of the person though it includes parts of the brain that are
extraneous in determining life from death. As Veatch notes, we need not include
all portions of the brain; we need only to focus on those parts that produce the
functions that are significant to man’s nature. 382
Gervais argues that any definition of death requires choosing a decision of
significance, that is, agreement that the loss of a particular attribute or attributes
constitutes the death of the human person. She views the continuance of
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consciousness, regardless of its quality, as that which signifies life and its
absence personal death. 383 She crafts her argument in a manner fit for public
policy, which is not something that can be said of much of the academic
arguments which attempt to grapple with such ontological issues. Her proposed
statute is as follows:
Human death is the death of the individual person.
An individual person is dead when an irreversible
cessation of brain functions necessary for
consciousness has occurred. The cessation of these
brain functions can be determined by the prolonged
absence of spontaneous cardiac and respiratory
functions. When artificial support systems are in use,
the cessation of these brain functions may be
determined by any means recognized by the ordinary
standards of ordinary medical practice. When cardiac
and respiratory functions continue spontaneously, the
cessation of these brain functions may be determined
by any means recognized by the ordinary standards
of current medical practice. 384

383

Gervais, Redefining Death 169.

384

Gervais, Redefining Death 213. She also includes a conscience clause for
those who believe death occurs only at WBD though for the purposes of legal situations
(determining if one should be charged with murder, for example) death occurs when the
brain has been damaged to the extent that consciousness has been irreversibly lost.

144
We have thus far examined how the biological argument is seriously
flawed and how the WBD criterion is not consonant with it. We have also
examined the conceptual foundation of WBD and HBD and concluded they both
rest on a different justification than the traditional cardio-respiratory criterion, one
that considers consciousness rather than organismic functioning as the sine qua
non for human personal life. 385
In light of this, we have also argued for determining the death of the
human person, rather than the human organism because the death of the human
is metaphysically distinct from the death of other animals. This required that we
identify the conditions of existence for what it means to be a human being rather
than a human organism. This section reviewed the various approaches used to
identify what is essential to the human being, the loss of which equals death.
Though there remains philosophical disagreement regarding the sufficient
conditions for personhood, there is agreement that irreversible loss of higher
brain function is the death of the individual and is a necessary and sufficient
criterion for death since personhood cannot persist after neocortical death. 386
We need now to evaluate the criterion of HBD.
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V. Conceptual and clinical difficulties with the higher brain death
criterion
The Higher Brain Death criterion is used to fulfill the definition of death of
the human person rather than the death of the human organism. Generally, as
we have seen, this concept rests on the ontological claim that the death of the
human being is the death of the person, whether it is described in terms of the
irreversible loss of personhood, consciousness, rationality, or personal identity.
The primary difficulty that arises, which must be addressed prior to the clinical
concerns with HBD, is that consciousness and/or personhood are popular terms
that philosophers frequently use; yet they are highly ambiguous. 387 The first task
then is to define what we mean by consciousness.
Consciousness is typically defined in one of three ways: as a waking
state/arousal, as experience, and as the possession of any mental state. 388 Selfconsciousness can refer to an exhaustive account but is generally regarded as
knowledge of awareness of self. 389 Certainly we are not the only creatures who
have the capacity for experience, arousal, or mental states. Thomas Nagel
attributes consciousness to an entity if there is something it is like to be that
entity. 390 Whether or not other creatures have self-consciousness is arguable,
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although, as John Searle notes, capacity for consciousness does not necessarily
imply self-consciousness. 391
It would seem that most HBD advocates use consciousness as the
possession of a mental life to the extent that this refers to an experiencing
subject, one that is self-reflexive. Consciousness relies on several physiological
conditions within the Central Nervous System (CNS) before it can manifest itself,
though the neuroanatomy of consciousness is ill defined. Consciousness is often
regarded as the product of higher brain function but as The President’s
Commission contends, “It is not known which portions of the brain are
responsible for cognition and consciousness; what little is known points to
substantial interconnection among the brain stem, subcortical structures, and the
neocortex.” 392
The brain stem does play an important role in regulating arousal;
specifically, the Ascending Reticular Activating System (ARAS) is a network that
regulates conscious states, which diffusely affects the CNS but does not pinpoint
a specific locus where consciousness occurs. 393 Consciousness is contingent on
arousal, which is a vegetative function, but the two are not synonomous since it
is possible to have arousal without cognitive content. 394
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The two primary conceptual objections to HBD are: slippery slope
concerns that death will be declared based on the quality of conscious
experience, and declaring death in the presence of spontaneous respiration. In
regard to the first objection Lizza clarifies that there is no danger of a slippery
slope since a HBD standard would never include the severely senile or mentally
disabled because they continue to perceive and to experience the world. He
draws a bright line between dementia, the deterioration of cognitive functions and
amentia, the complete loss of cognitive functions. 395
Veatch further responds to the criticism that HBD would entail declaring
death when consciousness was diminished or when it resembled a type of
existence that was deemed worthless by a specified intellectual metric. 396 The
issue is not the quality of consciousness but whether or not it continues,
regardless of its perceived value since, as we have argued earlier, quality of life
may inform treatment decisions but it does not distinguish life from death.
Gervais concurs, arguing that any capacity for consciousness regardless of its
quality signals life, though she does suggest that one’s moral standing may be
impacted with regard to rights and responsibilities, though this is a separate issue
from the determination of whether or not one is dead or alive. 397
Gervais further responds specifically to the question of why profoundly
compromised consciousness, which may even be intermittent, is considered
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significant. 398 That is, what is the difference between a minimally conscious
patient and one where such capacity is absent? She concludes that assessing
the QOL of a patient for the purposes of directing treatment decisions is
appropriate whereas the judgment that a patient ceases to exist as a person
must not be a QOL determination. She claims that because there is no QOL
experienced by the HBD patient it cannot be a QOL judgment. Thus, when there
is no longer an experiencing subject, it can no longer be said to exist; QOL is no
longer a consideration. 399
In response to the second problem of how to handle a PVS patient who
would be regarded as dead but continues to breathe spontaneously, Gervais
endorses administering a drug to stop respiration or proceed to organ
procurement if the patient is a donor. 400 Clearly this would not be killing, since
the person is already dead according to the argument that human death is the
death of a person, and the person is dead when consciousness is irreversibly
lost. It is important to note as well that spontaneously beating hearts are excised
from breathing patients at WBD. The fact that WBD patients ventilate with
assistance is beside the point, both in terms of spontaneous versus assisted,
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which as we have noted is an empty distinction, and in view of the fact that while
the WBD patient requires assistance to ventilate he continues to respire
spontaneously.
According to HBD advocates, spontaneous respiration that supports
organismic functioning in the absence of a person is irrelevant and comparable to
respiration that continues in a WBD body. While it is true that patients have
never been declared dead while spontaneously breathing, we have
demonstrated that whether a function is spontaneous or assisted is not the issue;
the point is whether functioning, which indicates human life, continues. 401
Spontaneous breathing is not a sine qua non for life; thus it is not conceptually
inconsistent to have a ‘breathing corpse.’ However, despite its theoretical
justification, there may be some degree of cognitive dissonance involved in
declaring a spontaneously breathing body as dead, which we will explore in the
concluding section.
A large part of the intractable problem with HBD is that consciousness
cannot be reduced entirely to brain states since it has purely subjective qualities;
it is a different kind of stuff from brain stuff yet there seems to be agreement that
if the requisite brain material is absent or permanently and irreversibly damaged
the phenomenon cannot persist. We are begging the questions however: does
irreversible cessation of the functions of the higher brain assure consciousness is
permanently lost and how much higher brain destruction is necessary for loss of
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consciousness to be permanent and irreversible? The answer to both questions
is variable depending upon whom one asks.
In addressing these questions it behooves us to differentiate between
three clinical conditions that affect consciousness: coma, Minimally Conscious
State (MCS), and Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). Coma is referred to as
eyes-closed unconsciousness without sleep-wake cycles; it is typically
characterized as a transient state leading to recovery or to a terminus at PVS. 402
The MCS is characterized by intermittent, though undeniable, awareness of self
or environment, although it does not prove a functional cognitive system is
present. 403 PVS is characterized as eyes-open unconsciousness with sleep-wake
cycles as demonstrated by EEG. 404 Such patients often ventilate independently
because mid brain functions have been largely spared; this disjunction often
allows subcortical reflexes, such as response to simple stimuli caused by sound
for example, despite loss of cortical functions. 405
Neither coma nor MCS patients would be considered dead under a HBD
formulation, whereas patients in PVS would be considered dead on the basis that
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such brain injury obliterates any capacity for consciousness. The diagnosis of
PVS is, however, complicated, and may be difficult to distinguish from other
catastrophic brain conditions such as the Locked-In Syndrome in which the
patient cannot demonstrate response to stimuli due to near complete paralysis
despite an intact brain. 406 Event Related Brain Potentials (ERPs) constitute a
technique used to evaluate whether unconscious patients can perceive their
environment. It should be noted, however, that ERPs are not always
demonstrated in healthy individuals; thus the presence of a response to ERPs
will always imply the presence of a function whereas the absence of a response
does not necessarily prove a lack of function. 407
If PVS patients are accurately diagnosed, it would seem incompatible that
such a patient could experience anything at all, though “evidence from ERP
research suggests that many patients diagnosed as in coma or vegetative state
are able to perceive and process various aspects of their environment including
in some cases semantic elements of human speech.” 408 It could be claimed that
such patients were not actually in PVS, however, as the incidence of
misdiagnosis of PVS is substantial.
One retrospective study published in the British Medical Journal evaluated
forty patients admitted to a rehabilitation unit between 1992-1995 with a
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diagnosis of PVS. Of those forty patients 43% were concluded as having been
misdiagnosed in PVS. 409 Review of patient records showed that the diagnosis of
PVS had been made by a neurologist, neurosurgeon, or rehabilitation specialist;
hence the expertise of such clinicians demonstrates the difficulty in clinically
assessing “internal awareness.” 410 Perhaps the most terrifying discovery this
study made was that some patients had been thought to be in PVS for several
years but were, in fact, aware. 411
Robert Truog claims that Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans of
PVS patients show extremely low metabolic brain activity comparable only to the
rates shown in deep anesthesia. He hypothesizes that it is unlikely that such
PVS patients with this type of marked reduction can conjure any experience. 412
However, in an article published in Brain the author claims it is not a closed
debate as to whether PVS patients are wholly unaware. 413 Alan Shewmon, a
prolific critic of the WBD criterion, rails against the loss of consciousness as the
death of the person because it embraces actualism, the belief that a person is
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nothing more than his or her acts. 414 He claims there is a dearth of data to
support the notion that without a functioning cortex consciousness is impossible.
Clinical diagnosis of PVS is exclusionary, meaning that it is made on the
basis that patients do not reliably express awareness. Shewmon argues this is
unacceptable since, “Diffuse cortical destruction results in spastic quadriplegia,
pseudobulbar palsy, apraxia of motor control, global aphasia, dementia, cortical
blindness, etc…How could anyone then externally manifest inner consciousness
even if it were present?” 415 He considers the possibility that PVS may actually be
a “Super Locked-In State” where the patient may be aware but cannot exhibit it
due to cortical destruction. 416
Another clinical difficulty with HBD arises with the timing of death. Even if
we grant diagnostic accuracy and agree that consciousness has been irreversibly
lost at PVS, such a determination of death would have to wait the requisite period
of six months before such a determination could be made. Obviously such a
time lapse would be unadvisable for any statutory definition of death for practical
reasons.
Veatch asserts that the HBD criterion is in no worse a position than the
WBD criterion as the latter must discount spinal cord reflexes, EEG activity, and
explain why parts of the brain may not be dead in whole brain death. 417
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Accordingly, he states “if there is a slippery slope, anyone who leaves the
comfortable confines of the pericardium and begins ascending the spinal cord
toward the cerebral cortex is already on it.” 418 Veatch questions the significance
assigned to brain stem reflex arcs, such as pupillary constriction, when spinal
cord reflexes are discounted. Since the spinal cord is, properly speaking, part of
the CNS he determines there is no principled reason to exclude one reflex arc
but include another that is one-quarter inch higher. 419 Veatch suggests that such
a distinction relies on the notion that integrative functions endogenous in the
brain are more valuable or important than those that are exogenous, that is in the
spinal cord. However, neither can be said to play a role in the integration of the
organism as a whole or in the role of consciousness; thus it seems arbitrary to
make an ad hoc division within the CNS. 420

VI. A hybrid approach
We have carefully reviewed the conceptual and clinical arguments
regarding HBD, but there is also an emotional component that ought not be
ignored. It is not simply aesthetics not to wish to bury a breathing body nor is it
clear that the slippery slope is impervious to putting the most vulnerable or
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disenfranchised in danger. Perhaps it is the nature of man to be able to make a
distinction intellectually that a breathing body may no longer be a person though
there is a visceral objection to reconciling such a person as dead. We examined
this epistemological issue in the previous chapter on WBD. Further, if a patient is
stripped of his personhood rendering him no more than a fido-like entity, what is
the status of a patient with severely diminished consciousness, one where Fido
has much more self-awareness than the patient? According to David DeGrazia,
capacity for consciousness cannot be a sufficient condition for personhood
without classifying animals that also have consciousness as persons. 421 We
have not solved what appears to be an intractable tautological argument: human
beings are essentially persons because they are human beings.
Further, the clinical problems in determining HBD are substantial. The
publicized case of Terri Schiavo showed how experts disagreed regarding her
diagnosis and the emotional issues involved. Schiavo was diagnosed in PVS,
which was confirmed on autopsy though she simply did not ‘look’ dead, which is
what the HBD standard would require. She appeared to smile, to grimace and to
visually track a balloon. Burying such a patient could scandalize society even if it
is correct conceptually. We do not have the certainty we need to ensure that the
diagnosis of HBD is accurate and that consciousness in such a state has
irreversibly been lost.
However, the definition of death as the cessation of the person is more
philosophically sound than the biological argument, which simply does not work
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as it stands with the WBD criterion. It seems we must make a compromise. As
we have argued in this and the previous chapter, the WBD patient is not dead on
the basis of the traditional biological argument of the loss of integrated
functioning. In addition, human death is more than a biological event that
describes the loss of organismic functioning as human death has normative
import. The definition of the death of a human being should be reclassified as
the death of the person rather than the organism. This can be determined by the
irreversible cessation of the brain because the brain is that complex structure that
supports, however mysteriously, the phenomenon of consciousness, a necessary
condition for personal existence. However, it is a near impossibility to decide
precisely which parts of the brain are absolutely necessary and which areas
correspond to those functions we determine essential to the existence of human
beings.
Perhaps the best solution is to adopt the concept of the higher brain death
argument but apply the whole brain death criterion and tests until such issues
can be resolved. In this way we have conceptual clarity with clinical confidence
because WBD can be diagnosed with accuracy and any patient who passes a
WBD protocol necessarily suffers higher brain death as well. It is not a perfect
solution however; WBD is, even according to WBD supporters, an approximation
and as such there are clinical issues that should be addressed. Some functions
may potentially be excluded, such as cessation of certain brain stem reflexes for
example, whereas other functions may need greater focus such as reevaluating
the acceptability of continued EEG activity in WBD patients and perhaps
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requiring cerebral blood flow studies in all WBD protocols. These are clinical
issues that should be resolved by those who are expert in medicine. What is
important for our purposes here is to note that, regardless of how these
remaining testing difficulties are resolved, anyone who is dead by WBD criteria is
most assuredly dead according to the HBD concept. This preserves conceptual
clarity on the one hand and protects against mistakes and abuse on the other.
We should take stock of what we have examined and concluded thus far
in this dissertation. We began by exploring how death has been declared
historically beginning in the 17th century, focusing on the inability to accurately
determine death, which led to premature burial and the many macabre solutions
posed to avoid untimely interment. We then followed a chronology of medicine,
which enjoyed a shift from quackery and charlatanism to a respected field due to
the scientific revolution. As technology progressed, the ability to determine death
with sensitive equipment all but obliterated fears of misdiagnosis of death.
Ironically, however, the concomitant boom in technology yielded devices and
procedures that could now reverse conditions that were previously thought to be
irreversible making the determination of death hazy once again.
Complicating matters further were the advances made in organ
transplantation, which moved from science fiction to reality with the first kidney
graft in 1954. Public policies would be crafted to regulate organ donation;
perhaps the most important for our purposes was the Dead Donor Rule (DDR)
stipulating that vital organs could not be removed prior to death nor could
removal hasten death. Organ transplantation was largely contingent on the
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availability of organs, which remain in short supply today. The late 1960s
experienced the downside of technology when physicians realized they could
sustain vital signs but not cure irreversibly brain-damaged patients. The term
coma depassé was coined and the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee subsequently
introduced the notion of whole brain death. Despite the fact that a philosophical
justification to equate such patients as dead would not come for another decade,
WBD patients were declared dead and served as heart beating cadavers for the
purposes of organ transplantation.
In the previous chapter we examined the WBD criterion and the biological
argument, which was applied posthumously to justify it. We concluded that WBD
patients are not dead under the concept of death as the irreversible cessation of
the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole on the grounds that the
whole brain is often not dead at a declaration of brain death and because
integrated functions can continue in the absence of a functional brain.
We focused in this chapter on the concept of higher brain death,
concluding that it is more conceptually sound to regard the death of the human
being as the death of the person rather than the death of the organism, though
we endorsed WBD as the appropriate criterion to fulfill the definition until we
attain greater clinical accuracy for HBD. In this regard then, WBD patients are
dead, not for the reasons endorsed by the traditional notion of death but because
such patients have irreversibly lost the capacity for consciousness.
Having reviewed and criticized the traditional definition of death and
argued for why an ontological definition is more coherent, we will use both
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definitions as a foundation for our argument in the concluding chapter that some
Donation After Cardiac Death Donors are not yet dead at organ procurement.
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Chapter 5
On the Legitimacy of Donation After Cardiac Death

Nobody would seriously argue that the condition of a patient, two minutes post
arrest, who is unable on his own to return to normal rhythm, is ipso facto dead. 422

Each chapter of this dissertation has laid the groundwork for this final one,
in which I will evaluate the practice of Donation After Cardiac Death (DCD),
specifically whether these donors are dead at the moment of organ recovery.
We could not attempt to answer this question without first addressing the many
foundational issues concerning death prior to this point.
We began this dissertation with a discussion of how death had been
determined historically and reviewed how death was, prior to medical technology,
perceived as a discrete event where the organism quickly and predictably failed
when the heart and lungs ceased. In this time period the definition, criteria, and
tests for death were not well articulated because death was largely understood
as a binary event. Unfortunately, inadequate tools to test for the cardiorespiratory criterion occasionally led to misdiagnosis, resulting in premature
interment where it became clear that a physician’s declaration that a person was
dead did not necessarily make him dead. In response to this, elaborate and
often destructive tests were performed on the alleged corpse to ensure it would
not revive and life signaling and life saving coffins were constructed as an
additional safeguard. Putrefaction and the “death watch” became the standard
422
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benchmark for the determination of death until embalming practices largely
obviated the fear of premature burial and medicine began its ascent toward the
modern era.
The development of highly sophisticated clinical tools allowed physicians
to diagnose death accurately though advances in transplantation quickly
demonstrated that the brain, not the heart and lungs, was of primary significance
in the determination of death. The declaration of death had a direct and complex
relationship with organ transplantation since it became clear that organs must be
alive at procurement whereas the organ donor must be dead. 423 Thus, with the
exception of a few vocal minority groups, we saw society readily accept a
redefinition of death. This shift from a cardiac-centered criterion to a neurologic
criterion facilitated organ transplantation since organs would not suffer warm
ischemic damage after death but could be well maintained by artifice within a
dead human being.
The brain was exalted as that primary organ responsible for integration
within the organism as a whole. Cardio-pulmonary function could be used as an
indirect indicium of brain function, but it was neurologic function alone that
determined life from death as death could be declared in the presence of
circulation, heartbeat, and respiration. It was not the task at hand to explore
whether whole brain death was constructed to expand the donor pool but rather
to evaluate whether the definition and criteria were conceptually sound.
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We then examined the whole brain death criterion and the traditional
definition of death and found that the definition and criterion are not reflexive.
That is, a dead brain does not necessarily indicate a dead organism as
evidenced by the many integrated functions a brain-dead body performs.
Therefore we argued that the traditional definition of death as the irreversible
cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole is not
necessarily fulfilled by a neurologic standard. Since it became clear in that
discussion that the brain is the only substrate that sustains our unique human
functions and capacities it would be necessary to define death, not in terms of
cessation of biological functioning, but as the loss of that which is essential to the
human person.
As such, we offered an alternative ontological definition of death as the
irreversible cessation of consciousness as a more conceptually sound approach.
Since irreversible loss of higher brain function coincides with the irreversible loss
of human capacities (consciousness and personhood) a higher brain death
definition could supplant the traditional biological definition. The criterion used to
test this definition would be the whole brain death standard until the higher brain
death standard could be reliably implemented since all those who pass whole
brain death are necessarily higher brain dead as well. In changing the definition
of death we addressed the clinical and conceptual incoherency with whole brain
death and yet retained the societal standard.
Having come full circle I will now argue that some DCD donors fail to pass
the traditional legal definition of death or its criteria as described by the Uniform
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Determination of Death Act (UDDA). In addition, I will also argue that at least
some DCD donors are still alive using the ontological definition of death as
well. 424 Thus, regardless of whether one subscribes to the traditional notion of
death as the irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism
as a whole or to an ontological position that defines death as the irreversible loss
of consciousness, I will argue that DCD remains incompatible with regard to
either definition.
My central claim is that DCD donors have not fulfilled the irreversibility
criterion of death and that a cardiac criterion of death prognosticates death but
does not accurately diagnose it since, as we have argued in the previous two
chapters and we will reiterate here, a person cannot be dead unless his brain is
dead. In arguing that DCD donors are not irreversibly dead we will examine the
medical literature on auto-resuscitation (return of spontaneous circulation) where
it will be shown that the point at which auto-resuscitation may occur has not been
sufficiently studied to conclude that 2-5 minutes of asystole forecloses the
phenomenon. We will also review the literature on manual resuscitation where it
will be shown that cardiopulmonary (heart-lung) and cerebral (brain) resuscitation
424
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techniques continue to improve such that some DCD donors could be
successfully resuscitated after a declaration of death and time interval of 2-5
minutes, thus proving that such patients are not dead but in a dying process. 425
In addition to discussing the problem of irreversibility, we will also focus on
the logical inconsistency that a DCD donor may be heart-dead but not
necessarily brain-dead, thus raising the question that perhaps the UDDA ought
not to be used to justify the practice since its drafters could not predict this
peculiar bifurcation that DCD poses. Finally, we will raise additional questions
regarding the procedural variability within DCD protocols. The attached
appendices include a copy of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
(UPMC) DCD protocol (appendix A), the Pittsburgh Mercy Health System
(PMHS) DCD protocol (appendix B), and the Geisinger Medical Center DCD
protocol (appendix C). These represent three protocols approved for use in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in order to demonstrate the vast procedural
variability between them.
Ultimately I will conclude this dissertation by arguing that that DCD is
clinically problematic and conceptually inconsistent for three principal reasons.
First, auto-resuscitation has not been sufficiently studied to confidently declare
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that it will not occur after 65 seconds of asystole. 426 This notwithstanding,
however, even if it could be established, the ordinary understanding of
irreversible loss of function is not satisfied when auto-resuscitation does not
occur or when an individual proscribes an intervention. Second, DCD focuses on
a criterion of death that claims cessation of the organism as a whole can be
determined by the loss of cardio-respiratory function only, independently of brain
status. Finally, DCD conflates a prognosis of death with a diagnosis of death
such that imminently dying patients are treated as if they were dead, thus
violating the dead donor rule. I will conclude that in light of the analysis of death
taken up throughout this dissertation, DCD equivocates the line between a dying
patient and a corpse and as such violates the current rules that direct organ
transplantation.

I. BACKGROUND: Defining Donation After Cardiac Death
Before we develop our arguments against DCD we must first define the
practice itself and review its genesis. As discussed in chapter two, prior to the
acceptance of whole brain death (WBD), cadaveric organs for transplantation,
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primarily kidneys, were initially recovered from uncontrolled DCD donors. 427 This
meant that death occurred in a manner that was unplanned, such as when a
patient arrived at a hospital dead on arrival, or had failed resuscitation. 428 An
uncontrolled DCD donor was subsequently declared dead on the basis of
irreversible cessation of cardio-respiratory functions following which consent was
obtained from the family to proceed with donation.
Conceptually speaking this practice was not ethically problematic since it was
thought at that time that cardiac death was death, as opposed to being a
mechanism for death. 429 The clinical procedure was not ideal, however, since
organs often suffered warm ischemic injury during the time that elapsed between
declaring death, securing consent, and mobilizing a transplant team. 430 Because
of these technical problems, though in larger part because WBD was introduced,
which provided heart-beating cadavers, uncontrolled DCD was abandoned. 431 In
the early 1990s, however, there was renewed interest in DCD since the need for
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organs continued to increase while the number of organ donors reached a
plateau and death on neurologic criteria was not commonplace. 432
UPMC revisited DCD under controlled terms in 1993 in response to
competent patients’ requests to become organ donors following the withdrawal of
life sustaining treatment (LST). 433 Controlled DCD could facilitate organ recovery
from a patient who would not be declared dead using neurologic criteria but
would undergo a planned withdrawal of LST and be declared dead using the
cardio-respiratory criterion. In this way, as opposed to uncontrolled DCD, a
patient’s death could occur under carefully orchestrated circumstances, that is,
the withdrawal could occur in the operating room with a transplant team in the
adjacent room equipped to remove organs as soon as death was declared.
Our focus here is on controlled DCD, which is the more commonly practiced
DCD category in the United States. 434 A request for organ donation using
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controlled DCD is made after a decision to forgo LST when it is clear the patient
will not be declared dead using neurologic criteria. It is difficult to describe
precisely how DCD protocols proceed since there is little consistency across the
country, despite the repeated calls for protocol uniformity. 435 A common thread to
all protocols is that discussion regarding DCD occurs only after a decision to
forgo LST had been made and the physician declaring death cannot be
associated with the transplant team.
Michael DeVita, MD, current chair of the UPMC ethics committee, rejects the
assertion that reviving DCD was purely a utilitarian endeavor in order to expand
the donor pool. 436 He maintains instead that DCD was reintroduced to actualize
patient autonomy. 437 He argues that if the decision to forgo LST is made

individuals have may be limited to a physician in an emergency department. Therefore it
seems of little value to endanger an already fragile climate for short-term goals. See G.
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independently of donation there is no basis to prohibit this method for organ
recovery and in fact, “patient autonomy demands it.” 438 There are, however,
limitations to autonomy that DeVita fails to recognize. Patients have the right to
make their own choices to the extent that they do not harm others, but autonomy
is constrained when it impacts greater societal goods; goods at stake in this case
are the preservation of the dead donor rule and the prevention of homicide. 439
Thus, simply because a patient desires something does not mean it must be
provided carte blanche. 440 Patient autonomy does not justify commodifying the
body, as evidenced by the prohibition against buying and selling organs. Thus,
autonomy is better understood as an individual’s right to privacy and the ability to
make decisions in accordance with his values. It is not unconditional, but is a
principle that must be balanced against other goods, rather than used as a
means to justify all requests. Further, consent only applies so far in that one can
consent to donate organs after death but one cannot consent to a procedure that
arguably removes them prior to death. 441 In this regard it is irresponsible to base
the legitimacy of a practice on whether or not patients desire it or consent to it.
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Moreover, it does matter, contrary to DeVita’s position, how a patient will be
declared dead if that particular criterion cannot ensure the patient is truly dead.
It is important to note that interest in DCD in the 1990s was not isolated to
UPMC, however, as the international community assembled to discuss the
clinical, ethical and legal surrounding the practice. 442 The 1st International
Workshop on DCD was held in Maastricht, Netherlands, March 30th and 31st
1995, in which the four categories of DCD donors were classified, now known as
the Maastricht Categories. Maastricht Categories I and II are uncontrolled and
refer to those patients pronounced dead on arrival (I) or to patients who have
failed successful resuscitation (II). Maastricht Categories III and IV refer to
controlled DCD, which refer to patients awaiting cardiac arrest after a planned
withdrawal of LST (III) or patients who suffer cardiac arrest while awaiting WBD
protocol or after a WBD diagnosis but prior to transfer to the operating theatre
(IV). 443
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UPMC implemented their protocol two years prior to the international
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II. DCD and The Institute of Medicine
In 1997, when it became clear that DCD had arrived with few guidelines in
place, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) commissioned the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), a non-profit advisory board, which serves as the
research arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to evaluate DCD and
recommend how it may be utilized without violating prevailing ethical norms. 444
The IOM recommended seven primary guidelines for DCD protocols.
1)

Written, locally approved non-heart-beating

donor (NHBD) protocols
2)

Public openness of NHBD protocols

3)

Case by case decisions about the premortem

administration of medications
4)

Family consent for premortem cannulation

5)

Conflict of interest safeguards

6)

Determination of death (in controlled NHBD) by

cessation of cardio-pulmonary function for at least 5
minutes by electrocardiographic and arterial pressure
monitoring
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7)

Family options (e.g., attendance at life support

withdrawal and financial protection.) 445
The IOM Report assigned a Principal Investigator, John T. Potts, to
synthesize expert opinion from the transplantation community, the federal
government, and donor families pertaining to DCD. Potts also had access to a
panel of senior special experts who were considered “at arm’s length” from
transplantation to inform the Report. 446 On the first page of the Report this
general conclusion is offered:
The recovery of organs from NHBDs is an important,
medically effective, and ethically acceptable approach
to reducing the gap that exists now and will exist in
the future between the demand for and the available
supply of organs for transplantation…The problems
raised require attention, but they are, in fact, not
significantly different from those that arise in
cadaveric transplantation generally. 447
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The Report admitted that it accepted this basic premise at the outset. 448
Since the Report begins with a preordained conclusion that DCD is ethically
acceptable and that it does not differ from other means of cadaveric
procurement, the Report does not genuinely wrestle with the substantive issues.
Regarding the most contentious issue, the concept of irreversibility, which we
shall address at length, the Report adopts the weakest construal in which the
patient’s wish to forgo treatment is viewed as a sufficient criterion to meet the
standard of irreversibility coupled with the fact that the patient will not autoresuscitate. However, the Report admits that there are no scientific studies
offering any definitive conclusion as to how long the interval must be to preclude
auto-resuscitation. It further criticizes the 2 minute interval as “not supported by
any experimental data on the probability of auto-resuscitation and is too short to
support a determination of whole brain death due to circulatory arrest.” 449
The Report continues then to undermine the importance of establishing brain
death by stating, “Although this is not relevant to a determination of death, the
interval of absent circulation recommended here will, in a donor with normal body
temperature, produce irreversible brain damage.” 450
If brain death is not necessary to declare death then this implies there are two
kinds of death rather than two criteria that instantiate the same phenomenon of
448
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whole brain death. Moreover, irreversible brain damage is not the same as
whole brain death such that even if asystole resulted in devastating brain
damage, such damage would not, according to the traditional definition of death,
constitute death. It is beyond our purposes here, however, to focus on the many
shortcomings of the IOM. Suffice for our interest that it recommends a 5-minute
interval after cessation of circulatory function as confirmed by
electrocardiographic and arterial pressure monitoring. The report concludes,
Uniform adoption of this recommendation which is on
the conservative end of the current range, could
ensure death has occurred, diminish the appearance
of haste and reassure the public, and eliminate the
uncomfortable situation whereby a donor could be
defined as dead in one OPO region and still, however
briefly, be defined as alive in another. Since, in the
final analysis, this recommendation is only an expert
judgment, data should be collected to validate an
interval. 451
In 1999 the DHHS requested the IOM reconvene in order to follow up on their
recommendations outlined in the 1997 report. The 1999/2000 IOM report
indicates that few of their recommendations have been adopted. DCD protocols
continue to differ across the country; some protocols administer medications post
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mortem whereas others stipulate ante mortem administration. Blanket orders for
Heparin and/or Phentolamine are also written into some protocols without regard
for the potential of low blood volume or intracranial bleeding. Perhaps the most
serious problem, however, is that death can be determined and organs procured
anywhere after 2-10 minutes of asystole, ventricular fibrillation (VF), or
electromechanical dissociation (EMD), depending on the particular protocol. 452
Both IOM reports are well known but not necessarily well regarded by those
involved in the definition-of-death debate. On April 7th and 8th, 2005, a National
Conference on Donation After Cardiac Death was convened in Philadelphia in
which experts in neuroscience, critical care, transplantation, and bioethics were
asked to address the controversy surrounding DCD and ultimately find ways to
expand its practice. 453 Work Group I was charged with determining death by a
cardiopulmonary criterion and exploring the conceptual problems it poses. This
work group considered the IOM reports in their discussions but ultimately found
them ethically hollow and took issue with specific points. 454 A major point of
contention was the IOM recommendation that “accepted medical detection
standards include electrocardiographic changes consistent with absent heart
function by electronic monitoring and zero pulse pressure as determined by
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monitoring through an arterial catheter.” 455 The work group argued that
electrocardiographic (ECG) silence is not necessary since the criterion for
determining death via the cardio-respiratory criterion is based on the absence of
circulation not on electrical heart activity, which may or may not be sufficient to
generate a pulse. 456 This distinction may appear negligible, but in fact it
becomes a point of contention with regard to auto-resuscitation and manual
resuscitation, which we shall turn to now.

III. Auto-resuscitation and Manual Resuscitation
In this section on auto-resuscitation, cardiopulmonary, and cerebral
resuscitation, I will assert and defend my central claim that some DCD donors
are not irreversibly dead at organ procurement. I will argue that using the
traditional definition of death, irreversibility has not been established if autoresuscitation is possible or if manual resuscitation can return some amount of
brain function that precludes a declaration of whole brain death. Further, I will
also argue that using an ontological definition of death irreversibility is not met if
revival to a conscious state is possible.
Auto-resuscitation is a phenomenon in which a patient’s heart
spontaneously regains pump function and effectively generates circulation after a
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period of circulatory arrest. 457 The issue of auto-resuscitation is pertinent to DCD
since procuring organs during the time frame in which a patient could autoresuscitate would mean that neither a strong nor a weak irreversibility criterion
had been fulfilled; thus procurement would be tantamount to murder. Autoresuscitation could theoretically occur in both controlled and uncontrolled DCD
donors though it is more likely to occur in the latter. Thus we will examine the
implications auto-resuscitation has in the uncontrolled DCD donor first.
When auto-resuscitation occurs after cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
has been discontinued and after a declaration of death and has been made, it is
often referred to as the Lazarus Phenomenon. 458 Since the Lazarus
Phenomenon was identified in 1982 there have been upwards of 25 clinical case
reports in the literature though it has been suggested that clinicians may be
hesitant to disclose the phenomenon accurately due to the sensitive medico-legal
concerns it presents. 459
Named the Lazarus Phenomenon after the eponymous historical figure
Jesus is said to have raised from the dead, the mechanisms for what causes the
phenomenon are not yet fully understood. It is believed to occur either after
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1) Delayed delivery of previously administered
medications to the heart; 2) cardiac reperfusion due to
a spontaneous dislodging of embolized
cardiovascular plaque from the coronary artery; 3)
recovery of venous return after cessation of artificial
ventilation causing dynamic pulmonary hyperinflation,
especially in a patient with obstructive airway disease
(auto-positive and end-expiratory pressure); 4)
electromechanical dissociation. 460
The Lazarus Phenomenon would not likely occur in controlled DCD
because CPR, which plays a major factor in the Lazarus Phenomenon, has been
proscribed in such patients. However, it has direct relevance to category II
uncontrolled DCD donors since such patients will have, by definition, failed
resuscitation and are at risk for the constellation of circumstances that make the
phenomenon possible. While 30 minutes of pulselessness at normothermia is
typically considered incompatible with functional recovery, there is no exact time
interval for how long CPR must be continued. Therefore establishing exactly
when, in the resuscitation process, the individual should transition from being a
patient to a donor remains ill defined. 461
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For example, if paramedics respond to a cardiac arrest they will likely
initiate basic life support (BLS) measures in the field and transfer the patient to
the nearest emergency room for advanced cardiac life support (ACLS). If the
patient remains unresponsive after a number of ACLS algorithms, the physician
may declare death. Generally speaking, there is no harm in such a declaration,
but because the Lazarus Phenomenon has been documented up to 10 minutes
after the cessation of CPR, longer time intervals between the declaration of death
and organ recovery for uncontrolled DCD would be mandated to prevent the
possibility of inadvertent vivisection. 462
More relevant to our discussion here is the prospect of auto-resuscitation
in the controlled DCD donor. Despite repeated calls for data, no large-scale
studies have been designed to address this issue. 463 Only one 2004 study by
Wijdicks and Diringer has undertaken the incidence of auto-resuscitation
prospectively, though the authors admit that their small sample could not be the
final arbiter on the issue. 464
Wijdicks and Diringer report twelve patients undergoing withdrawal of
mechanical ventilation who had cardiac function monitored via ECG. The
patients had moderate to severe neurologic injuries, with a Glasgow Coma Scale
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(GCS) score between 3 and 4. 465 The patients were monitored with an ECG for
at least 10 minutes post cardiac arrest and 3 patients had arterial catheters in
place. Two recordings showed a burst of 5-20 heartbeats 6 minutes after
asystole but the arterial catheters in place in those patients did not register
circulation, indicating that the cardiac activity was not strong enough to generate
circulation. Four other patients demonstrated broad, undefined complexes after
5, 7, 9, and 10 minutes after asystole but did not show a recognizable rhythm.
The authors note that though this cardiac activity was disorganized, their
observations are in conflict with the IOM recommendations that call for “at least 5
minutes of asystole by electrocardiographic and arterial pressure monitoring.”
Despite the fact that pump function sufficient to sustain circulation did not
return in these patients, bursts of cardiac activity after 6 minutes of standstill as
well as unrecognized rhythms up to 10 minutes after the initial cardiac arrest
challenges the traditional understanding of irreversible cessation of cardiorespiratory function as required by the UDDA. Furthermore, it is unquestionably
contrary to the IOM recommendation. This study mirrors older studies cited by
UPMC, which will be discussed hereafter, in that it confirms that cardiac activity
has often not irreversibly stopped after a declaration of clinical death. However,
the study was far too small to serve as convincing evidence to prove that
circulation will not resume after a specific time interval.
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UPMC established its 2-minute protocol years prior to the 2004 study and
has been criticized for using data that are sparse and quite old, dating back from
the early to mid twentieth century. 466 These studies report a total of 109 cases in
which cardiac rhythms were charted via ECG before and after the diagnosis of
clinical death. The studies were not specifically undertaken to chronicle the
incidence of auto-resuscitation but to document the changes that occur in the
dying heart, specifically to prove which part of the heart was the last to die, or the
ultimum moriens. 467
Similar to the Wijdicks and Diringer study, the case reports do not
establish reliable data on auto-resuscitation, but they do reveal that death on
cardiac criteria, ironically, does not ensure a dead heart. One study noted, “A
very interesting observation was the fact that evidence of cardiac activity was
registered by the electrocardiograph from six to thirty-five minutes after all the
usual clinical signs of death had occurred.” 468 Another noted, “Unless otherwise
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stated, clinical death occurred sometime before the electrocardiographic tracing
became flat. 469 The same study concluded,
In human subjects, ventricular fibrillation
is not necessarily a permanent event, as
there are a number of case reports in
which spontaneous return to regular
rhythm has been noted. In the literature
we reviewed, although no recoveries
occurred, a small number of the patients
returned to orderly ventricular excitation
after the burst of ventricular
fibrillation. 470
The case studies do not explicitly state that circulation had been restored
after a declaration of death; that is, they do not report auto-resuscitation, though
they do show that at the time of clinical death, cardiac standstill had often not
occurred as predicted. Ventricular fibrillation (VF) and electromechanical
dissociation (EMD) are not the same as cardiac standstill, or asystole. VF occurs
when the heart is writhing like a bag of worms but not pumping blood whereas
EMD refers to disorganized electrical activity in a still, motionless heart. 471 Since
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circulation is contingent on effective cardiac pump function, it is possible,
according to this argument, that the cardio-respiratory criterion can be met while
the heart continues to retain some ineffective movement or electrical activity. In
other words, the cardio-respiratory criterion can be met while the heart is in a
dying process but not yet dead.
However, as we have seen, some have argued that the UDDA does not
require asystole but that the irreversible cessation of cardio-respiratory function
refers only to the cessation of circulation. 472 Thus, when circulation will not
spontaneously resume and when interventions to restart it will not be
implemented, death has occurred.
According to this interpretation, the cardio-respiratory criterion could still
be met while the heart was in VF or EMD provided such conditions did not
generate circulation. 473 This means that a declaration of clinical death and
cardiac death are not necessarily coextensive nor is asystole required to declare
cardiac death. It is not our task to resolve this issue though the term Donation
After Cardiac Death implies that organs are removed after the heart is dead. The
limited studies on auto-resuscitation do not indicate what period of time is
necessary to foreclose the phenomenon; however, the data do indicate that the
heart is, in many cases, not dead though in a dying process after 2-5 minutes of
a clinical declaration of death using the cardio-respiratory criterion.
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To briefly recapitulate, the current data on auto-resuscitation do not
establish how long an interval is required to exclude the phenomenon. Thus, it is
impossible to make a determination as to whether a 2 minute or a 5 minute notouch period is adequate at this time. However, auto-resuscitation is not the crux
of the issue because the inability to auto-resuscitate does not make an individual
dead. Rather, the inability to auto-resuscitate prognosticates death but it is not
death itself, for even if it is proven that auto-resuscitation will not occur after 65
seconds of asystole, as DeVita argues, that has only satisfied the weakest
construal of irreversibility.
Using a weak construal of irreversibility that declares death on the inability
to auto-resuscitate is problematic since many people may suffer an injury from
which they cannot auto-resuscitate, though they could be successfully
resuscitated with an intervention. Adopting such an approach to irreversibility
would mean that the many patients who suffer a cardiac arrest each year who
are successfully resuscitated were dead but subsequently resurrected. This
seems counter-intuitive at best, as such patients were not dead but clearly in a
reversible dying process.
The inability to auto-resuscitate is not equivalent with death; it merely
reflects a condition that may or may not be terminal. For example, if I am
speaking at a medical meeting and I suffer a cardiac arrest from which I cannot
auto-resuscitate, it is likely that one of the physicians will start chest
compressions and perhaps even find a defibrillator. If I am successfully returned
to normal sinus rhythm, clearly I was not dead and brought back to life but I was
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in a dying process that would have culminated in death without an intervention. If
I am on a deserted island and I suffer a cardiac arrest from which I cannot autoresuscitate the outcome is assured; I will definitely die. But the argument cannot
be made that because I cannot auto-resuscitate and do not have access to an
intervention (either because I refused it or because it is unavailable) that I am
already de facto dead.
Moreover, there is a difference between dead and dying that ought not to
be minimized. Edward Bartlett clarifies the distinction between irreversibly dead
and irreversibly dying. He argues,
Even though in the past there was
nothing to be done to save the patient’s
life after having suffered, for example, a
cardiac arrest or kidney failure, the
patient was, at the time of the failure,
dying and not dead. What could have
been reversed was not, strictly
speaking, death but rather the dying
process. Death does not occur,
however, until that process has been
fully completed. Only then do we
properly say that the patient is dead. 474
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We must now turn to the prospect of manual resuscitation to support the
claim that some DCD donors are not yet dead at organ procurement if they could
be successfully resuscitated with an intervention. Successful resuscitation must
be regarded as a moving target; that is, the ability to resuscitate an individual
varies greatly depending on the circumstances and the co-morbidities in place.
Since the majority of DCD donors will undergo withdrawal of mechanical
ventilation (MV), a typical scenario would be to initiate palliative measures and to
extubate the patient in the operating room. Depending on the patient’s
ventilatory drive, respiratory insufficiency will deteriorate to respiratory failure and
ultimately culminate in cardio-respiratory arrest. Though the lungs may quickly
fail, the heart will often continue to beat for a variable amount of time as it draws
on its metabolic reserves; the heart will not immediately arrest simply because
the lungs have ceased. 475 When the heart finally depletes its energy stores it is
unable to sustain pump action. When this occurs, blood flow stops and the brain
will lose consciousness between 10-15 seconds.
If circulation is restored (reperfusion) within a variable few minutes, brain
function may be recovered, but how much functional recovery can be regained
without neurologic sequellae is contingent on a number of different “fate” factors
including: arrest time, resuscitation time, time interval between collapse to CPR,
core temperature, age, sex, and baseline neurologic status. 476 Effective
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management of the reperfusion process is essential, as neuronal damage
predominantly occurs during this phase rather than during the cardio-pulmonary
arrest itself.
During a cardiac arrest, circulation effectively ceases. CPR often
generates a low-flow circulation, meaning there is some diminished amount of
blood circulating though often not enough to sustain full brain metabolism, which
requires, at the very least, 20% of normal cerebral blood flow. 477 CPR on its own
then is not optimal for successful resuscitation.
In addition to restoration of blood flow through numerous techniques,
temperature regulation has proven critical in cardio-pulmonary and cerebral
resuscitation. Exactly how many minutes the brain can sustain complete global
ischemia and still be resuscitable remains debatable. 478 The literature indicates a
potential range anywhere between 5, 7, and 11 minutes for acceptable
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neurologic outcome depending on the types of resuscitative mechanisms
utilized. 479
The currently accepted maximal period
of time of normothermic no-flow that is
consistently reversible to complete
recovery of neuronal function is less
than 5 minutes…The 5 minute limit is
being challenged by observation that
occasional animals or humans recover
after 10 minutes of arrest time. 480
This 5-10 minute time frame may be much longer, however, considering
some animal studies, which have shown promising results with induced
hypothermia. Recent studies have shown complete neurologic recovery in dogs
and cats after 16-60 minutes of complete cerebral ischemia. 481
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Since neurons require an uninterrupted supply of oxygen and glucose to
maintain brain metabolism, mild to moderate hypothermia can improve cerebral
outcome by facilitating a “metabolic ice box” for the brain. 482 That is,
hypothermia offers a neuro-protective effect by cooling the core body
temperature to induce a clinical state similar to suspended animation or torpor,
whereby neuronal metabolic consumption is suppressed. By lowering oxygen
consumption needs, the brain struggles less to obtain its normal requirements
and therefore less damage ensues. Induced hypothermia is also thought to be
beneficial in reducing other co-morbidities associated with ischemia and
reperfusion including cardiovascular and hemodynamic disturbances,
hyperthermia, and coagulopathy. 483 Accordingly, the recent literature indicates
“The 5 minute limit for neuronal survival from normothermic arrest has been
extended to 11 minutes with the use of a combination treatment regime.” 484
The scientific data are clear that between 2 to 5 minutes following
circulatory arrest, successful cardio-pulmonary and cerebral resuscitation is
technically possible. Given the diverse population of patients undergoing DCD
we cannot make a sweeping generalization that all DCD patients could be
successfully resuscitated. It is clear, however, that modern resuscitation
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techniques are capable of successfully resuscitating patients following much
longer downtimes than previously experienced. Thus, far longer than 2-5
minutes must elapse before successful resuscitation can be foreclosed.
We have thus reviewed the scientific data showing that the phenomenon
of auto-resuscitation has not been sufficiently investigated. There are no
convincing data showing that it cannot or will not occur after 2-5 minutes of
asystole, VF, or EMD. Also, we have presented data indicating that successful
manual resuscitation certainly remains a possibility in this 2-5 minute interim as
well. The term “successful” resuscitation must again be qualified. If a DCD donor
could be resuscitated to exhibit any brain function that would preclude a
diagnosis of whole brain death (pupillary constriction, or any other rudimentary
brain stem activity), then it cannot be claimed that the donor has met the criterion
for death as outlined in the UDDA.
According to the statute, circulation and respiration can only be discounted
in the presence of whole brain death. Therefore, if a DCD donor were
resuscitated in whom circulation and respiration could be restored, the patient
could only be declared dead on neurologic criteria. It is quite possible however,
considering the data presented, that brain function could be restored in the 2-5
minute interim following cessation of circulation. Brain physiology has
consistently demonstrated that the brain does not die instantly upon circulatory
arrest and some parts, particularly the brain stem, are quite hardy and can
withstand prolonged periods of anoxia.
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Using the statutory definition of death, it does not matter whether brain
function is restored to a marginal state or to a fully functional state; in other
words, the quality of neurologic recovery is not important. If a whole brain death
protocol is not fulfilled then death cannot be declared in the presence of
circulation and respiration, even if such functions are supported by artifice. 485
Following this argument then, many DCD donors would be able to be
resuscitated to some degree of brain function after 2-5 minutes of asystole, EMD,
or VF after a declaration of death using the cardio-respiratory criterion and
therefore are in a reversible dying process and not yet irreversibly dead.
In chapter four we argued against this traditional biological definition of
death in favor of an ontological approach that determines death when the
individual has irreversibly lost the capacity for consciousness. The argument still
holds, however, that after 2-5 minutes of asystole, EMD, or VF, the DCD donor
could be resuscitated to a conscious state and therefore proves that the
individual was not irreversibly dead. In sum, regardless of whether one
subscribes to the traditional or to an ontological definition of death, some DCD
donors are not irreversibly dead at the moment of organ recovery based on the
fact that “successful” resuscitation, as specifically defined by each approach,
remains a viable possibility. These arguments only hold, however, depending on
how one interprets the concept of irreversibility itself. We must now move from a
scientific perspective to a conceptual discussion to address the issue of
irreversibility.
485
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IV. Defining Irreversibility
We must again revisit the classic definition of death: the irreversible
cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole. Irreversibility
is a component of any definition of death since death is a state from which one
cannot return; it represents finality, a terminus. 486 The UDDA is clear that an
individual who has suffered either irreversible cessation of cardio-respiratory
functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain is dead.
Unfortunately, the UDDA never defines irreversibility. Before we examine the
relationship between the two criteria as outlined in the UDDA, we must address
the fundamental question, when is death irreversible?
This question is generally polarized between two ideological camps. The
first camp argues that death is irreversible when the individual cannot autoresuscitate and when further interventions will not be initiated. This is a weak
construal of irreversibility. The second camp argues that irreversibility is an
empirical statement regarding what is or is not technically possible to reverse.
This is a strong construal of irreversibility that is not contingent on a choice but
on the ability to affect a particular outcome.
Both positions are fraught with conceptual difficulties. A weak construal of
irreversibility does not draw a clear distinction between the actively dying and the
newly dead. It implies that individuals who cannot auto-resuscitate are instantly
dead and that a moral decision to refuse treatment necessarily ensures that the
486
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clinical state of death has occurred. In contradistinction, a strong conception of
irreversibility could mean that a condition may not be determined to be
irreversible until every known intervention is applied; essentially a retrospective
analysis of irreversibility that can only truly be proven upon putrefaction.
John Lizza, who argues for a weak construal of irreversibility, attempts to
reconcile the difficulties by identifying three factors that determine the condition:
1) The physical state of the person, 2) Physical factors external to the person, 3)
Individual and social decisions. He concludes that irreversibility is met when the
first and second conditions can reasonably predict that functions will not
resume. 487 Lizza’s presentation, though ultimately flawed, is helpful in fleshing
out these difficult issues.
Using Lizza’s analysis, the physical state of the person determines
irreversibility to the extent that if a condition causes irreparable injury to the heart
or lungs (or brain for that matter), the person is said to be irreversibly dead. If,
for example, a motorist is crushed by a semi tractor-trailer, causing massive
internal injuries, the condition is irreversible regardless of available interventions.
Physical factors external to the patient refer to the types of interventions available
at the time of injury. Accordingly, a person alone in the wilderness, who suffers a
cardiac arrest, is said to be irreversibly dead since there is no way to reverse the
process given his isolation. 488 Individual and social decisions refer to the rights
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individuals have to refuse such interventions despite the fact that they may
reverse a particular condition. 489
Lizza’s analysis is helpful in determining when a function may be
irreversible but not in determining when the person is dead, as these may be
different points on the spectrum. His first factor for determining irreversibility is
the strongest; if the physical substrate is damaged to the extent that it cannot be
reversed, the condition of irreversibility is fulfilled. His second and third
conditions are less convincing, however. Alexander Capron asserts that the
absence of an intervention in the wilderness, for example, means certain death
can confidently be predicted, more so than if the patient were in the emergency
room. However, the person in the wilderness is not instantly dead and the point
at which time the condition becomes impossible to reverse remains the same. 490
Edward Bartlett recognizes the problems in Lizza’s position by clarifying,
“As long as there are no serious doubts about the medical possibility of reviving
these patients after two minutes of asystole the condition is clearly reversible and
therefore cannot constitute death.” 491 Accordingly, we do know there are
different points upon a continuum indicating stages in which function is probably
reversible, probably not reversible, and certainly not reversible. 492 How closely
we wish to tread between these lines is at stake.
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If we take the literal definition of irreversibility, it means “incapable of being
reversed,” which Jerry Menikoff argues, is not contingent on our intent to reverse
something but rather on our ability or inability to affect the empirical world. 493 We
have discussed how cardiac arrest was irreversible prior to effective CPR
whereas now it may be a reversible condition. That we choose not to reverse a
condition does not make it functionally irreversible—a moral argument does not
determine the empirical state of irreversibility—though such inaction will lead to
an irreversible condition and culminate in death.
The counter argument to this point and to our claims made above is that it
does not matter that resuscitation is possible because the patient or family has
already refused it and as such it would be unethical to initiate a procedure on
someone who has proscribed it. While it is true that resuscitation would not be
initiated against one’s will, the fact remains that if it is possible, then the patient is
clearly not yet dead but in a dying process, regardless of the moral prohibition.
The argument that irreversibility can be understood as a moral choice is
unconvincing. This holds that if a patient would not authorize resuscitation, it is
not “ethically significant” that resuscitation is possible. 494 As to whether a moral
choice to forgo resuscitation means the individual is dead, Bartlett rightly
responds, “The issue here is not whether there are persuasive reasons to
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resuscitate them but whether or not they are dead.” 495 Thus, simply because a
patient refuses resuscitation it does not make him dead. Accordingly, Youngner
and Arnold draw the analogy that UPMC’s version of irreversibility would be akin
to saying a car has suffered irreversible loss of engine function if the engine
stops and does not restart itself within 2 minutes and one chooses not to take it
to a mechanic. 496
James Dubois argues that it does not matter that resuscitation is possible
since death is a unified phenomenon where the brain begins to shut down as
soon as cardio-respiratory function ceases and it will not resume function if
treatment has been forgone. 497 In a sense, the brain is turned off and will not
turn on because a moral decision has ensured it will remain off; thus the
condition is irreversible. This interpretation carries with it interesting implications,
however, when we consider the cardio-respiratory criterion and the neurologic
criterion each being instantiations of the same phenomenon (death), as per the
UDDA.
If the cardio-respiratory criterion can be said to be irreversible by moral
choice then brain death must be also become a moral choice, as it is inconsistent
to apply different standards of irreversibility to determine death. But the
neurologic criterion for whole brain death only applies when it is impossible that
the brain can regain any function, not when the decision is made to refuse
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treatment that can reverse a potentially reversible brain injury. That is, a WBD
protocol can only begin once it is proven that the brain is irreversibly damaged to
the extent that it cannot be fixed under any circumstances or with any available
interventions. If death is a unified phenomenon, as Dubois claims, the cardiorespiratory criterion should not operate under a weaker sense of irreversibility.
Clearly the assumption is that irreversible cessation of cardio-respiratory
functions is not death itself but is a mechanism for death, in which all death is
brain death. Following such an argument then, the patient cannot be dead until
the brain is dead.
It is further noteworthy that DCD advocates rely on the argument that if the
patient or family refuses resuscitation such refusal is sufficient to determine
irreversibly because patient autonomy demands we respect the decision. Patient
autonomy is given such weight that it overrides the clinical possibility that
resuscitation could be successful; that is, even though cardio-respiratory function
is not technically irreversibly lost, it would be inappropriate to override a DNR.
However, a DNR can be overridden with family consent in order to initiate
uncontrolled DCD if the situation arises. For example, if a patient suffers a
traumatic brain injury with a poor prognosis the family may enact a DNR before
WBD protocol is begun. In the event of a code, however, the family can suspend
the DNR order and allow resuscitation in order to facilitate an uncontrolled DCD
protocol. 498 Such a situation indicates that patient autonomy is not inviolate but
is only important insofar as the needs of the transplant community determine it.
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Another perplexing issue that arises with the notion of irreversibility is the
use of cardiac massage, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), and
cardio pulmonary bypass, which have been used to restore perfusion during
DCD procurement. 499 These procedures essentially reperfuse the organs in order
to minimize the damage from ischemia that begins as soon as circulation stops.
This ability to restart respiration (not ventilation) proves that the DCD patient has
not suffered clinical irreversible cessation of cardio-respiratory function using
either a strong or weak construal. 500 In order to avoid cardiac or brain perfusion
it is standard when using these procedures to implement a balloon catheter to
occlude the thoracic aorta. This allows blood flow within the abdominal cavity
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only, but if circulation continues, this disproves the claim that the loss of cardiorespiratory function has been irreversibly established.
The fact that the aorta must be occluded proves that the transplant team is
aware that cardio-respiratory function is not irreversibly lost and they must
ensure that brain perfusion, and therefore potential brain function, will not
resume. Joanne Lynn and Ronald Cranford rightly note that if artificial circulation
is implemented, one must rely on neurologic death since cardio-respiratory
functions have clearly not been established as irreversible. 501 ECMO and/or
cardio pulmonary bypass have been used throughout Europe, usually after a 10minute wait after cessation of cardio-respiratory functions occurs. This may be
less worrisome as the brain is probably dead after 10 minutes without perfusion,
yet WBD should be assured before such a procedure is implemented.
The irreversibility debate remains unresolved. In an attempt to reframe the
issue, James Bernat suggests replacing the term “irreversible” with the term
“permanent.” He admits that DCD patients are not irreversibly dead when organ
recovery commences since the DCD patient can be resuscitated; thus such
patients are dying but not yet dead. 502 However, he argues that using the
concept of permanence, in which a loss of function will not be returned, either
spontaneously or with an intervention, is sufficient for the purposes of DCD.
Bernat clarifies this by claiming that irreversibility is stronger than permanence

501

Lynn, Cranford, "The Persisting Perplexities in the Determination of Death"

109.
502

James L. Bernat, "Are Organ Donors After Cardiac Death Really Dead?"
Unpublished manuscript (2005): 3.

200
since all functions that are irreversibly lost are necessarily permanently lost
whereas all functions permanently lost may not yet be irreversibly lost. Since he
claims that most deaths are certified when functions are permanently lost rather
than irreversibly lost, however, the difference is inconsequential. 503
The state of permanence then relies on an earlier judgment of irreversibility
since once functions are permanently lost they will inexorably proceed to being
irreversibly lost. He argues that this reliance on permanence is similar to how
death is declared in the clinical setting; thus it reflects our ordinary
determinations for declaring death. Bernat acknowledges the counter argument,
however, which is that determinations of clinical death often occur after a
significant amount of time has passed, between the time when the loss of
functions is first discovered to the time it takes for a doctor to arrive and perform
a clinical exam to the subsequent declaration of death. Thus, in the course of
‘ordinary’ clinical declarations of death, far longer than 2 or 5 minutes of asystole
has elapsed. 504
Bernat admits that using permanence probably violates the dead donor rule
(DDR) but argues that an exception to the DDR may be justified in DCD for the
following reasons: the DCD donor will be dead within a matter of minutes if he is
not yet dead at 5 minutes of asystole; irreversible loss of cardio-respiratory
function will follow permanent loss in the natural progression of events; the
outcome of using a permanence standard over an irreversible standard is
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negligible; the patient or surrogate authorized removal of organs at such a point;
organ donation is regarded as an altruistic goal; the IOM encourages DCD; and
finally, the DDR was devised to prevent people from being killed for their organs
but removing organs prior to death in the context of DCD is not the cause of the
donor’s death, rather removal of LST is the primary cause of death. 505
Bernat argues that DCD does not cause or hasten death since death
eventuates when the brain is dead (WBD), which occurs as a result of the
cessation of cardio-respiratory function from the removal of LST. Accordingly,
the brain’s dying process is unaffected by the removal of organs; that is, it
continues to die at a fixed rate regardless of organ removal. It appears that
Bernat does not consider that removal of organs would hasten death in the
context of successful resuscitation. If the underlying disease process is ALS, for
example, and a ventilator is removed to allow respiratory failure to naturally
ensue, removing vital organs before the brain dies does hasten death if it
precludes successful resuscitation.
For example, if a patient with ALS was mistaken for a DCD donor, he could
be successfully resuscitated (as Bernat admits) after 2 or 5 minutes of asystole
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(which makes the patient dying rather than dead) once the error was discovered.
However, if organs were removed at 2 minutes of asystole and the error was
discovered then, the prospect of successful resuscitation is no longer possible if
vital organs have been removed. Thus organ procurement using DCD can cause
the death of the patient. Bernat’s argument heavily relies on the utilitarian
justification that because death is imminent a patient may be regarded as dead.
This is contrary to the current laws and normative rules that regulate organ
donation.
We should, once again, take stock of what we have established. We have
marshaled the scientific data indicating that the studies on auto-resuscitation
have not been comprehensive or authoritative and have argued that the inability
to auto-resuscitate is not a legitimate understanding of irreversibility. We have
further argued that a legitimate definition of irreversibility cannot be determined
on the basis of a decision to refuse treatment because it conflates a prognosis of
death with a diagnosis of death. If cardio-respiratory function is not irretrievably
lost, and the brain is not yet dead, the DCD donor cannot be dead but is in a
dying process.
Moreover, we have established that manual resuscitation remains a
possibility far longer than the 2-5 minute interval after a declaration of death
using the cardio-respiratory criterion, which indicates that the patient is in a dying
process but not yet dead. Further, the fact that DNR orders may be suspended if
uncontrolled DCD is possible proves that irreversibility has not clinically occurred.
We have also examined Bernat’s suggestion to move from an irreversibility
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requirement to a permanent requirement though his position requires making
exceptions to the DDR, which has consistently been rejected by the philosophical
and transplant communities. We have certainly not solved the contentious
problem of when irreversibility occurs, though we have demonstrated why the
weak construal of irreversibility used for DCD is incompatible with our customary
notion of death as a finality that cannot be reversed in theory or practice.

V. Heart-dead versus brain-dead
Having attended to the issue of irreversibility, we must now turn to the last
conceptual issue pertaining to DCD, that is whether the cardio-respiratory
criterion can be used as a legitimate criterion of death independently of the
neurologic criterion. Advocates of DCD argue that the process is licit because it
uses the cardio-respiratory criterion promulgated by the UDDA. They maintain
that the UDDA allows either criterion to be fulfilled to declare death. 506 The
UDDA does in fact state that death may be declared when either criterion is met.
Thus, DCD is in accordance with the way the statute is written; death can be
declared using the cardio-respiratory criterion without also ensuring that the WBD
criterion is fulfilled. 507 However, if we accept a literal interpretation of the UDDA
we are offered two disjunctive criteria to ascertain when death has occurred with
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no explanation of how they are related to one another. This raises several
complex problems.
Robert Veatch identifies the crux of the issue when he notes that if a
cardiac arrest can be called irreversible at 2 minutes then death does not require
that brain functions must cease. 508 Recall the discussion in chapter three on
necessary and sufficient conditions. It has been agreed that the criteria to fulfill
the definition of death should be both necessary and sufficient, yet only the WBD
criterion fulfills this. 509 Death can be declared in the presence of continued
respiration and circulation provided the whole brain is dead whereas death may
not be declared in the presence of continued brain function when circulation and
respiration have irreversibly stopped. This reflects the notion that all death is
brain death. If the heart and lungs are not prerequisites for life, and are not
necessary to declare death, as the President’s Commission claimed, a criterion
that is not necessary for life or death cannot logically be used independently of
the brain to declare death. Yet this is precisely what DCD requires.
As stated in the New England Journal of Medicine, “It is clear that a
person is not dead unless his brain is dead. The time honored criteria of the
stoppage of the heartbeat and circulation are indicative of death only when they
persist long enough for the brain to die.” 510 But dying takes time; as James

508

Robert M. Veatch, "Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Organ Procurement,"
Transplantation Proceedings 29(1997): 3339.
509

It is arguable of course, whether WBD is both necessary and sufficient for
death using the traditional organismic account of death as we addressed in chapter
three, but for our purposes in examining the UDDA we will assume that it is.

205
Bernat notes, “It takes considerably longer than a few minutes for brain and other
organ systems to be destroyed from cessation of circulation and lack of
oxygen.” 511 Stated in 1993, the following still applies, “There are no empirical
data proving that a patient who meets the Pittsburgh Protocol’s criteria for cardio
pulmonary death also meets neurological criteria for death.”
The UDDA has been criticized as an inconsistent statute, yet Menikoff
suggests the legitimacy of DCD cannot be applied retrospectively to the UDDA
since “It is clear from this language that Capron and Kass were not
contemplating declaring dead the NHBD on the operating table with warm skin,
partially functioning brain, and perhaps even reactive pupils.” 512 This implies that
the UDDA drafters did not foresee such a situation in which a criterion may have
been fulfilled but not the definition of death itself. This is probably because brain
failure will result from prolonged absence of cardio-respiratory functions; thus it is
a contingent criterion. All things being equal, when a patient irreversibly loses
cardio-respiratory function he will become WBD, such that irreversible absence
of either criterion instantiates the definition of death. The problem is that DCD
prevents all things from becoming equal. 513
Using the cardio-respiratory criterion it is possible (and in some cases
likely) that the whole brain is not yet dead, which is morally and legally
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unacceptable. The motivation behind the dual criteria set forth in the UDDA was
somewhat pragmatic in that because cardiac death had been used historically to
determine death, it was easier to integrate WBD as another criterion rather than
replace the traditional one. This was not only because the President’s
Commission did not wish to endorse a new concept of death, which we have
seen and discussed at length in the previous chapter as its primary error, but
also because most deaths can be determined using cardio-respiratory criteria.
Using cardio-respiratory criteria to declare death has not been problematic
outside of DCD because WBD naturally occurs as a result of cardio-respiratory
failure. 514 The brain does not die instantaneously, however; thus DCD
intervenes during the process and removes organs often before the brain has
had time to die completely. If the brain is not dead, or the critical parts thereof
depending on whether one espouses a traditional or ontological view, the patient
cannot be dead. The President’s Commission has been clear that all death is
brain death.
DeVita argues that the two criteria endorsed by the UDDA are
complementary in that both need not be fulfilled to declare death. He argues,
“Most brains cease to function before the heart stops, usually when the blood
pressure gets very low, about 50 or so (normal is usually about 120 or so.)” 515
DeVita continues, “In addition, when circulation stops, brain function always
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stops within 12 seconds except in a very few specific situations which are
impossible during non-heartbeating organ donation.” 516
It is difficult to accept the conclusion that the whole brain is dead simply
because brain function stops at 12 seconds. Lynn argues that no one would
suggest that two minutes of anoxia indicates that the brain has irreversibly
ceased to function. 517 The brain may have stopped functioning (unless EMCO or
bypass is initiated without aortic occlusion) yet a non-functional brain is not a
dead brain. As Lynn further notes, not only is there inadequate evidence pointing
to global loss of brain function on the basis of cessation of circulation, but the
available evidence shows that it must be longer than a 2 minute duration. 518 This
is especially relevant when one considers the neurologically intact DCD patient
rather than a patient who retains some ventilatory drive but has extensive brain
destruction.
Given the clinical data reviewed, it is arbitrary to select a number of
minutes to precisely determine when death has occurred in all cases. 519 There is
no clear consensus regarding how much time must elapse after cardiorespiratory functions have failed to declare death and begin organ
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procurement. 520 Whether 2, 5, or 10 minutes have elapsed after cessation of
circulation and respiration, irreversibility has likely not been established since
resuscitation to a conscious state is theoretically possible. This does not become
“ethically insignificant” simply because of a moral choice; a decision to forgo
treatment does not ensure death at that moment; it simply ensures that death will
inevitably occur.
In their position paper regarding DCD, The Society of Critical Care
Medicine (SCCM) argues that the manner in which death is declared should not
differ depending on whether one is an organ donor. 521 This would seem
appropriate in order to guarantee that individuals are not being treated differently
because of their donor status. The SCCM argues that if it is customary to declare
most deaths on clinical exam, after observing two to three EKG screens without
evaluating brain function, it is inconsistent to apply a longer observation time for
DCD. 522 DeVita suggests that in a DNR patient it is sufficient to wait
approximately 30 seconds after pulselessness documented by a central arterial
catheter to declare death. 523
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But DCD donors are different and they are treated differently than other
dying patients. For example, a DCD donor’s death is manipulated to occur in a
specific setting, cannulae are inserted, medications that do not benefit the patient
and may hasten death are given, and bypass or EMCO with occlusion may be
initiated as soon as death is declared. Thus it is disingenuous to suggest donor
status is irrelevant when a similar patient dying on the ward would be managed
quite differently. Further, a patient who dies on the ward is not at risk for bodily
harm if the diagnosis of death is made a few minutes or seconds prematurely.
Such a patient’s entire brain will assuredly die from prolonged lack of circulation;
but in controlled DCD enough time must elapse not only to ensure autoresuscitation will not occur but also that the brain is dead, lest we risk procuring
organs from the dying rather than the dead. 524
The SCCM recommendations also argue that there is no physiological
difference between declaring death at 2 or 10 minutes following circulatory arrest
since resuscitation during such time could be successful, as we have discussed
above. 525 They conclude that once return of spontaneous circulation has been
ruled out, “no less than 2 minutes is acceptable, no more than 5 minutes is
necessary.” 526
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Further, the SCCM claims that if irreversibility is regarded as a state that is
impossible to reverse even with an intervention, a much longer observation time
will be needed since a heart can resume function after being excised from the
body. 527 The Committee commits its most formidable error here, for the
traditional definition of death is not based on the cessation of the heart or any
one of the sum of the body’s parts, but on the irreversible cessation of the
integrated functioning of the organism as a whole; this is precisely why the heart
can continue to beat in a WBD body, because it is in itself irrelevant. Thus, as
Capron notes, by only relying on the cardio-respiratory criterion in DCD and not
the brain, how can their position not be proven false when a heart from a DCD
patient is successfully transplanted? 528 It cannot be both ways; either cardiorespiratory function is important in itself or it is important only as it pertains to
brain status. The heart cannot be used as the sole criterion for death only to be
transplanted into another body, thus negating any criterion of irreversibility and its
relationship to the organism as a whole.
Ultimately, it does not matter if loss of cardio-respiratory function is
irreversible; what matters in the definition of death is whether loss of brain
function is irreversible, though how much and what parts are involved will depend
on which definition one accepts. Until the brain is irreversibly dead the patient
cannot be said to be dead. At the 2 or 5 minutes of asystole that DCD requires, it
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is clear the brain is not yet dead according to the traditional WBD argument or
the higher brain death (HBD) argument presented in the previous chapter. 529
Relying on the UDDA to solve the problem is fruitless because it offers two
disjunctive criteria to determine death and it was not written with the current
procedures in mind. The cardio-respiratory criterion is manipulated to legitimize
a practice that was not foreseen by its drafters and is used independently of the
neurologic criterion, which violates the underlying argument that death is a
unified phenomenon.

VI. Additional Procedural Concerns
We have exposed the many conceptual problems pertaining to DCD but
there are, however, additional procedural issues that must be addressed. The
literature is clear that DCD protocols not only differ nationally and internationally
but also by institution within the same state, depending on which OPO and
surgeons direct the transplant. 530 The lack of consensus on major procedural
issues, such as how long one must wait to declare death, undermines the
practice’s credibility and the confidence necessary to sustain it. For example, a
DCD donor could be considered alive under the Geisinger Medical Center
protocol but dead and undergoing organ procurement at UPMC. If the Geisinger
protocol declares death only in a severely brain injured patient undergoing DCD
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after 5 minutes of asystole, whereas a neurologically intact DCD donor at UPMC
can be declared dead after two minutes of asystole, and at PMHS after 4
minutes, DCD is little more than “death by protocol.” 531
The Geisinger Medical Center DCD policy only accepts comatose, ventilator
dependent patients with severe irreversible brain injury as candidates for DCD.
This is evident from the title of their protocol “Rapid Organ Recovery in
Terminally Ill Brain Injured Patients.” 532 Conscious, ventilator dependent patients
are forbidden to undergo DCD and uncontrolled DCD is not permitted. 533 The
policy states, “Whenever possible, attempts will be made to fulfill brain death
criteria.” 534 Gregory Burke suggests the rationale for prohibiting conscious
patients was based on the fact that the policy was designed for a limited
population with serious brain injury that would approach, though not fulfill whole
brain death criteria. 535
Under the Geisinger protocol, withdrawal is ideally performed in the OR,
where staff may prepare the body for organ donation prior to withdrawal of life
support. 536 After consent is obtained a femoral arterial line is placed to detect
blood and pulse pressure for the declaration of death. Only when death is
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regarded as imminent may five thousand units of Heparin be administered to the
dying patient. Heparin is administered at such time because “At this point the
issue is less the life of the patient, than the viability of the donor.” 537 This is a
blanket order despite the fact that Heparin is an anticoagulant, which can hasten
death in patients with cerebral hemorrhage, and is recommended only on a caseby-case basis according to the IOM recommendations. 538 Geisinger justifies its
usage by arguing that such a small dose is unlikely to cause harm and larger
doses have not indicated better outcome for organs. 539 It should be noted that
five thousand units of Heparin is considered a therapeutic dosage and is less
problematic than at other hospitals, UPMC and PMHS included, that give
upwards of sixty thousand units.
The Geisinger protocol certifies death using the cardio-respiratory standard
when there is zero pulse pressure via the femoral arterial catheter and any one of
the following:
5 minutes ventricular fibrillation or
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5 minutes of electrical asystole, (no
complexes, agonal baseline drift only),
or
5 minutes of electromechanical
dissociation. 540
The DCD protocol does not continue if the dying process is protracted,
generally considered longer than two hours, due to warm ischemic injury, which
renders the organs unsuitable for transplant. Under such circumstances, the
patient is transferred to the Intensive care Unit (ICU) or a private room where the
dying process can conclude. 541
The UPMC DCD protocol is radically different than the Geisinger protocol. It
does not restrict candidacy to severely brain injured patients; any patient who is
not contraindicated for donation in general (HIV positive, certain cancers,
Hepatitis infection) may undergo DCD provided death is predicted to occur
ideally within 1 hour. 542 This means that conscious patients on Left Ventricular
Assist Devices (LVADs) or other neurologically intact patients such as those with
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) for example, can be candidates for DCD.
UPMC allows ante mortem interventions that may cause pain that would
require adequate analgesia and/or sedation provided the patient or family
consents, such as insertion of a femoral arterial catheter. The Geisinger policy
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requires a femoral line as well, though candidates are unlikely to perceive pain
given their neurologic status. Also, similar to the Geisinger policy, UPMC notes
“Organ procurement may proceed only if the patient or surrogate agrees to organ
procurement upon death of the patient and signs the appropriate consent
form.” 543 Though it is not explicitly stated, CORE will proceed with DCD despite
family refusal if a donor card is located. 544 Heparin is also given as a blanket
dose per “CORE routine,” though unlike Geisinger, which gives five thousand
units, UPMC administers a total of sixty-thousand units of heparin with fifty
thousand units given prior to extubation and ten thousand units mixed into the
first bag of perfusion flush. 545 In addition, the UPMC protocol calls for 100 mgs
of thorazine, though their rationale for doing so is not provided. 546
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It is curious that a neuroleptic drug used to treat psychosis and/or disordered
thinking, which is not used during traditional withdrawals, is given as a blanket standing
order in the UPMC DCD protocol. Michael DeVita suggested Thorazine might be used
because it may have secondary vasodilator effects, which could theoretically improve
graft function post transplant. When asked why UPMC did not simply use Phentolamine,
a drug used specifically for vasodilation, DeVita maintained it is controversial because
Phentolamine clearly decreases blood pressure and can certainly hasten death. DeVita
noted, however, that those protocols that use Phentolamine (the University of Wisconsin
for example) do so in very low doses, making it unlikely to hasten death, though equally
unlikely to have any effect on organ function. Personal communication, Michael DeVita,
MD, January 2006.
It would appear then that UPMC favors Thorazine, not for its antipsychotic
effects, but for any vasodilation properties it may have in lieu of Phentolamine.
DeVita could not explain why ten times the therapeutic dose of Heparin is
administered, but argues that Heparin, given within 20 minutes of death, will not cause
or hasten death. This rationale is similar to the Geisinger policy that requires Heparin be
given (at five thousand units) only when death is imminent. DeVita clarified that CORE
does “suggest” dosages and the times drugs are to be administered, but he provides
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Skin preparation and draping can also be undertaken ante mortem but not
before the patient has become unconscious and unresponsive. 547 If death does
not occur within two hours, DCD may be cancelled and the patient returned to
the ICU. UPMC recognizes the need for greater specificity and sensitivity in
diagnosing death when DCD is utilized. Thus, absence of a palpable pulse in a
large artery is insufficient to declare death. The policy requires continuous EKG
and pulse oximetry wherein
1) Absence of circulation must be documented by
either absent pulse pressure via a femoral arterial
catheter or echocardiogram showing absent cardiac
contraction (the pulse pressure must be zero, or by
definition the heart is beating); 2) the patient must be
apneic and 3) the patient must be unresponsive to
verbal and tactile stimuli. These three criteria must be
simultaneously satisfied, and the patient must be

Heparin when blood pressure falls below 80. It should be noted, however, that the
protocol is not written in such a way, which raises the question of how variable DCD is
depending on which attending physician oversees the process.
The protocol states “Medications which do not harm the patient and which are
necessary for DCD/NHBOD to occur are acceptable. For example, Heparin, in the time
frame being considered, is not harmful to the potential donor, makes organ donation
possible, and may be given.” However, the protocol fails to note that anticoagulants are
contraindicated in certain classes of brain-injured patients because they may hasten
death by exacerbating brain hemorrhage. DeVita’s argument that high doses of Heparin
are not proximally the cause of death in the imminently dying patient is corroborated in
the literature (see Bernat et al, "Report of a National Conference on Donation After
Cardiac Death," American Journal of Transplantation 6(2006): 283), but the UPMC
protocol, as it is written, does not leave room for the attending physician to make a
prudential judgment as to when it shall be administered.
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observed to satisfy those criteria continuously for a
minimum of two minutes. 548
The PMHS protocol is fashioned similarly to the UPMC protocol, though it
requires a longer wait time before death is pronounced. The PMHS protocol
requires a DCD candidate must be terminally ill or that death be considered
imminent. It is similar to UPMC in that neurologically intact patients are
appropriate candidates for DCD. The PMHS protocol requires ante mortem
cannnulation since absent circulation is determined via a femoral arterial line but
the protocol is silent on whether ante mortem medication is administered. 549
The following criteria must be met for death to be declared using cardiorespiratory criteria secondary to DCD at PMHS:
1) Prompt and accurate diagnosis of cardiac arrest must be
made
2) Cardiac arrest must be present for at least 4 minutes to
establish firmly death and the loss of integrative unity of
the donor
3) Cardiac arrest is strictly defined as all of the following
four elements:
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a. Electrocardiographic criteria (either I or II)
I. 4 minutes of electromechanical dissociation (EMD)
II. 4 minutes of electrical asystole
b. Absence of pulse by arterial catheter with a pulse pressure
of zero (0) mmHg or a lack of pulse by Doppler by two
independent observers
c. Apnea
d. No response to noxious or physical stimuli
4) It is only after the passage of 4 minutes without any
return of the above four (4) elements that a patient may
be declared dead for the purpose of organ procurement.
We have presented three DCD policies in the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania that describe how death is determined using the cardio-respiratory
criterion and the variable no-touch waiting period necessary to rule out the
possibility of auto-resuscitation, after which organ procurement commences. We
have reviewed how policies differ according to institution, the regional OPO and
transplant service, as well as according to the attending physician overseeing the
process. The use of Heparin continues to be debated as well with no real
consensus on when it should be given or at what dosage. Ante mortem drugs
have been justified under the Principle of Double Effect (PDE), though it is
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arguable whether the PDE should be invoked when it is clear that the patient will
not benefit but may be subject to harm for the sole purpose of a third party. 550
Using David F. Kelly’s description, however, the PDE can be applied to
any moral dilemma in which both good and bad effects will result, some which
are good and rightly intended and some that are bad but not intended. 551 Four
conditions must be passed if an action is said to be morally legitimate. The first
condition states that the act in itself must not be intrinsically evil. The second
condition states that the evil effect is not the cause of the good effect (in other
words the end may not justify the means). The third condition states that the evil
effect is not intended but only tolerated. The fourth condition states that a
proportionate reason must exist for performing the action in which ontic evil may
result. 552
Using this construct we will evaluate whether ante mortem drugs that may
hasten death can be justified provided the intent is not to cause or accelerate
death but to ensure organ viability post transplant. 553
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It is clear that administering Phentolamine passes the first condition since
there is nothing morally evil about giving such a medication. The second
condition requires the bad effect (loss of blood pressure thereby hastening death)
not cause the good effect (post transplant organ viability). It would seem this
second condition is fulfilled since a lethal decrease in blood pressure is not the
proximate cause of organ viability status post transplant. The third condition is
fulfilled if a lethal drop in blood pressure is not intended in order to remove
organs, but accepted as an unintended side effect. The fourth condition
stipulates a proportionate reason must exist to perform the act.
This last condition is perhaps harder to justify than the first three since
providing medications that are not for the patient’s benefit and may hasten death,
even if not for the primary purpose of removing organs, may cause
disproportionate harm to the doctor-patient relationship, transplantation
programs, and sully the professional image of physicians as willing to scavenge
the living if utility is served. 554 Furthermore, there is little evidence-based
medicine to show that Phentolamine necessarily improves organ outcome; thus
the likely harms may far outweigh the possible benefits. 555
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VII. Conclusion
In our attempt to determine what constitutes death and when it occurs, we
began with an historical examination of how death was determined from the 18th
century to the modern era. Chapter one focused on the misdiagnosis of death,
instances of premature burial, macabre devices that were created in order to
indicate or prevent live interment, and medicine’s reputation for quackery and
incompetence.
Chapter two chronicled the scientific advancements that restored medicine
to a respected endeavor. In the modern era, technologically sophisticated tools
including the stethoscope, thermometer, ophthalmoscope, and fluoroscopy were
developed which could more accurately determine when death occurred. Such
measures obviated the barbaric tests of the past, including applying a hot iron to
the soles of the feet, incising the chest to manually feel the heart, or piercing the
medulla to ensure death.
Ironically, however, as science progressed, specifically with the advent of
organ transplantation and resuscitation, the tests for death became ambiguous
once again. It became clear that heart and lung function was not the deciding
factor in determining death, as such functions could be substituted by medical
intervention. Further, effective CPR could reanimate those who had suffered
conditions previously thought to be irreversible, thus prompting the issue of when
is ‘dead’ ever really dead? As technology improved, and mechanical ventilation
became widely available, individual organs and hemodynamic systems could be

222
maintained indefinitely despite an illness or injury that could not be cured or
reversed. While such patients were languishing in a state of life-in-death on
machines, a new definition of death was endorsed.
Chapter three explored the conceptual basis of whole brain death (WBD),
introduced in 1968. This chapter focused on how WBD was promulgated without
any justification for why a dead brain ought to be equated with a dead human
being, examined the many neurologic functions that may persist despite a
declaration of WBD, and argued that the brain is not the sole integrator of the
organism as a whole. Chapter three concluded that whole brain death may
actually be a misnomer, and that WBD patients are not dead according to the
traditional integrated functioning argument. This prompted us to question
precisely what parts or functions were considered important in equating a dead
brain with a dead human being and the possibility that some parts or functions
were more important than others.
Chapter four argued for an ontological rather than an organismic account
of death in which the death of a human being is not determined solely by the loss
of its organic properties but on the loss of that which is essential to the nature of
the human person, which I determined to be consciousness or personhood.
Admittedly consciousness is difficult to quantify, but the aim of the chapter was to
endorse a more conceptually sound framework for death since WBD is internally
inconsistent and clinically dubious. Higher brain death (HBD) was suggested as
a more coherent approach, although we noted the diagnostic weaknesses of
tests to quantify higher-brain functions, which preclude moving to such a position
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at this time. A compromise was reached in which a HBD definition could be used
with WBD as the criterion to fulfill it since all those who meet WBD are
necessarily HBD. Accordingly, I concluded that WBD patients are dead but not
for the traditional reasons espoused.
This final chapter evaluated Donation After Cardiac Death in order to
determine whether it is a legitimate practice or if organs may be removed from
the dying rather than the newly dead.
As reiterated at the National Conference on Donation After Cardiac Death, the
fundamental axiom of organ donation is the preservation of the DDR. 556 We
have presented clinical and philosophical evidence that DCD protocols violate
the DDR by conflating a prognosis of death with a diagnosis of death, by relying
on an unreasonable account of irreversibility, and by solely relying on the cardiorespiratory criterion, which is neither necessary nor sufficient for death.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that whether one subscribes to a WBD or
a HBD concept is irrelevant to the legitimacy of DCD since it is clear that
reanimation often remains possible at the moment of organ procurement. The
fact remains that we do not know the exact moment when a human being
transitions from life to death, but we accept that there is a distinction between the
state of death and the process of dying, the former being an irreversible state
while the latter may or may not be irreversible.
Advocates for DCD interpret the UDDA to support the claim that DCD is
licit practice. Upon examination, we have shown that this literal understanding of
556

James L. Bernat et al. "Report of a National Conference on Donation After
Cardiac Death" 281.
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the UDDA also supports the counter intuitive claim that a human being can be
dead regardless of neurologic status. A technical reading of the statutory
definition of death ought not legitimize a practice that is both medically and
philosophically contrary to our traditional understanding of what it means to be
irreversibly dead. Finally, we reviewed the procedural differences in DCD
protocols within one geographic region and discussed the problems associated
with such variability, including the ethical implications of administering
medications that may hasten death.
In this dissertation I challenged the traditional definition of death, the
irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a whole, as
biologically reductionistic and further claimed that the whole brain death criterion
does not satisfy it. I suggested we move from an organic to an ontological
understanding of death. In so doing I endorsed an ontological definition of death
as the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness with the understanding
that biological integration may continue in the absence of a human life. I
exposed the clinical problems in testing for the irreversible loss of consciousness
and argued that a WBD criterion should be maintained until such clinical
confidence can be established.
This work has now come full circle with the examination of DCD in which I
have formulated and defended the position that such patients may not be dead
according to a traditional or to an ontological understanding of human death.
Organ transplantation is a vital field that can often save or dramatically improve
the quality of human life. It can only continue if the public supports it and if the
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public is confident that the normative rules and guidelines that have been
implemented are upheld. At this juncture, DCD is likely an unknown procedure to
the general population and it may continue without public debate. There is also
the possibility, however, that these conceptual issues will eventually be
addressed in a public forum. If society concludes, as I have argued, that some
Donation After Cardiac Death patients are not yet dead at the moment of organ
recovery, the field of transplantation may suffer reprisals that could cripple or
endanger its viability. In order to safeguard against this possibility, DCD ought to
be suspended until these issues are publicly resolved.
The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the bio-philosophical
literature on the definitions and criteria of death in order to evaluate whether DCD
is a legitimate method for organ procurement. We conclude this work having
argued that the traditional biological definition of death is fraught with scientific
and conceptual difficulty; an ontological definition is more theoretically sound;
and some donors who undergo Donation after Cardiac Death may not be dead
according to either account.
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